




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The Princeton theological
review



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THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

No. 2—April, 1905.

I.

THE INCARNATION AND OTHER WORLDS.

IT has been objected to the Biblical doctrine of the Incarnation, that it is suggestive of conceit on the part of us men. Large as the earth seems to us, it is small when compared with even our own sun. But there are stars, themselves suns, in comparison with which our sun itself is small; so that astronomy shows how insignificant this little earth of ours is amid the multitudinous items that make up the universe. Whether or no the starry worlds or the planets of our own system are now or ever have been or ever will be inhabited, has long been an open question. The latest word on the subject has been uttered by Mr. Alfred Russell Wallace, who, in his recent discussion of *Man's Place in the Universe*, has urged with great zeal the thesis that our earth is the only one of the millions of globes throughout the universe that has or can become the seat of intelligent life. Both his reasonings and his conclusions have been combated by competent critics, so that the question remains an open one as far as the scientists are concerned.

But granting for the moment Mr. Wallace's contention, our humanity would then be but as a speck of intelligence in the universe; and the objector to the Incarnation asks, "Why should the Son of God ally Himself—and so irrevocably—with such an insignificant part of his wide creation?" The very question, in the judgment of the objector, shows how absurd is the conceit. Possibly it is enough to say, in reply to the objection as thus stated, that, with astronomy in mind, the Bible itself comes to the exactly opposite conclusion. The objection is predicated upon the insig-

nificance, if not inferiority, of our race. Not so the Bible. It would seem, from the eighth Psalm, that David was for a time perplexed by the same problem. While watching his flocks by night he thought of the heavenly worlds—the sun and the moon and the stars—and the question, What is man? at first perplexed him. Why should he be the object of the divine concern? Why should God be “mindful” of him, why “visit” him? But the answer came. “Thou hast made him a little lower than the angels. Thou hast crowned him with glory and honour.” Man’s origin, his dignity, his glorious possibilities, are enough to justify the divine concern—indeed, to justify any effort on his behalf, however extraordinary, on the part of his Creator. It is interesting on this point to note that Mr. Wallace, who, of course, has nothing to say of the Incarnation but is simply dealing with the question of the exclusive manifestation of intelligence on our planet, has his answer to any who demur to his view. Alluding to the fact that our planet “has developed humanity,” he boldly maintains that “the supreme end and purpose of this vast universe was the production and development of the living soul in the perishable body of man,” and that “the development of man as a spiritual being, with all his intellectual powers and moral possibilities, is certainly a great end in itself—so great and so noble that if a universe of matter were required for the work, why should it not be used?” Instead, therefore, of objecting to the assumption of our nature by the Son of God, on the ground that humanity is too insignificant to warrant such a divine alliance with it, the Bible urges the almost infinite value of a soul as a good reason for the Incarnation. This is a legitimate and adequate reply to the caviler who would degrade man in the scale of creation, and would brand as an absurd conceit the formal alliance of the Son of God with our human nature.

But objection to the orthodox view of the Incarnation takes another form, based upon the common belief that there are groups of intelligences other than the human family. The Bible in no uncertain language takes for granted that God’s universe is numerously peopled by different orders of beings, all endowed with intelligence. On the basis of this Scriptural view of intelligences so numerous and widespread throughout the universe the objector anew takes issue with our belief in the Incarnation, affirming that it suggests partiality in the divine Being, that out of all orders of intelligence, some highly exalted, God should select one race alone and ally Himself exclusively therewith as “the Son of Man” for ever. But the objection in this case is a begging of the question, and

rests on an inadequate view of God's relations to other intelligences. We make our answer to it not, however, as revealed in the Bible in so many words—some may think not at all—but with the conviction that it explains many Scripture passages and is in perfect harmony with what may be called the Bible scheme of creation. "It is necessary to be cautious and reverent in any such inquiry," as Ellicott wisely suggests in the introduction to his *Commentary on the Epistle to the Colossians*, "for it may be too deep or too near forbidden ground." Nevertheless, there are quite a number of suggestive passages in the New Testament the meaning of which evidently lies deeper than the surface. They may be difficult to understand, and yet are exciting beyond measure in the glimpses they furnish of other worlds than ours; for they seem to teach that God has not been partial in so inseparably associating Himself with our humanity. One of them is the passage in Colossians i. 15-20—we prefer it in the Revised Version: "Who is the image of the invisible God, the first-born of all creation: for in Him were all things created, in the heavens and upon the earth . . . whether thrones or dominions or principalities or powers; all things have been created through Him, and unto Him; and He is before all things, and in Him all things consist. And He is the Head of the body, the Church: who is the beginning, the first-born from the dead; that in all things (the margin has, among all) He might have the pre-eminence. For it was the good pleasure of the Father that in Him should all the fulness dwell; And through Him to reconcile all things unto Himself, having made peace through the blood of His cross; through Him, I say, whether things upon the earth, or things in the heavens."

The apostle's view, gathered from these words, is (1) that He whom we know as "the Son of Man" has, as Creator of all things, had as much to do with other parts of the universe as with our own; (2) that "the image of the invisible God" is and has been "the first-born of all creation"; (3) that He is the Pacificator and Unifier of the universe, so that in Him not only "all things in the heavens" find a common fellowship, but, "having made peace through the blood of His cross," "the things upon the earth" also are brought into a completed brotherhood of intelligence.

The underlying idea of the passage would seem to be that God has not been partial in his treatment of our race. While "the Son of God" became "the Son of Man" also, that simply means that "the Son of God," in addition to what constitutes his proper Deity, acquired the essential features of humanity; so that He now knows

our human nature not only as its Creator, but by a personal acquaintance with it. And yet, emphasize this amazing and precious view of the Bible as we may, it does not exclude from the Deity the possibility of allying Himself similarly, if He pleases, with the essential features of other forms of intelligence. Some may fancy that such a supposition is flatly contradicted by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews in ii. 16, when he says, "for verily He took not on Him the nature of angels, but He took on Him the seed of Abraham"; but the point of this passage is, that in coming to our rescue the Son of God, as a matter of necessity, identified Himself with those whom He came to save. In coming to earth, therefore, He did not come as the Son of God simply, nor in any angel-form, but came in "flesh and blood," and in this way became forever "Immanuel," God with us, one of us. The passage has therefore nothing to do with the relation in which the Son of God stands to other intelligences. They know Him as we know Him to be, "the Word of God" who is "the Son of God"; but they know Him distinctively as their Angel-Jehovah, we as our God-Man, because He became "the Son of Man."*

A careful examination of some of the particular expressions of the Colossians passage will show how suggestive they are as to the intimate relationship of the Son of God to other worlds. Take, for example, the significant phrase in the fifteenth verse, where God's Son is said to be "the image of the invisible God." The gospels had already taught that "no man"—literally, "no one"—"hath seen God at any time." The apostle's phrase, taking it in connection with the next clause, seems to extend the fact to all intelligences as a necessary first truth; for they, too, all of them, are finite. All

* This view best explains the Jehovistic manifestations recorded in the Old Testament, which are commonly regarded as (in some way) anticipatory and temporary assumptions by God's Son of our nature before the Incarnation—a view that is attended by no end of difficulties; as, *e.g.*, if the Son of God used a human body for these many theophanies, was it a new body each time, and if so, what became of the body laid aside? There are fewer difficulties suggested if we regard the theophanies as visits to earth of the Son of God in the form of some one of the many orders of previous creations with which He had become allied through the ages. There would be some reason, then, in his being styled, as He is so often, "the angel of the Lord," or simply "an angel." And there need be no difficulty as to His being able in such a form to manifest Himself to men, for no one knows the contents or the possibilities of being, either as respects men or angels or, as for that, the divine Being Himself. At any rate, previous to becoming "the Son of Man," the Son of God manifested Himself to men as "the Angel-Jehovah." Only when "the Word was made flesh" could the Son of God claim to be also "the Son of Man," and ever after entitled to be known as "the God-Man."

that mind throughout the universe has ever known of God has been through Him who is "the image of the invisible God." The phrase is akin to the expression of John's, who refers to the second Person of the Trinity as "the Word," who was with God from the beginning and was God, but is distinctively "the Word"—the title implying that the Son of God alone expresses to created minds the mind and will of God. "He who was in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him." And how could "the Word of God" reveal Him to other creations than our own; how be "the image of God" to them, unless, as in our own case, He has been seen of them—"seen of angels"—seen of them in their own proper natures, so seen as that He could say to them as to us, "he that hath seen me, hath seen the Father"?

The idea is yet more clearly implied in the words that follow; for Paul not only says that the Son of God is "the image of God," but, as though he would explain how, "the first-born of all creation." This cannot mean that the "first-born" was Himself created; for, in the next verse, He is said to be "the creator of all things." The expression is but another form of saying that He is "begotten before all creation," or, as the seventeenth verse puts it, "He is before all things," or, as the Creed has it, "begotten before all worlds." "Begotten" is the synonym used by John for "the first-born"—"the only-begotten of the Father."

But there is another clause in the passage (verse 19) which yet more clearly shows what special thought was in the apostle's mind. He says: "For it was the good pleasure of the Father, that in Him should all the fullness dwell." The word *πληρωμα* was an important one in the philosophy that Paul was combating. It is difficult for ordinary readers of the epistle to understand what fantastic notions were taught in those days by some professed Christian teachers, whose minds were full of the Oriental philosophy. Starting with a statement that is true enough, they distorted it so as to evolve from it an antichristian philosophy. They bridged the interval between God and humanity by what they called "the pleroma," that is, the fullness, that which fills this interval. They taught, as the Bible does, that in this interval there are various grades of being, some very exalted, albeit between these and the divine Being there is in reality an immeasurable interval. But the philosophers taught that these angelic orders are not only man's superiors but his natural mediators, and the next step was easy enough; to worship them, to pray to them, and the like. It was against this monstrous perversion of a truth that Paul argued in

this epistle, showing how it derogated from the glory of Christ, who is the only mediator between God and man. Taking the very word out of the mouth of the philosophers, he taught how alone the interval between God and our humanity can be bridged. The angelic orders, however superior to man, leave an infinite interval between themselves and God. They cannot, therefore, bridge it. Only the Son of God can do that, and "it pleased the Father" that His Son should fill the interval, or, as the passage puts it, "that in Him should the whole *pleroma* dwell." He was the only One who, from the very necessities of the case, could occupy this unique position. As "the Son of God," "He was the image of the invisible God," God's *alter ego* (so to speak), "the Word of God, who was God." Then, as "the Son of Man," he became one with the human family. Then, as "God's first-born of all creation," He has ever been brought into personal relations in some way with all of God's created ones. The eternal Son of God "dwells" and has forever dwelt in the bosom of the eternal Father. The rescued of earth are said to "dwell in him," being made sharers of His Spirit. And all other intelligences similarly find their bond of union in Him who is "the only-begotten of God" to them all. So that it is true that in God's good pleasure all creation meets in His Son.* It can be said, indeed, that the Colossians passage is but one of many in which the apostle refers to the relations of our "Son of Man" to other creations. In Ephes. i. 10, for instance, he says that God has made known unto us "the mystery of His will . . . that in the dispensation of the fulness of times, He might gather together in one all things in Christ, both which are in heaven (the heavens, R. V.) and which are on earth—even in Him." Precisely what this means it is not easy to say. It cannot mean that there is to be a restoration of all to primitive purity, for that would contradict other Scriptures. It can only refer, however vaguely, to some unfolding of the work of the Redeemer, some new relations of it to the universe, of which we know little now, but which is to be unspeakably glorious; for he adds, "that we should be to the praise of the glory of His grace." We cannot, therefore, now understand all that is included in this "gathering into one" in Christ of both heaven and earth; but nothing can so satisfy the nature of any being made in the image of God as to be brought into fellowship and to be put upon an equality with other sons of God "in the heavens."

* See Ephes. i. 20-23 and iv. 10, where we find the same view of Christ as "the Bridger of Creation" — "the filler" of the universe.

But that is not all. In the twentieth verse reference is made to a "reconciliation" of all things unto God, which in some way has been effected through the Son of God; and in "the all things" so reconciled is specifically included "things in the heavens," as well as "things upon the earth."

One cannot be too careful in touching upon such a subject. And yet the Bible is clear on at least one feature of it, that in the ages past, before a human soul breathed, a widely marked separation had occurred among the intelligences that people the universe—a separation occasioned by sin. Those who kept not their first estate but fell from it became "devils," while the steadfast ones, who were "reconciled" ever after to the divine government, are generically classed as "angels," and the twentieth verse asserts that the Son of God was the Reconciler. And it is interesting, as well as corroborative of this view to learn from the lips of the Son of Man Himself that humanity's "hell" is indeed the abode already occupied by hellish souls of the other creations—"prepared for the devil and his angels."

It is, moreover, to be particularly noted in this connection that in the "all things" that are reconciled through the Son of God—just as it is stated in the Ephesians passage with regard to the "all things" that are gathered together in Christ—the apostle includes "things upon the earth and things in the heavens." He does not add "things in hell." The Son of God is not the Unifier of fallen angels, any more than He is of the lost from among men. As far as we men are concerned, Christ is the Reconciler between believers and God. And then (such is the import of the passage) He brings reconciled humanity into relations of unity with the reconciled in the heavens, which can only mean with the reconciled of other worlds.

One clause of this twentieth verse cannot be passed over without at least some notice: "and through Him to reconcile all things unto Himself, having made peace through the blood of His cross." Most probably this was intended to refer solely to the way in which the "reconciliation" was made by the Son of God as respects the human family. Doubtless the reconciliation effected by the Son of God as to "things in the heavens" (whatever form it took) was accomplished ages before the earth had an inhabitant. And yet so sober a thinker as Ellicott could write: "There would seem to be a superadded meaning in the influence the apostle seems to give to the cross of Christ as extending beyond the limits of humanity. I don't know that he does. Still, it is conceivable how the

transaction on Calvary might affect outsiders. We are assured that these things the angels desire to look into. Even upon humanity we know the cross of Jesus impresses profoundly the sense of the heinousness of sin that could lead to such a sacrifice. May it not similarly affect other creations, so as to render it doubly impossible for them ever to fall from their steadfastness, and so reconcile them all to God and holiness forever?"

At any rate, the Bible by no means obscurely teaches that as a result of the separation occasioned in other worlds by sin, there came into existence what it appropriately calls a "Church in the heavens"—an "elect assembly" (as the word means) of those "whose names are enrolled in the skies," referring to "the gathering together in one" of the steadfast ones. This culminating point of our discussion is definitely raised in a very remarkable passage in the Epistle to the Hebrews xii. 22-23. "But ye are come unto Mount Zion, and unto the city of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem, and to innumerable hosts of angels, to the general assembly and church of the first-born, who are enrolled in heaven, and to God the judge of all, and to the spirits of just men made perfect."* The Revised Version gives the meaning more precisely. The basal conception of the passage is that the kingdom of God is one, though made up of many provinces; that the Overlordship of the Redeemer includes more than His Lordship of earth. He is the Unifier of this and other worlds. Our earth is not so isolated as it seems to us who live upon it. There is a time coming when the rescued from earth will become closely associated with the rescued from other worlds, who are already gathered in God's holy "city" or the New Jerusalem. Nay, it is a fact that some of the rescued from earth are already there. Such, I think, is in general the Spirit's teaching in the passage, emphasizing as it does the beatific relations into which the saved in Christ are brought. "But ye are come unto Mount Zion"—the historic "Mount Zion" was, of course, the centre around which gravitated the spiritual as well as the political hopes of Israel. Adopted into the Christian vocabulary, it became a synonym for the Church of God's dear Son on earth, wherein as a holy brotherhood the saved in Christ are associated. But, says the inspired writer, yet more exalted privileges come to the saved in Christ. They come to Mount Zion, but also to another and a better

*The R. V. margin gives an alternate arrangement of the middle clauses of the verses, viz.: or, "and to innumerable hosts, the general assembly of angels and the church of the first-born."

"city," the "city of the living God." And the writer goes on to state what a marvelous constituency it embraces. First of all, it is described as made up of "innumerable hosts of angels" who are united into a "general assembly and Church," significantly styled "the Church of the first-born who are enrolled in heaven." But it must be observed that by "the Church of the first-born" is not meant "the Church of Jesus," for the word for "first-born" is in the plural, so that it is literally "the Church of the first-born ones" that is referred to, which can only mean in its connection "the Church of the earlier creations"—the word "Church" as applied to these earlier creations being, as already intimated, of special significance, suggesting a "called out" or "selected" gathering. It can only mean, then, that "the innumerable hosts of angels" is made up of the elect angels gathered out of previous creations, and enrolled, or registered name by name, and organized into a Church in the skies. And it is interesting to observe how the writer, in his summary of the constituency of God's holy city, discriminates "the Church of the earlier born creations" from "the spirits of just men made perfect," that is to say, saints from earth already gathered in the heavenly Jerusalem. The dominant note of the passage is the privilege of association with the great and good out of the universe which the Gospel secures for the redeemed from among us men. The Lord Jesus will unite us all, angels and saints, into a blessed unity, under the general title of citizens of the New Jerusalem. What a glimpse does the passage so interpreted give us into a past long before our humanity's creation, during which the universe was being peopled by "the innumerable hosts" of various orders, out of whom God has through the ages been gathering the heavenly Church.

Sir Robert Ball, not long ago, published a book entitled *The Earth's Beginning*, in which he gives an astronomer's story of the earth's making. With emphasis he insists that an almost immeasurable amount of time has been required in bringing the earth to the stage when it could become fit for man's residence upon it. It is just as stoutly maintained that there is a day coming when the earth will no longer be a fit dwelling-place for our race.

The Word of God is therefore in harmony with the latest word of science when it also gives us two glimpses—one into the past and the other into the future. But the past of the Bible deals not with earth's peopling alone, but with the peopling of the universe. And its future, also, has to do not with our race alone, but with hosts gathered and to be yet gathered out of the universe

into one heavenly Church. The most wonderful thing about all this is that the alliance of our earth with the Church in the skies has been made possible only by the Incarnation of the Son of God. He was already the Pacificator of angels. He could only become the Pacificator of earth by becoming "the Son of Man." Only when that came to pass was the Son able to make peace between God and men by the blood of His cross, and having made peace, to include men so rescued first of all in "the Church of God's dear Son" here upon earth, and then, through a spiritual union with Himself, to associate them with all others rescued through the ages and gathered into the heavenly Church.

The impression left by the Bible is that the universe is one; that, diverse as it is in its almost endless variety of being, a unity pervades it and that the Son of God is the Unifier. He is its Creator, "by Him all things consist"; and nothing could, therefore, be more reasonable than the contention of this paper, that He sustains a similar relation to all the orders of intelligence that He has called into being. All are "one in Him," "of whom the whole family in heaven and earth is named"—all equally honoring God's Son, as they see Him in a form that suggests their own, and "behold his glory, full of grace and truth."

Our answer, therefore, to the objector to the Incarnation is that it does not involve a charge of partiality against the divine Being. If it pleased God to add to his divine attributes those which are purely human, that fact would not necessarily prevent Him, should He please, from similarly adding to Himself features characteristic of other orders of created intelligences. The Bible, at any rate, tells us that when "the Son of God" became "the Son of Man," He was already "the first-born of all creation," "the Head of all intelligences that fill up the interval between God and ourselves" and "the image of God to them all." And John saw the Redeemer of men "crowned," not with a crown, but "with many crowns." That was not a mere figure of speech. Our humanity's diadem is but one of many. The angels, God's elect ones out of previous creations, are represented as themselves joining in humanity's song of praise. There is no discord, no jealousy in the heavenly Church. "The spirits of just men made perfect" are as welcome in God's holy city as the elect angels, and together they chant the hymn which without ceasing ascends to our Lord as theirs.

We think, therefore, that there can remain no doubt as to what may be called the Bible's view of the universe and of man's place in it, nor yet of the relations which the Son of God sustains to this and other worlds. Some of the details of the paper may be

demurred at by some, but not the main contention, that the Bible peoples the universe with intelligent life.

Accordingly, if such is the view of the Word of God, its averment seems, at least on the face of it, to be in direct opposition to the conclusions of Mr. Wallace already stated, who holds that intelligent life has been and is of necessity exclusively confined to this earth of ours.* To be sure, his view is not shared by some at least of the scientists, one of whom particularly, Dr. Turner, Professor of Astronomy in the Oxford University, hastened to call in question the reasonings on which Mr. Wallace bases his conclusions.

Carefully pondering both Mr. Wallace's view and Prof. Turner's demurrer, we think it possible to combine their apparently opposing views in such a way as to bring them in at least measurable harmony with each other, and in harmony also with the Biblical scheme of creation.

Mr. Wallace's views may be summed up thus, mostly in his own words: He holds that "facts and observations tend to show that our position in the material universe is special and probably unique." He starts out with the contention, in which he is supported by Prof. Simon Newcomb, that "the stellar universe is not infinite," though, of course, vast beyond reckoning in its wide sweep. The stellar universe being finite, he next seeks to arrive at some definite conclusion as to its form and structure. Putting together the results of the latest astronomy, he regards the vast ring known as "the Milky Way" that encircles the earth, as all can see on a dark and clear night, as a vast star system or congeries of star systems lying far beyond the remotest bounds of the globe of stars which we also see on a clear night sparkling like diamonds over the vault of heaven; albeit the nearest of these to us, as far as known, is so far that light therefrom takes more than three years to reach us, while light from our sun reaches the earth in about eight and a quarter minutes.† In his view, there-

* Mr. Alfred Russell Wallace was for long the ablest expounder and vindicator of Mr. Darwin's views on evolution. Latterly he has modified his view of evolution, so far at least, as is generally understood, as to treat it from a theistic standpoint. His view on the subject in hand was first given in an article in *The Fortnightly Review* (March, 1903) entitled "Man's Place in the Universe." In the April number of the *Review* appeared Prof. Turner's sturdy reply. And this led Mr. Wallace to publish a more extended work (with the same title) in which he gives at length the astro-physical reasons for his view—albeit the gist of his theory is quite clearly and more succinctly expressed in the original article.

† Some idea of the scale on which creation is built may be gathered from an illustration used by Prof. Newcomb in an article on "The Extent of the Universe," published in *Harper's Magazine* (October, 1904). He says: "Imagine round our solar system as a centre, a sphere with a radius 400,000 times the earth's distance

fore, the stars that we see scattered over the sky in all directions constitute a "globular star-cluster" of their own, which "occupies a nearly central position in the exact plane of the Milky Way," and he regards our sun as "one of the central orbs of this globular star-cluster." He argues, further, that this enormous "globular star-cluster is situated not in any part of the Milky Way, from which it is, in fact, immensely distant, but at or near the very central point in the plane of the ring, that is, nearly equally distant from every part of it." And he concludes that "our sun is thus shown to occupy a position very near to, if not actually at, the centre of the whole visible universe, and therefore in all probability in the centre of the whole material universe." His inference is that these facts cannot be looked upon "as without any significance in relation to the culminating fact that the planet so situated has developed humanity," and his conclusion follows, given *in extenso* on page 178 of this article, that "the supreme end and purpose of this vast universe was the production and development of" humanity. These points are simply developed at length in his book, together with the reasons therefor.

Prof. Turner, however, attempts to undermine this reasoning—based on our solar system being as a matter of fact in the very centre of the universe—by the demurrer that if it be so now, it has not always been so, nor will it always remain so. The so-called "proper motion of the stars" has been calculated for large numbers of them by means of the spectroscope, and with the result that everything in the universe seems to be in motion, more or less rapid, and in every possible direction. This is true of our own solar system; the sun, carrying along his planets, moves rapidly. And Prof. Turner concludes, that as a result our solar system millions of years from now will occupy a very different position relatively to the other suns in "the globular star-cluster" of which it is now the centre, and also as respects the Milky Way. Accordingly, he calls in question Mr. Wallace's view of "Man's Place in the Universe" and, indeed, Mr. Wallace's whole reasoning as to the introduction and development of humanity therein; more particu-

from the sun. An idea of this distance may be gained by reflecting that light which makes the circuit of the earth seven times in a second and reaches us from the sun in eight minutes and twenty seconds, would require seven years to reach the surface of the sphere we have supposed. But the first result of measures of parallax is that within this enormous sphere there is besides our sun in the centre only a single star—Alpha Centauri." And he adds that were the supposed sphere to have a radius 800,000 times the distance of the earth from the sun, there would then be found within the enormous sphere not more than eight stars!

larly disallowing the astro-physical reasons that Mr. Wallace gives for regarding intelligent life as possible only at the centre of things.

We hope we are not too bold in imagining that the two apparently discordant views may be combined into one; which, whether it be accepted as true or not, is at least an adequate solution of the problem, both in mode and measure, and falls in line at the same time with what may be styled the basic view of Scripture on the interesting theme.

It is undoubtedly true that the universe is in motion, covering vast reaches of space with involved and intricate movements, consuming an immeasurable duration. But if the stellar universe be finite, there must be a centre somewhere. Then, as the star systems major and minor move, some faster and some slower, some in one direction and others in another, it is at least conceivable that in the lapse of time their relative positions may be shifted. A remoter system may approach nearer the centre and a nearer system remove farther away. Now, if the astro-physical reasons arrayed by Mr. Wallace really require the position of a star-system at the centre if life is to be developed thereon, I see no objection to the proposition that the present era—if we may so express it—when our system is and has been for long at the centre of things, has simply proven to be the earth's opportunity for the introduction and development of the human family. All the evidence shows that man was introduced—the Bible would say created—in this planet not so very long ago. Moreover, astronomy also puts a limit, longer or shorter, to man's continued residence here; so that it is true that the human race has come into existence under God, at what may be called the present time. What happened previously, when another system was at the centre, and what is to happen hereafter when still another system shall be at the centre, it would be idle to speculate. But time is nothing to the Eternal. And the disclosures which the Scriptures give respecting the past of intelligence and its outlook for the eternity ahead would completely second the motion—if it may be so put—should science affirm that the creation of humanity is but one of the many similar creations of intelligence that have occupied the divine Being from the beginning and that will probably continue to occupy him forever. Mr. Wallace may be right, as respects the creation of humanity in the era of our earth's present position, but we fear that he has not carefully enough weighed the probabilities of past creations or the possibilities of future creations.

There is another item in the count that cannot be omitted.

For it is to be noted that while Mr. Wallace's contention, that a system must be at the centre of things before intelligent life can be introduced into it, would make it possible to people the universe (provided it be supplemented by Prof. Turner's contention as to the changes in the locale of any particular system produced in the long run by the proper motion of the stars), his view is based on many astro-physical considerations which, while Mr. Wallace himself regards them as incontrovertible, cannot be said to be proven incontestibly. They rise scarcely above suppositions. Prof. Turner, indeed, sturdily objects to the dictum of Mr. Wallace on the point, and sees nothing in the suggested astro-physical reasons mentioned to prevent the introduction of life elsewhere than at the very centre of things. And so little is really known of the constitution of the universe or of the laws that control intelligent life, that at present it is impossible to advance further than hypotheses or, at best, plausible suppositions. Mr. Wallace may suggest that there is special significance in the fact that our system is now at the centre, inasmuch as intelligent life has been introduced while there, and what he says may be true as respects humanity; but other intelligent life throughout the universe may be and probably is unlike the kind with which we are familiar, and may have been introduced under other and widely different conditions. We are not to forget that the law of variety pervades the universe—a fact of which Revelation takes cognizance in the disclosures it makes of outsiders. Considering carefully, therefore, the latest say of science on the interesting subject, we see no reason for yielding the say of the Bible. On the contrary, we find in the announcements of the astronomers and physicists but superadded reasons for holding with God's Word, that there is intelligent life in the universe other than that form of it with which we are so familiar.

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II.

ORAL TRADITION, LIBRARIES AND THE HEXATEUCH.

THE question of the Hexateuch is one of very great natural interest to a librarian. If it concerned only matters of authorship, date, genuineness, etc., it would still be a problem of great professional interest, for these things belong to the librarian's trade and come technically into play every day in matters of cataloguing and the purchase of documents. Questions, therefore, of Divine authorship or Mosaic authorship must always be professionally interesting to a librarian.

But in that the problem of the Hexateuch concerns especially documentary criticism it comes still closer professionally, for the most characteristic problems of both the higher and lower criticism of documents are, in their last analysis, problems in library history. Textual criticism traces the history of a document through its various copyings and marks the changes in form which take place whether by error or design. Carried to its logical perfection this traces each manuscript to the library where it was written, and the original from which this was copied in turn to the place where it was written. Higher criticism, on the other hand, identifies the sources used by an author when any given work was composed, or, in other words, the contents of the library from which a writer drew his material. Perfect success in criticism of this sort would trace the identical books which existed, for example, in the library of Pamphilus when Eusebius used it, or, say, in the Temple Library in Jerusalem when the Canonist gave final form to the Old Testament.

Library history has two aspects: first, the survival of the individual library and the individual book and, second, the survival of the type. The very books of Ashurbanipal may still be seen and read; those of Pergamon and Alexandria have as individuals perished to a book, but the works themselves have survived in their descendants through copying. One is a case of survival by continued existence and as an individual, the other is survival by

reproduction, or race survival. The record of the individual book or library is what is usually meant by "library history," but race history is, in reality, quite as much a part of library history as the record of individuals. The analysis of constituent documents, the freeing them of all variations from the original, whether these variations are changes, additions or subtractions—these characteristic tasks of criticism are, in effect, scientific reconstructions from the history of the race of the original books or libraries as they existed in a given place at a given time. Documentary criticism is, therefore, the characteristic scientific preoccupation of a librarian, and, apart from the supreme interest in the fact that this problem concerns the book which has most of all to do with the hope of eternal life, the problem of the Hexateuch is interesting as perhaps the most typically bibliothecal of all active problems in documentary criticism, both on the side of library history proper and on that of the transmission of documents.

In the first place the Bible is itself a library, and the books which compose it were literally those which formed the library of the Canonist. Both the Old Testament canon and the New Testament canon in turn reflect the libraries of the men who collected them. At some time, in some place, there were libraries consisting of certain books of such and such material, handwriting, size, binding, etc. The contents of these libraries are reflected, wholly or in part, in these collections of books unified by common title and transmitted as units: Bible, Old Testament and New Testament. The Bible as a whole is thus one of the most perfect problems in library history proper, while the New Testament affords the best existing example of text critical method, and the Old Testament is the field of the most highly developed work in higher documentary criticism.

And not only is the Bible a library and the Old and New Testaments libraries within this library, but still there are wheels within wheels, for the Hexateuch, whether it is divided horizontally, as Genesis, Exodus, etc., or perpendicularly into J E P D, is a library within the library of the Old Testament canon. Nor does the chain end even here, for J E P D are themselves collections "from older sources, oral and written," and so, in fact, libraries or composed from libraries.

If the current analysis into J E P D is correct, we have thus recorded at least half a dozen libraries which have at one time or another served as sources for one or another priestly or prophetic writer: (1) That of a Judean prophet who collected about the year 750 B.C. the works of a "School of Prophets," who may or

may not have been contemporaries and used the same library, but who, at least, used (2) a library or libraries of works "collected from many different places and originated in different periods," used by these Judean prophets as early as 850 B.C., (3) that of an Ephraimite prophet who made the "main collection of northern Israel's traditions" about 750 B.C., (4) the library of the editor who, about 625 B.C., combined the "Judean and Ephraimitic"—the two great prophetic narratives, (5) the library of the Deuteronomic editor which contained, at least, Joshua and Judges, and dated from 550 B.C. at latest, (6) the library of the collector of the priestly narratives, say 400 B.C., (7) the library of that editor who soon after 400 B.C. gave to the first eight books of the Old Testament "substantially their present order and form" by uniting the already combined prophetic narratives with the priestly. These, at least, and perhaps several others, are implied in the latest forms of the theory of the higher critics. The Hexateuch is, therefore, if the critics may be believed, itself a library within a library within a library, and each of its parts in turn implies still other libraries.

All this is extremely interesting to a librarian, and the present writer has followed the work of the higher critics with admiration for the brilliant linguistic work in analysis and with professional interest in applying its results to his own historical problems, but with the growing conviction that, whatever may be true as the analysis into J E P D, the attempt to interpret these documents is in danger of going astray from neglect of what may be called the bibliothecal factors, *i.e.*, library history and the laws of the transmission of documents, whether oral or written.

This tendency may be illustrated from Kent's *Beginning of Hebrew History* (1904), Paton's *Palestine* (1901), Driver's *Introduction* (tenth edition), 1902, and the articles in Cheyne-Black. Without forgetting the *Hastings' Dictionary* and the works of Wade, McFayden, and the rest, it will be convenient to use in the main this limited number of primary spokesmen, who are beyond suspicion as to scholarship or as to orthodoxy in the tenets of the strictest sect of the higher critics—not that they are necessarily more scholarly, but simply because, for one reason or another, their subject-matter and way of presentation or special attitudes suit them to convenient use in presenting the general attitude and tendency.

The conclusions on which all the higher critics are supposed to be agreed and which are, according to Kent (p. 29), "No longer on trial or under suspicion . . . the foundations—as sure as enlightened human insight and scientific method can discover—upon which

Old Testament interpretation and doctrine are in the future to rest," are (1) that the crystallization of the Old Testament traditions was gradual and the collection of these the work of four distinct schools of writers who flourished at different periods; (2) that "the present arrangement of the stories is the result, first, of the close amalgamation of extracts from the two older prophetic groups, and then of their being combined with the late prophetic and very late priestly narratives"; (3) that these composite histories have been supplemented at different stages by later additions and harmonistic and editorial notes. McFayden adds to "the things most surely believed by the critics" the three legal codes, Deuteronomy written in the seventh century B.C., and the late closing of the canon, but these are in substance implied in the statement of Kent.

Dr. Kent does not profess to include under matters "no longer on trial or under suspicion" the precise dates of the "different periods" at which the "four distinct schools of writers" flourished, but a broad synthesis of current views seems to reach the approximate dates of, say, 850, 750, 550 and 400 B.C., with the "amalgamation of extracts in the two older prophetic groups" about 625 and later additions at various dates. This rather rough generalization of dates represents well enough for the purposes of this paper a practical consensus of the higher critics in assigning the earliest of the four collections to a time not before the time of Solomon, and the others to various periods down to some time after the exile.

The present writer has no intention of contradicting these conclusions, on which all those critics who have agreed to disagree with traditional views are wholly agreed among themselves. They may be right or they may be wrong so far as present purposes are concerned. This paper is concerned not with the four collections or their dates, but with the things collected, the sources of the collections and the interpretation to be made of the collections as a whole in view of their composition. The intention is to proceed as strictly as possible on the "foundations" recognized by those whom this paper aims to convert in certain remoter matters.

And first as to the sources of J E P D. Here, too, there is substantial consensus among the higher critics, albeit the agreement is not quite so complete or confident as in the other matters. "For the period down to the time of Solomon the sources of the histories were almost exclusively oral tradition of the most varied character and contents; of records and monuments there are but few traces and these for the most part doubtful" (Moore in Cheyne-Black, 2077). "Thus all the indications contained in Israel's his-

tory point to the century or two beginning with about 950 B.C. as the era when the oral traditions of an earlier age were collected and woven into connected groups of narratives" (Kent, p. 18). "J and E then . . . appear to have cast into literary form the traditions . . . approximately, as it would seem, in the early centuries of the monarchy" (Driver, p. 117). In brief, there were few, if any, written sources when J was compiled.

So, too, again the writers are in substantial agreement as to the reason for this. The theory of oral transmission is founded, as Driver suggests (p. 123), of the general theory "upon grounds of probability derived from our view of the progress of writing or of literary composition." "While the Hebrews were nomads, without a definite national organization and probably personally unacquainted with the art of writing, it would appear that they had few, if any, written records," says Kent. Under David "the Hebrew system of writing appears for the first time to have come into use. Pioneers struggling for homes have little need or time for literary pursuits" (Kent, p. 18). "The literary skill it [J E] evinces indicates that it was not written until the Israelites had become well acquainted with the art of composition . . . period of the monarchy" (Wade, p. 7).

The general tendency is thus to maintain that all sources before 1050 B.C., if not for another century or two, were oral and remained oral until collected by J E P D. It is doubtful if Moore and Kent intend to concede any written sources before 1050. Moore certainly limits such sources down to the time of Solomon to the very smallest possible amount, and in general the tendency is to restrict such writings as there may have been up to this time to the most meagre annals and scanty setting down of traditions. "State annals probably containing brief memoranda . . . began to be kept," says Kent (p. 18), "in the time of Solomon." These annals, says Moore (Cheyne-Black, 2077), were brief and "there is no reason to imagine that the records of a reign were wrought into narrative memoirs."

Making due allowance, therefore, for various standards of chronology and individual variation of theory, there is practically complete agreement among the critics (1) that no parts of the Hexateuch or even the sources of the individual incidents were in writing before 1050, and few before 850, (2) because the Israelites had no books or writing before this period. As regards these two matters of predominant oral tradition and the absence of literary cultivation among the Israelites before the time of David and Solomon, the

author of this paper holds the contrary: (1) That the Israelites must have been well acquainted with writing and have had books and libraries centuries before Solomon, and (2) that the chief sources must have been written documents extending back over the whole period to the time of the Exodus and even to the time of Abram.

And first, a few words as to the nature of oral tradition and laws of oral and written transmission. From a librarian's standpoint oral tradition is just as much a document as anything else, and a collection of oral traditions in a man's head just as much a library as a collection of written documents in a book-case. The essence of a document or book is a fixed form of words. Naturally such a form of words is more accurately transmitted when written than when memorized, but even a written transmission by copying is likely to deteriorate rapidly. One careless scribe can throw confusion into a work for all his successors. In the case of oral transmission this is still more true, and variations are likely to become very wide within a very few repetitions. In the event, thus, of careful memorizing on the one hand, and careless or officious scribal work on the other, oral transmission of a given document (for oral and written transmission of the same document is not unusual) may even be more exact than written transmission.

Perhaps the most typical case of exact oral transmission is that of the religious books of India which were, it is alleged, handed down for centuries by a rigorous method of mental verbatim copying—a strict and scrupulous memorizing, such as the Chinese are said to apply to the Confucian writings. By this rigid training and constant correction from the masters, transmission was kept practically as exact as in copying from writing, and each man who had a collection of these verbatim documents in his head had, or was, a library. In ordinary oral transmission where there is no such training, that is, in what is commonly known as popular tradition, the transmission of prose stories is as careless as the transmission of the ordinary after-dinner stories to-day. It is equally rare, too, that a piece of prose is transmitted with any exactness, and it is probably to this circumstance rather than to any lack of prose composition that is to be ascribed the familiar observation that the oldest literature is always poetical. Poetry exists through its fixed form. This broken down it falls to pieces at once into prose, and thence into vague and wandering prose versions of the substantial ideas. On the other hand, rhythmical form aids the memorizing and in popular tradition it is, thus, only songs and poems which are transmitted without very wide variation indeed, unless this tradition is fre-

quently refreshed from written sources, as the popular traditions of the Middle Ages were from the Golden Legend.

Oral documents and written documents are, therefore, essentially the same thing. They differ simply in the facts that the variations which always occur in every repetition tend to become wider with each oral repetition than in the case of the corresponding written repetition, and that from the nature of oral repetition, it must take place as much more frequently as the life of a written document exceeds the life of a man; and, in fact, it usually has a history of many repetitions in direct descent within each generation. The rule is that written repetitions vary least, oral repetitions of poetry next and much more rapidly, and repetitions of prose many times more rapidly than either, but all according to essentially similar laws, and indicating the identical nature of the oral and written document.

The same essential identity between the oral and written document is shown in the law of repair as well as in the law of waste or deterioration, in the synthesis as well as in the variations. As written copies may be corrected by comparison with one another or with the original, so oral tradition, when the same story is repeated frequently before others for the benefit of a newcomer, or by the original story teller before the same audience, may be amended from joint memory, auditors familiar with the story suggesting the amendments. Every one who has an aged relative gets many stories by heart, and can amend the widely variant versions of his cousins who have heard the same stories less frequently. This natural process of repair made systematic is the science of text criticism, and its general laws apply to oral as well as to written documents.

The fact that oral traditions are documents subject to precisely the same laws of variation, heredity, and regeneration that we are familiar with through the text criticism of written documents, leads to the observation that these laws are precisely those of organic development. The most fundamental law of all is precisely the working law of comparative zoology to-day—that true homology points infallibly to a common ancestor. However much the interpretation of homologies may be at times disturbed by interfering waves of cross-breeding, whether in animals or in manuscripts, it is still true (at least within the limits of domestic breeding, manuscripts and oral traditions) that true, natural, fundamental likenesses point surely to common descent and lead securely to a truthful, scientific reconstruction of the original ancestor.

Applying now this primary law of documentary transmission to the critical theory of quadrilateral transmission, by which "we have to-day, instead of one, four parallel historical narratives" (Kent, p. 30), the normal scientific inference is that the entire common content of these documents represents an original which dates from before the earliest repetitions, whether oral or written, represented among the sources. In this case it would seem to be some time, at least, before 1250 (Kent, p. 17).

Let us examine a little more in detail the current doctrine of the J E P D school in this regard. The cardinal doctrine is the analogy with Tatian's Diatessaron: "similar subject-matter he introduced but once. Ordinarily when there were two variant versions he adopted the fuller, or where each presented independent detail he combined verses, or parts of verses, from one with similar selections from others. Sometimes parallel passages are introduced in sequence . . . great care is exercised not to leave out any fresh material. Consequently two-thirds of the first three and all of the fourth Gospel have been included . . . in the case of the Old Testament, the individual characteristics of the four originals are more marked, the amalgamation is not so close, the transpositions are not many, and more duplicate versions of the same instance have been retained. Similar reverence for the written word and a corresponding desire to preserve everything which contained additional material explains why, after the analysis which has been made, the four resulting narratives are each approximately complete . . . like the one-third of the Synoptic Gospels, which is omitted by Tatian, the remaining parts would probably be found to consist of exceedingly close parallels to the versions which have been retained . . . we have to-day, instead of one, four parallel historical narratives . . . not on one but four cornerstones" (Kent, pp. 29-30, cf. McFayden, 138-9).

We have, therefore, according to the critics, in the present Hexateuch all the common content of four documents and all their variants, the marks being, however, so clear that the component documents may be disentangled and reconstructed so that J E P D become practically as definite as the Gospels, but each one even more complete on account of the conscientious preservation of every variation.

Now the ordinary scientific task implied in the existence of four such documents is to take these variant transmissions, as Waitz has recently taken the Clementine Homilies, Recognitions and Epitome, and endeavor to extract the "Grundschrift." This is an-

other question from that sometimes raised as to whether J E or P may have been the original form worked over by the others. It refers to the critical law whereby in texts, documents, plants and animals at least likenesses in a manifold transmission lead to a common ancestor as unfailingly (save for cross-breeding) as the law of gravitation. The task is to extract the common ancestor, precisely as is done when a text of the Gospels is reconstructed from the many varying MS. descendants.

The critics have thus carried the matter to a point where, putting their documents on their inference, they seem to point to a well-defined common source, dating back to at least near the time of the Exodus and quite as well established as, say, the Eastern or Western texts of the New Testament. It is true that on the face of it this source need not date from a time much before the composition of J and E, yet in that elaboration of the theory, at least, which makes all of these stories current before 1250, it does logically point to a common source for all before that date.

As to whether this "Grundschrift" was oral or written, it may be observed: (1) That the very nature of oral tradition is such as to make unlikely that prose documents should take on a definite form "in the plastic oral stage," and be transmitted in that form for hundreds of years before being recorded in writing, and still retain such a degree of formal likeness as is alleged to exist between the forms of the different documents. In oral tradition anything like verbal correspondence or correspondence in a sequence of ideas or incidents, save such as are naturally chronological or geographical, must after a few transmissions disappear. It is doubtful if they would retain as much as the proportion of variation under the law of biological heredity. Any one may test this for himself by noting the variations in an after-dinner story or some local reminiscence of the Revolutionary War. Here, however, we have alleged a large amount of identical matter and another large amount complete with all its variants, among which latter even there is more or less definite and even verbal similarity. The least that can be said is that from the nature of transmission the presumption is of a written Grundschrift.

And in the second place (2), while it may make little difference whether transmission was oral or written so long as common content produces the true original, still the written does of course produce a more sure basis; and the question of fact may be cleared negatively by showing that the supposed need for a theory of oral transmission was mistaken, and positively by pointing out indications of actual or possible written sources.

Turning first to the ground for the theory of oral tradition in the alleged undeveloped state of letters among the Israelites, it seems to rest on a certain view of their racial development. According to this theory the Hebrews were a nomadic tribe or tribes, only gradually developing within themselves the elements of civilization and not attaining even a written language until, say, 1050 B.C. By many exponents this is carried so far as to allege or suggest that they did not come out of Egypt at all, but were savage tribes from somewhere out of the South.

The hypothesis of nomadic tribes seems, in its last analysis, to rest almost purely on an evolutionary theory. It is true that the rude frontier times of the Judges, and the evident lapse from high culture in this period, plays its part in the theory; but that fact alone could be easily and sufficiently accounted for by the analogies of pioneer work in general, and the remembrance that the rank and file of the Israelites had had only forty years of education, and that in a desert environment. But at bottom the argument is that "like all primitive people" they went through thus and so periods of "legend," "song and story" to writing, nomadic to agricultural life, and so as of religious institutions. Against this it may be said (1) that it is pure hypothesis over against what is alleged as historical fact, and carries thus the burden of proof, and (2) it implies a theory of independent evolution which does not follow the analogy of present evolutionary theory.

The traditional hypothesis which takes the face of the Biblical narrative and represents the Hebrews as enjoying an inherited Babylonian civilization, brought in contact for centuries with a high Egyptian civilization, and therefore enjoying from the beginning of their national life, before crossing the Jordan, the advantages of a developed civilization as regards learning, laws, the working of the stuffs and the metals, which in the frontier work of conquest and colonization was more or less neglected, equally covers the ground, and seems distinctly the better working hypothesis on an evolutionary basis. If one is to base any argument on evolutionary grounds, it would thus be more plausible to trace in the extraordinary development of the Hebrew nation and the unparalleled persistence of its civilization the evidence that at some point in their history the favorable variations of both Babylonian and Egyptian civilization were united, possibly by a thread of monotheism. This may, in fact, be suggested as the only adequate evolutionary explanation of the phenomenon. An emigrant from Babylonia, detached by long colonial residence in Palestine, subject to influ-

ences from both sides, then permeated for four hundred years by the influence of that other great civilization, the Egyptian when in its prime, and finally isolating itself far enough by its laws and residence to secure an individual development, would afford precisely the prerequisites for a vigorous individual race. It may be said that it was the union of Babylonian and Egyptian civilization in the Hebrew which produced this highly developed individual with its fitness to survive, as it was the union of the Oriental and Greek cultures at the beginning of this era which produced modern civilization.

Really Paton's suggestion, that its cosmopolitan position "may be one reason why Palestine, rather than Egypt and Babylonia, became the birthplace of a world-religion" (p. 102), has a profound philosophical basis in the modern view-point of race heredity. Nations do not grow like separate stalks, but like branches of a tree. The germ plasm of remote ancestors is even more important than special environment of immediate ancestors, and three generations of Babylonian stock kept pure from intermixture and four times three of Egyptian influence would be an ideal ancestry for such a race and a world-religion, whereas the transformation of savage tribes with savage ancestry by a process of self-evolution in a few centuries would be a freak of nature. But, whether theoretically possible or not, this independent development through the embryonic stages of legend was not the fact. The development was in the midst of advanced civilization and touched by it on all sides. It is this fact, that they lived surrounded by civilized and civilizing influences, that makes the theory of illiteracy so unnecessary and incredible and the theory of oral tradition supported by it so extremely improbable, and it will be worth while to study a little this environment.

Take, as a starting-point, the simple assertion that the Israelites probably derived many of their traditions from the highly civilized Canaanites among whom they dwelt. It is not the assertion of the writer of this paper, but of the critics themselves: "That they should bear with them and later receive anew through the Canaanites the traditional inheritances from the common ancestors of their race, was an inevitable result of the historical situation" (Kent, p. 6). "Also in the older Semitic inhabitants of Palestine . . . they found teachers who . . . imparted to them many of their varied traditions" (Kent, p. 6). "For at least five centuries," says Kent, "the civilizations of the Tigris-Euphrates valley had dominated Palestine, which had long been settled by Semitic

peoples" (Kent, p. 6). As Paton (p. 102), speaking of the Amarna letters, says: "From these letters we gain a wonderfully clear insight into the relations of the leading nations of the world about 1400 B.C. Far from being isolated, as was formerly supposed, they were in constant communication. Not only was there a steady interchange of commercial products, but also of art, literature and religious ideas. In the centre of this stream of trade and of thought lay Syria and Palestine, exposed to influences from every side."

Now the doctrine that highly civilized Canaanites, themselves perhaps migrating from the Tigris-Euphrates region, and at any rate for thousands of years in contact with two high civilizations, and for hundreds of years at least under the direct rule of one or the other, handed down to unlettered Israelites strong enough to be their masters oral tradition having definite literary form in that "plastic oral stage," without giving them the books and libraries or even the writing with which they were so familiar, and that this sort of thing should have gone on for hundreds of years, is on the face of it self-contradictory, and it becomes still more so on a closer examination of what the environment of books and libraries really was the kinds of documents likely to be accessible, and the evidences in the alleged collections J E D P of the existence of such documents and their use.

Every one, of course, knows that there were libraries in Assyria and Babylonia before the very earliest suggested date for the traditional Hexateuch, but there is no very systematic or modern statement of these accessible, and it is not surprising if the layman in library matters has not visualized very vividly the remarkable situation in this regard and made it a factor in the conception of the documentary situation. The fact is that there were not only libraries, but multitudes of libraries and of various sorts, both in Egypt and Babylonia, and, what is very rarely realized, in the region between as well.

About the time when J and E were compiled Ashurbanipal was collecting what is perhaps the most famous library of the Oriental world, and largely by transcripts and translations from older libraries. A little before this time Sargon had built up his library. These libraries contained tens of thousands of works each, and yet they hardly exceeded in size those of two thousand years previous—that at Tello with more than 30,000 tablets organized into a library as early as 2700 B.C., and that belonging to about 2500 B.C., excavated by the University of Pennsylvania at Nippur,

and containing a whole series of rooms filled with tablets. These particular excavations, indeed, gave evidences of libraries long before and during the whole period between the time of Ashurbanipal and Ine-Sin of Ur, and perhaps a thousand years earlier still. There were many groups of tablets belonging to certain reigns and bearing evidence, therefore, of many different libraries. There are scores of thousands of tablets in all, including a very large number of documents relating to about the period that we are considering, *i.e.*, from 1700 to 1200 B.C. The many excavations of various expeditions—English, German, French, American—all have revealed hundreds of thousands of tablets, indicating libraries at every period for centuries. There were, therefore, just previous to the entry of the Israelites into Palestine libraries all over the Babylonian empire and millions of tablets in them. These libraries were temple libraries and palace libraries, libraries of business houses and private libraries. Some were what might be called general libraries of literature, but especially they were record or archival libraries. The temple library at Sippar, with its three hundred rooms, contained "many thousands of little clay tablets . . . such as sales of houses, of fields, of produce, of stuffs, money loans, receipts, contracts for work, marriage settlements, and the like. . . . Similar collections have been found in almost every mound of southern Mesopotamia that has been opened" (Jastrow, *Rel. of Bab.*, p. 10; cf. on all these libraries Hilprecht, *Excavations in Assyria and Babylonia*, 1904).

During all this time, too, in the other direction there were the libraries of Egypt. These, too, were temple libraries, including on the one hand papyrus libraries, and on the other the many temple inscriptions. There were also the palace libraries, such as that dug up at Tel-el-Amarna.

An unusually comprehensive illustration of these libraries is afforded by the Annals of Talutimes III (about 1500 B.C.). These are extant in an inscription on the wall of the Temple of Amen at Karnak, and reach even in inscription forms the very reputable length of perhaps 13,000 words English, but are only an abridgment of the original Annals in the temple and palace libraries. All that his majesty did against Megiddo was, the inscriber says, "written from day to day under its date, under the title of Travels . . . (and) placed on a roll of leather in the Temple of Amen." Much could, therefore, be omitted from the inscription, and in the same way of the supplies furnished at all the various stations he says, "They are placed on the roll of the royal palace, so that their reck-

oning is not given on this tablet, in order to avoid a multiplication of words" (Petrie, v. 2, pp. 108-9, 115). Thus we have in one example the temple inscription, the temple library on rolls and a palace library on rolls. The memorial narrative was deposited in the temple, the royal archives in the king's palace.

The temple libraries also had their archives, and perhaps in earliest times were the only libraries. Besides archives, memorials and the like, both Babylonian and Egyptian temple libraries had the "chests containing sacred books, which were among the regular appurtenances of Egyptian (and probably of Syrian) temples" (Cheyne-Black, 306; cf. Budge, *Mummy*, p. 216, for ill.).

But these temple and palace libraries are not by any means the whole story of libraries. Beside this every tomb was a library, not merely of the Book of the Dead, the magical formulæ, etc., but of inscriptions relating to the virtues, achievements and ancestry of the deceased. At times there was something like a true library in the graveyards with stelæ, like the modern gravestones, but with fuller inscriptions. The story of Sepna, even if not written before the fourth century B.C., undoubtedly gives a true picture of what was the state of cemetery libraries in the time concerning which he writes (1300 B.C.) when he says (Warner Lib., p. 5264), "It came to pass that Naneferkaptah, my brother, had no habit on the earth but to walk in the cemetery of Memphis, reading the writings that were in the catacombs of the Pharaohs, with the tablets of the scribes of the 'House of Life,' and the inscriptions that were on the monuments; and he was eager for writing exceedingly."

Nor does the tale of libraries end even with temple, palace and tomb libraries, for while boundary tablets and rock inscriptions and victory tablets may be counted libraries only on a somewhat broad definition, still they are definitely located literary documents, and do fall within a proper definition of libraries, especially in the cases where a boundary tablet, set up and inscribed by one king, is reinscribed by his son or grandson or later successor. The boundary stone of Dilbat (858-842 B.C.) contains "two or more deeds by which a certain Kidinu came into possession of property in the city of Dilbat" (Johns, *Bab. Laws*, p. 29). The memorial stones set up by Tahutimes I and III (about 1550 *sq.*) to mark the boundary of their conquest on the Euphrates, probably, like the two set up by Usertsen III, 800 years before, contained boundary claims and accounts of the conquests which established these boundaries.

Nor was this wealth of libraries confined to the centre of these kingdoms. Certainly they extended all across northern Syria,

and we are not without evidence of their existence in the southern regions. There is, in the first place, that "City of Books," Kirjath-Sepher, in the hills of Judea, also called Debir, "the Sanctuary." On the face of it this points to a library as noteworthy for its region as the great libraries of Nippur, Sippara or Tel-el-Amarna in theirs, and existing when the Israelites entered Palestine. The only arguments against the name meaning what it seems to mean have served to bring out more securely the probable reality. Cheyne's argument (Cheyne-Black, pp. 2681-2) is itself simple incredulity with a rather feeble suggestion of possible text corruption of Sepher for Sephur, and incidentally it brings out the points: (1) That it was so called in LXX as well as Hebrew; (2) That it was called also the "House of the Scribes"; (3) That it was called also "Sanctuary"; (4) That it was near Hebron, which is looked on as a centre of Israelitish "legends"; (5) That it probably was not the true name, but "an additional descriptive title" for Debir or Beth-Zur; (6) That there are similar analogies in at least Sippara. All this indicates that Beth-Zur may have been surnamed Debir on account of the importance of the sanctuary there, and Kirjath-Sepher on account of the library or archive there. The double circumstance doubled again with the term "House of the Scribes" becomes real evidence in itself, and still more so when it is put in touch with the fact that on both sides geographically, and before and after chronologically, the archives and schools of scribes were associated with the temple libraries. Even if Sippara is not, as is held, a complete analogy as a city named for the library which it contained, still this city where, according to Berossus, Noah buried his books in the House of the Sun before he went into the Ark, and whence he dug them up after the flood, is a complete analogy for the union of the sanctuary, the house of the scribes and the libraries. That very Temple of the Sun has now been dug up with many literary works and great numbers of legal documents, and the documents of Babylonia show this as a great centre of records, the priests being regularly authorized witnesses, judges, etc. Berossus, it will also be remembered, makes the capital of the world before the flood a library—Pantibiblon.

When the general circumstances as to the existence of libraries in these regions at this time are further inquired into the proof is still further strengthened. One particularly pointed and interesting piece of direct evidence as to libraries in Palestine before 1050 is the story of Wen-Amen's visit to Gebal, about 1100 B.C., to get cedar for his Egyptian master. When, after many adventures and

delays, at last Wen-Amen succeeds in getting the King of Gebal to talk business, the latter asks how much money he has brought, and when he learns the amount—six pounds of silver—reproaches him for offering so little. Then sending to his archives he brings out accounts of his ancestors showing that they had received 200 pounds of silver for similar services from earlier Egyptian kings. The result is that Wen-Amen sends back to Egypt and gets more gold and other considerations, including 500 rolls of papyrus (cf. Paton, p. 168 *sq.*). How far back the archival records went is not indicated, but it points at least to well-organized archives some generations before 1100 B.C.

Passing now to the evidence of the Tel-el-Amarna letters. These letters, kept in the "place of the records of the King," were the diplomatic records of Egypt about 1400 B.C., and the excavated tablets include, as is well known, many letters from Palestine, even from Jerusalem itself. These were written in Babylonian, the diplomatic language of the time, and relate in general to matters concerning relations of tributary kings to the Egyptian king. The general significance of the state of things is learned from the annals of Tahutimes III and elsewhere, where the annual tributes, including king's sons and king's daughters, male and female slaves, vases, precious stones, rare spices, silver and gold, etc., are enumerated. They bought peace by annual tribute. It was a part of the Egyptian policy to take king's sons to Egypt, educate them in their ways and send them back to rule, steeped in Egyptian ideas, when their fathers died.

We have therefore letters from scores of princes in as many different places scattered over the whole region between Egypt and Babylonia. Some of these princes, at least, were "skilled scribes," educated in Egypt, and all able themselves or through secretaries (such as Kherapasera, "official scribe of the Hittite king," about 1325 B.C., cf. Paton, p. 125) to write Babylonian letters. One of these places, if we may believe Cook in Cheyne-Black (p. 1654) and others, is the very place Gebal which afterward, in the time of Wen-Amen, is known to have had such a library (but cf. Petrie, p. 314). In any event, putting the fact of the Gebal archive in relation with the general circumstances, we have a pretty complete picture of an archival system extending all over Syria and Palestine, with scores of libraries precisely similar to archival libraries in Egypt and Babylonia. These would contain records, contracts, terms of treaties and tributes at least. A striking example of what these would include is a treaty

between the Hittite and Egyptian kings, first drawn by the Hittite and sent to the king of Egypt on a silver tablet about 1300 B.C. This refers to earlier treaties and implies that copies of this and earlier treaties were kept in Hittite archives.

On the east of Jordan there are only two or three Amarna libraries, but it is to the point to connect the inscriptions of Mesha here, especially as it carries the geographical boundaries of libraries east and south. Suppose this even to be not earlier than 850 B.C., still, as Bevan (Cheyne-Black, 5358) says, it points to a literary period some time older, and "we may conclude with certainty that at the time of Mesha the Semitic alphabet was not a very recent invention."

Moreover, Mesha's stone relates his conquest of Nebo. Join with this the fact to which Jastrow alludes (*Rel. Bab.*, p. 130), that in the name of Nebo in Moab "there survives a testimony that the worship of this popular deity extended beyond the Euphrates and the Tigris." Now Nabu or Nebo (p. 124) "is the wise, the all-knowing. He embodies in his person all the wisdom of the gods." He was (p. 129) "god of writing and the patron of science"; like Mercury, he was herald of the gods. Ashurbanipal "invokes Nabu on thousands of tablets of this library as 'the opener of ears to understanding.'" Sargon "calls him the 'writer of everything.'" It need hardly be added that where this god was worshiped there was, by that very fact, literature and libraries, and if there were any historical ground for supposing that Moses had ever been at Nebo (city or mountain), this itself would be enough to account for his sources had he written Genesis!

This inscription of Mesha, reminding of the victory inscriptions and boundary pillars of Egypt and Babylonia, suggests the pertinent query whether the boundary pillar of Jacob and Laban may not have been inscribed and furnished a written source for legend in later writings, and so of other monuments when not expressly described as untouched by chisel. Certainly we have the tradition, however late, that Joshua by command of Moses did inscribe the whole on the stones of an altar, and this at least suggests, and perhaps by archæological inference evidences, that the various altars and pillars mentioned as memorials were in fact inscribed.

But however it may be of "inscription libraries," there is a much more curious and probable suggestion of a tomb library in the account of Abraham's purchase of a grotto-tomb at Hebron. By the nature of Babylonian custom there would probably be records there; the very detailed account of the sale would suggest that the

actual contracts were then preserved. In any event, the elaborate preparations of Joseph for his father's burial certainly suggest to any one who will follow the elaborate Egyptian funeral custom given in Erman (319-25) or Budge (*Mummy*, p. 154-73) that, supposing this to have any historicity, Joseph would not have felt it in any way decent not to have made some written records to "keep his father's name alive" and give his achievements and ancestry. The same would in less degree be true of Joseph's tomb and others. Without pretending that this suggestion of inscription and tomb libraries is evidence in any conclusive sense, there is at least a conjectural possibility as to the above two sources, strengthened by the fact that, though few inscribed objects have been found in Palestinian tombs, still there have been a few.

We have, therefore, all these libraries of the Amarna tablets, the libraries of Kirjath-Sapher and perhaps Nebo, the possible tomb inscriptions, boundary inscriptions, and memorial tablets.

All this only emphasizes and reinforces with enlarged content what all the critics agree on "as to the highly civilized Canaanites." Not only were they able to produce the exquisitely artistic objects shown upon the Egyptian monuments among the spoils of the Egyptian victors, about 1500 B.C., but the whole land from Tyre and Gebel to the extreme of Moab was dotted with libraries at this time, like Assyria and Babylonia on the one hand and Egypt on the other. This state of things is conclusive against any hypothesis of tribes, however wild to begin with, remaining untouched by literary sources for several centuries. It is not so conclusive of the fact that J E P D, written at the times alleged, were derived from written rather than oral sources, nor does it necessarily contradict the view that writing in Hebrew was not much developed before 1050. The fact was, that these libraries were undoubtedly (in part at least) written in a language already dead or nearly so among the Canaanites. It bore, in the early period, the same relation to the current language that Latin did to the popular speech, say, of Italy and France in the thirteenth century. In a later period, about the time when J and E are alleged to have been written, it was so dead that the Mesopotamians themselves were translating its literature wholesale into Assyrian for their libraries. During most of this period the Egyptians were writing their literary works in the language and style of antiquity. In short, the libraries and written and scholarly language stood to the current language as Latin and Greek to French and Italian during, perhaps, the fourteenth century. To deny libraries and books in a highly civilized people at

this time would be like denying that there were libraries in Italy during the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, which is certainly contrary to facts. So far, then, as the abundant existence of written sources is concerned the matter seems pretty clear, but whether these sources were transmitted to the time when they are alleged to have been gathered up through popular tradition is not so fully established. The presumption is that there were books in living languages more or less akin to the Hebrew not so very long after the time of the Exodus, and perhaps translations from the older documents, but there is little need of raising the question whether they were in one language or another.

These matters relate so far chiefly to libraries before the Israelites entered Palestine, and the evidence from the fact of high cultivation and numerous libraries among the Canaanites of the times is conclusive up to this point only against the theory that writing and written documents were not well known among the Hebrews before 1050.

Passing now to the evidence for books and libraries in the Hebrew writings, the matter would be simple enough under the traditional hypothesis of the Hexateuch. Taking it on the ground of the critics and trying to look at it through their eyes it is a different matter, but, after all, not as hopeless as it seems at first, with all the most significant direct mentions of books discredited. It is true that it is only the late priestly narratives which connect Moses with Nebo in the direct sense, and that Nebo may have had another meaning; nevertheless the fact or tradition that the Israelites spent some time in this region where Nebo undoubtedly was, and where, if Nebo was not a library, there were certainly books and libraries, is witnessed by all the lines of tradition and belongs to the *Grundschrift*, whether that was oral or written. It has, moreover, at least a curious touch of reality in the very late priestly narrative, which is real evidence that Nebo was from Nabu and so a library, in the suggestion that this was one of the cities to be changed in "name," because, of course, it was the name of a heathen divinity.

In the same way the quadruple or triple or at least dual traditions, even if supposed to be exclusively oral, but to go back to 1250, bear witness in common to the stories representing the early history of Abram (for which indeed Paton finds a document), to the story of Joseph, the fact of an Exodus, and many other matters less to our point. We may, therefore, suppose that the unanimous tradition from 1250 was at least as to the fact of an Exodus from Egypt. This brings it as near, say, to the supposed time of the Exodus as

the Revolutionary War or the landing of the Pilgrims is to us. They came, according to this hypothesis, from a land of as high civilization relatively to the world in general as the Pilgrims did, and they not only brought some memories at least of that civilization with them, but they came among a civilized people—an advantage which the Pilgrims did not have. Possibly a fairer analogy would be the civilized Spaniards coming to the civilized Aztecs; but the gap here would be too great, and, on the whole, it is fair to say that there is just as much antecedent probability, from the standpoint of the librarian and of library history, that a history of the Exodus of the Pilgrim Fathers from England with a sojourn in Holland, written to-day, should be interpreted by the historian of 3000 years hence as a gathering up of oral tradition, as that J and E should be regarded as a gathering of oral tradition of an Exodus from Egypt with a sojourn in East Jordan.

Starting from the mere fact of an Exodus from Egypt, universally implied in the tradition, this is confirmed by the undoubted fact that there were insurrections and migrations of slaves from Egypt, one-third of whose families were foreigners or of foreign descent and contained vast numbers, as we know, of children of princes, skilled artisans and the like, imported from Palestine—starting from the bare fact of an Exodus from Egypt at about this general time (between, say, 1500 and 1100) and several substantial bases are assured. In the first place, the revolting slaves at least had scribal overseers of their own people. These scribal overseers were educated, and it was part of their business to superintend and to keep records of the work. Even, therefore, if Moses was not brought up by the daughter of the king and especially trained in all the learning of the Egyptians, still the leaders of the people (such as the seventy elders appointed, according to E and also P, very soon after leaving Egypt, must have been) would necessarily have been more or less trained in scribal knowledge for the performance of their work in building store cities, etc.

In the second place, there is at least a triple statement of the writing on the two stone tablets, *i.e.*, a tradition of some writing from the very beginning. It may be that one swallow does not make a summer, but any writing at this stage, put together with the fact that these were men who had come out of Egypt, is enough to base a good deal of definite suggestion on. It is not disputed that, for great periods in later history, the traditional supposition was that these tables at least were kept in the Ark—whatever else may have been there. It is alleged in the verses which the critics have

expurgated from Deuteronomy that it contained also the book of Deuteronomy written by Moses, and this was the common view in later times. It was certainly supposed later that it contained some other matters, for when, after its wanderings, it was deposited in Jerusalem and opened and found to contain nothing but the tables, this was counted surprising enough to record. It may have been the pot of manna and Aaron's rod only whose absence caused surprise, but this much seems clear, that at one time or another tradition did regard the Ark as containing not only the tables of stone, but the roll of the law. Perhaps, even, the Ark in which the roll of the law is now kept in the Hebrew synagogue (*Jew. Enc.*, 2: 107) may be an echo of this traditional view. In any event, the tablets must have been kept somewhere, and wherever they were kept they were a library, and any other books would have been likely to have been kept with them. Now, turning to the customs of Egypt, from the life of which these men were only barely separated in space and time, we recall (Cheyne-Black, 306) that in the temples of Egypt, and probably of Syria, inscriptions were set up and papyri kept in little wooden chests, and that rolls of leather recounting the events of a king's reign, taken down from day to day, were kept there likewise, while in the Babylonian region there were terra-cotta and alabaster boxes containing stone tablets. We have thus at least a presumption that these tables of stone would have been kept in something like the Ark, even if the point is made that these boxes are not identified with the shrine which was carried upon the boat, and which is obviously the origin of the Ark—the arks of Amen-Ra or of Bel. Still the tradition associating the tablets and the roll of the law with the Ark does, by any fair interpretation of tradition, identify the two functions in the Ark of the Israelites, which was, therefore, their library under every fair interpretation of a library and of tradition.

Looking a little more closely into the "tradition" of the Ark and the Egyptian shrine, we observe that not only was the chest or shrine supposed to contain or to be intimately associated with the Divinity itself, but in both cases God was alleged to speak from it, and it was even supposed to contain God. Again, these oracles which, among Egyptians and Israelites alike, began with a fixed liturgical formula for the oracle "Thus saith the Lord," were, in the case of the Egyptian oracles from such shrines, often recorded consecutively on a roll in the order of utterance with the formula. In any event they would, by men familiar with writing and from an atmosphere where everything was (as is said likewise of

Babylonia) set down for which there could be a reason for setting down, naturally be committed to writing. Whether Jethro was a priest of Midian or not and had his temple archives organized after the fashion of Egypt or Babylonia, his advice to his son-in-law to organize his legal decisions was the work of an experienced organizer of such matters, such as the priests of the time, notably the priests of Sippara, were in fact officially, as we know from an immense amount of Babylonian testimony. In any event the tradition is that Moses so organized the legal work that he reserved for himself the important decisions, light on which he sought directly from Jehovah, and the balance he entrusted to minor judges. The inevitable outcome of this sort of thing would have been a written memorandum of decisions. He would probably have made a systematic memorandum of decisions up to the time of beginning a system, and this would have been somewhat of the nature of a code. He would then have added, "from day to day," to the roll such new decisions as were made, and this common law he might naturally have codified toward the end of his life in a more mature style—although we must not forget that we are speaking only on the grounds of the critics who say that, as a matter of fact, the book of Deuteronomy was not such a writing. However this may be, it was natural, and indeed inevitable, considering the place and time, that the decisions of Jehovah should have been set down on papyrus or on leather, and, taken in connection with the tradition of the Ark and the matter of the tables, it is fair to assume, quite apart from the resting-place of Deuteronomy, that a roll or rolls of day-to-day decisions would also have been kept in the Ark. It seems quite likely, from the different classes of laws mentioned, statutes, judgments, etc., that there may have been several rolls in active commission at the same time. That the Ark was the library is also, perhaps, confirmed by the very fact that it was regarded as the abode of Jehovah, at least in later times. This would be most natural if from out its depths were taken and read to the uneducated populace the very words of God. It may even not be too fanciful to connect Jehovah and the Word of God, as connected in later Jewish thought, with these written words within the Ark, as well as the voice proceeding from or from above it.

Now we recall once again that the whole tradition agrees that the Israelites halted on the east of Jordan, in the region of Nebo and Yabishi, where, or in the vicinity of which, there were undoubtedly libraries and where Moses might well have spent some of his later

days writing from the records there, the records written during the wanderings, and such inscriptions as they might have found like, perhaps, the boundary pillar of Jacob and Laban. Whatever it contained, when the Ark went across Jordan, copies might have been left for Reuben and Gad, and across the Jordan copies made for other sanctuaries north and south other than where the Ark was. In this event there might have been at some time or another a copy in Ephraim, a copy in Judea, a copy in East Jordan, and even other copies. Some of these manuscripts would have perished in wars, some might have been carried away in raids to Damascus or Babylon, affording thus a threefold or a fourfold manuscript tradition. Each of these manuscripts would have been liable, if papyrus or even if leather, to become worn and perhaps fragmentary, and would be recopied, perhaps in fragmentary form. Other books, like Joshua's Survey and the various others to which we have allusions, would be added to the general collection, and to the original documents would be added such new facts as might be picked up from boundary pillars, memorial tablets, tomb inscriptions, and records, etc., and finally epitomes and histories would be made from them.

This history of the Ark library is (granted the smallest original premise of an Ark library, which is at least, if they came out of Egypt at all, entirely accordant with both circumstance and tradition) the natural and necessary history, and is to be carried to the point where the papyrus and leather documents had been taken away and only the tables of stone left, then to the loss of the tables of stone and the disappearance of the Ark itself, unless we can regard the synagogue boxes for the roll of the law, as the *Jewish Encyclopedia* seems to do, a spiritual descendant.

Under this conception of the Ark library the common content of J E P D would be this library. It would be the Grundschrift. Additions or alterations would be the work of later hands. It would not imply how much was done by Moses or how much by a later hand, so long as it remained together in the Ark, but the various currents of tradition would be the written transmission of variant copies of the contents of this library, the earliest of which should have been the alleged stone inscription of Joshua.

It would be unfortunate to have this constructive hypothesis, which it is not attempted to establish in detail, pass for more than a hypothesis. It looks from the book standpoint as if it (including of course the ascription to later hands of everything contradictory to it) was a good working one, but it is intended merely as a just .

response to the proper scientific demand that in the denial of oral tradition, at least a possible method of accounting for the facts positively should be offered, and the substantial facts of the Ark library, indeed all the necessary ones, seem to the writer soundly established on the grounds of comparative library history.

The object of the paper is, however, to maintain that the state of civilization, learning and libraries during the two or three hundred years preceding 1250, or say 1050, is such as to make a hypothesis of oral tradition unnecessary and improbable; while in view of the nature of the documents J E P D and the traces of individual documents, such as the one relating to Abram, the genealogies introduced by their technical formulæ, the oracles by theirs, there is actual evidence of individual written sources, whether they were introduced before Moses or after.

What bearing these considerations may have on critical positions in general this paper does not pretend to say. It may be suggested, however, that they point to the following critical tasks if the work is to be taken up at the point of analysis into J E P D: (1) The reconstruction of the Grundschrift; (2) The further analysis of this into its individual, genealogical, historical, religious and legal documents; and (3) A further study of the history as a whole, starting out from the minimum basis of undoubtedly unanimous "tradition." It may perhaps be confessed that so far as the writer is concerned, on the broad lines already considered, the margin of doubt seems chiefly to concern the question whether Genesis and Deuteronomy joined the library before or after crossing the Jordan, and what additions were made to the Hexateuch after the time of Joshua. He at least sees no reason why the four documents J E P D should not be regarded as four recensions of a common work, whether P and D had J E for their main line, and only odds and ends of variation to offer, or were themselves full independent transmissions. For that matter there is no *à priori* documentary reason why the present form should not be a sort of Tischendorf's *Critica Major*, with the variants run into the text.

But if the constructive suggestion proves scientifically impossible, even on the unanimously recognized principle of higher criticism, that whatever does not agree with a good hypothesis may be ascribed to "later hands," still this does not affect the fact unanimously recognized by the critics that the Israelites were living in an immediate environment of high civilization, subject to its influences from all sides, or that this civilization included not merely books and libraries, but plentiful books and libraries. Nor does it affect

the presumption against anything more than a small element of oral tradition under these circumstances, or the fact that there are internal evidences of written documents such as that recognized by Paton regarding Abram. This particular essay of Paton is, indeed, the most significant and almost the only attempt to approach the documentary problem from the standpoint of library history—although the present writer, while accepting the analysis, does not accept the conclusions from the document analyzed.

Princeton.

ERNEST CUSHING RICHARDSON.

III.

WILLIAM MILLER PAXTON.*

WE are here to-day gratefully to remember before God the life of one of His saints. Up to a good old age he abode among us, imitating his Master's example, going about doing good. Our eyes see him no more: he no longer passes in and out, showing us daily what it is to walk with God. But our hearts are glad for him yet: and we wish to give expression to our gratitude to God for his gift, and to recount the chief services he has been permitted to render to the Church of God on earth.

William Miller Paxton was descended from a godly ancestry of thoroughly Presbyterian traditions. As the name indicates, the family was of Berwickshire origin. In the branch of it from which Dr. Paxton sprang it was Scotch-Irish. The earliest of his paternal ancestors who has been certainly traced—the fourth in ascent from him—is found a little before the middle of the eighteenth century living in Bart township, Lancaster county, Pennsylvania, in a Scotch-Irish community which worshiped at Middle Octorara Church. The only son of this founder of the family served as an elder in that church; and out of it came his son, Dr. Paxton's grandfather, the Rev. Dr. William Paxton, who, after having like his father before him fought in the Revolutionary war for the liberties of his country, enlisted as a soldier of Christ in the never-ceasing conflict for righteousness. Crossing the Susquehanna, he was settled in 1792 as pastor of Lower Marsh Creek Church, in what is now Adams county, Pennsylvania, and there fulfilled a notable ministry of half a century's duration. Thus a new home was given to the family in a region of remarkable beauty and in a community of similar origin and congenial temperament.

Dr. Paxton always cherished a wholesome pride in his ancestral home and his lineage. When he reckoned among the felicities of Dr. Francis Herron's career that he was born "beneath the shadow of Pennsylvania's lofty mountains, and reared amid the patriots

* A discourse delivered, by appointment of the Faculty, in Miller Chapel, Princeton Theological Seminary, February 24, 1905.



of the Revolution"; and that he was a scion "of that illustrious historic race, the Scotch-Irish Presbyterians—memorable in all their generations for their devotion to liberty and religion, and ever ready to die upon the battlefield in the defense of the one or to burn at the stake as a testimony for the other"—he spoke out of his own consciousness of a noble heritage. And it was a source of constant delight to him that, having himself begun to study theology within three months of the death of his grandfather, their combined ministries fulfilled an almost continuous service in the Gospel of more than one hundred years. Nor was this continuity merely a matter of years. When we read the account of the Rev. Dr. William Paxton which his friend, Dr. McConaughy, has left us, we seem almost to be reading of our own Dr. Paxton. The "benignant and intelligent countenance," the "strong, vigorous and balanced intellect," the "symmetrically developed faculties," "the warmth of affection," "delicate sensibility," "chaste imagination," which Dr. McConaughy signalizes as characteristic of his Dr. Paxton—his care and exactness in the mental preparation of his sermons, the naturalness and lucidity of their arrangement, the thoroughness of their discussion, the freedom, solemnity, dignity, authority, grace of their delivery: have we not seen all these things repeated in our Dr. Paxton? We are told that Dr. Paxton was particularly fond of his grandfather and loved to visit him and be much with him. We all remember the affectionate reverence with which he always referred to him. We can scarcely be wrong in supposing that, in addition to his natural inheritance from him, he consciously modeled himself upon his example.

Dr. Paxton's father, Colonel James Dunlop Paxton, was a man of intelligence and enterprise, of fine presence and large influence in the community, engaged in the manufacture of iron, first at Maria Furnace, which was situated at the foot of South Mountain, some ten or twelve miles from Gettysburg, and afterward, in partnership with the Hon. Thaddeus Stevens, at Caledonia Iron Works, on the pike between Gettysburg and Chambersburg. It was at Maria Furnace that William Miller Paxton was born, on the 7th day of June, 1824. His youth was passed chiefly at Gettysburg, whither the family had removed that Mrs. Paxton, a daughter of the Hon. William Miller, might be among her people during a long and trying period of weak health. Here he spent a sunny and gay-tempered boyhood, winning affection on all sides by the brightness of his disposition and his happy, fun-loving humor. Here also he received both his primary schooling and his collegiate training, the latter

at Pennsylvania College—recently founded, it is true, but already occupying an enviable position among colleges under the efficient presidency of the Rev. Dr. Charles Philip Krauth. In college he enjoyed the fellowship of a choice company of young men who, like himself, were to give a good account of themselves in the future as ministers of Christ—Lutherans like B. M. Schmucker and J. P. Benjamin Sadtler, President of Muhlenberg College; Episcopalians like Robert Harper Clarkson, Bishop of Nebraska; Presbyterians like G. W. McMillan, missionary to India, and J. B. Bittinger, teacher and preacher. Among his fellow-students were also at least two who were to serve the Church efficiently as professors of theology, Henry Ziegler, of Selinsgrove, and James A. Brown, who taught theology for nearly twenty years at Gettysburg. Graduated in 1843, he carried away from college a reputation for rare social qualities and great gifts in oratory.

Residing now at Caledonia Iron Works, he began the study of law in the office of Judge George Chambers at Chambersburg. He had not yet given himself to Christ. During his last year in college the institution was visited by a most blessed revival; and during his period of law study the community was moved to its centre by another, in which his chief, Judge Chambers, for example, was converted. He seems to have passed through both without reaching a decision. How the great change came to him at last we do not know in any detail. We only know that the grace of God was in part mediated to him through the offices of his devout sister, and that after prosecuting the study of law for almost two years, he united on profession of faith with the Falling Spring Presbyterian Church at Chambersburg, in March, 1845. Dr. Daniel McKinley was pastor of the church; and we hear from Dr. Paxton's associates of those days much about his affectionate intimacy with his pastor. Not more than a month after uniting with the Church, on April 9, 1845, he was received under the care of the Presbytery of Carlisle as a candidate for the Gospel ministry, and in the ensuing autumn he repaired to Princeton for his theological training. It would appear from this that when he gave himself to his Lord he gave himself completely, holding nothing back.

We are not unprepared, therefore, to learn that he took his seminary course seriously; and sought to utilize to the full the opportunities it brought him to prepare for the great work to which he had devoted himself. Although so young a Christian, he appears to have stood out among his comrades from the first for the depth and fervor of his religious life. Those were, indeed, days of search-

ing of heart for him. "I well remember," he has told us himself, "that when I was a student, no young man could pass through his first year without being constrained to reëxamine his personal hope and motives for seeking the sacred office." No doubt this is primarily an encomium upon the pungency of the religious teaching of those four great men under whose instruction he sat—Drs. Archibald Alexander and Samuel Miller, Drs. Charles Hodge and Addison Alexander. But it is a leaf, also, out of his spiritual autobiography. His fellow-students bear consentient witness to the singleness of his purpose, the seriousness of his character, the dignity of his bearing, and the attractiveness of his personality. "He was a hard student," writes one, "industrious and painstaking; as a man, solid and judicious, and hence wielding much influence over men." Another touches the heart of the matter when he remarks that he had obviously said to himself, "This one thing I do." "He did not fritter away his time," continues this informant; "he made theology, the grandest of the sciences, his study, and how to deliver the Gospel message most effectively." "The memory of what Paxton was," he adds, "and of his devotion to theology and to his Lord and Master, has remained with me, and has been a distinct and decided help to me in my weakness and in my times of doubt and difficulty."

One of the things Dr. Paxton always congratulated himself upon was that he had had a double training in theology. "The class to which I belonged," he tells us, "heard" Dr. Archibald Alexander's "lectures upon Didactic Theology as well as those of Dr. Hodge. Dr. Hodge gave us a subject with massive learning, in its logical development, in its beautiful balance and connection with the whole system. Dr. Alexander would take the same subject and smite it with a javelin, and let the light through it. His aim was to make one point and nail it fast. I always came from a lecture with these words ringing through my mind, 'A nail driven in a sure place.'" But his devotion to the study of theology was more than matched by his zeal in cultivating the art of presenting its truths in strong, clear and winning public address. A doctrinal preacher he wished to be, because he felt to the core of his being that it is useless to preach at all unless you preach the truth. But the real end of his study of doctrine was that he might become a doctrinal preacher. He had no sympathy with that kind of doctrinal preacher which he called, not without a touch of contempt, "a theological grinder"; and whose procedure he described as "crushing and pulverizing truth between logical millstones, and then doling it out, grain by grain, particle by particle, as if the bread

of heaven was scarce, and the minister restricted to a slow and frugal distribution." He longed to become himself a preacher who could preach doctrine—as he put it—"all ablaze," who could "put the light of his own living experience inside" the doctrine, and "make it a spiritual transparency" which would "interest and attract." "A heart that is full of Christ," he said, "will gild every doctrine with the halo of His glory."

With this ideal held steadily before him, he spared no labor in perfecting himself in the art of orally presenting truth. Already in college, we will remember, he had exhibited marked oratorical gifts: and during the interval between college and seminary he had exercised these gifts in political speaking. Now, however, he set himself definitively to develop them to their utmost capacity. His sister remembered all her life his diligence on his visits home in the training of his voice: there was a jutting rock on the mountainside to which he would resort for this purpose, and which lived in her memory as her "brother's pulpit." His fellow-students noted not only the diligence but the success of his efforts. "When he was to preach or to conduct a prayer service," one of them writes, "we students were always present, and we all expected he would make a great and popular preacher." There was one special occasion for the exercise of his gifts arising in the course of his Senior year, to which he looked back as to a kind of epoch in his life. It was in the month of February, 1848. A precious work of grace was going on in the Tennent Church, and Dr. Alexander was applied to for aid. He sent three students, of whom Dr. Paxton was one; and unexpectedly to themselves they were thrust into the thick of the work. "The blessing that rested upon the people," said Dr. Paxton in relating it, "seemed to fall on us." The way one of his fellow-students puts it is, "They conducted the services with marked success."

As his seminary life drew to its close, it became evident enough that such a young man would not go begging for a pulpit. Calls came to him unsought and even somewhat embarrassingly. But the people of his own region who knew him well had been wise enough to forestall all others. Already, on the 16th of February, 1848, "the congregation of East Conococheague, commonly known as Greencastle," had sent him a hearty call and had received assurances of his acceptance. He was on the field as soon as the seminary closed, and was formally ordained and installed on the 4th day of the ensuing October. He was only twenty-four years of age, but was far from a callow and unformed youth. One who knew him

well describes him as at the time "a remarkably handsome young man of a commanding presence, a superb figure, with beautiful eyes and a splendid voice." He was already a "great sermonizer," to whom large congregations listened "with almost breathless attention." It is interesting to learn that he had already worked out that peculiar method of preparing his sermons which he employed throughout life—"walking them out," as he expressed it, that is, mentally composing them as he paced back and forth in his study, thereby wearing a pathway in the carpet which observant visitors used to amuse themselves tracing out. "In 1849-1850," writes my informant, "I was teaching in the Chambersburg Academy, and, as a licentiate, was supplying the church at Fayetteville, five miles out. Mr. Paxton's kindness of heart and friendliness were exhibited in this, that he was willing to come and preach for me. . . . After dinner Paxton said to me, 'I must be alone this afternoon, to make my preparation to preach this evening.' He told me he had selected Romans iii. 19 for his text. He spent a couple of hours, perhaps more, walking to and fro in the little parlor, arranging his heads of discourse, gathering his illustrations, and going over the words and sentences that he would use—without a book, save the Bible, without a scrap of paper, without pen or pencil. That a man could do such a thing and then preach such a grand and thrilling sermon as we heard that evening filled me with astonishment."

The church of Greencastle was one of those good old churches characteristic of the region, with a membership at the time of about 200 and paying a salary of \$600. The reportable results of the young minister's labors during his two years of work there were twenty-one additions on confession of faith, the first fruits of the great number of 609 of whom it was his privilege to become thus the spiritual father before the ministry thus inaugurated reached its close, yielding an average of about eighteen for each year of his active work. From Greencastle he was transferred to Pittsburgh at the end of the year 1850, and was formally installed pastor of the First Presbyterian Church of Pittsburgh on the 28th of the following January. This new church was but little larger in mere number of communicants than the one he had left, but it was of indefinitely more importance, possessing, indeed, a truly metropolitan influence and burdened with thronging metropolitan responsibilities. We cannot stay to tell the story of the young pastor's reception. Suffice it to say that the new pastorate was most auspiciously begun, and its very first months were marked by a work of grace which had scarcely

died away before it was followed by another and stronger wave of interest which not only added largely to the membership of the church, but greatly increased the fervor of its religious life and the energy of its Christian activity. The membership grew steadily throughout the pastorate from 237 at its beginning to 446 at its close. And membership in Mr. Paxton's church—or now, since Jefferson College had honored itself by conferring upon him in 1860 the degree of D.D., we must say Dr. Paxton's—meant something. In reaction against the abounding wickedness of a great city, the ideal of Christian living was cast very high in the First Church of Pittsburgh, and very strict obligations were laid upon its members. From 1860 its protest against the prevalent laxity was embodied in a formal pledge, exacted from those who made confession of their faith, to abstain from such worldly amusements as the opera, theatre, circus, cards, dancing. The measure had at least the effect of compacting the membership into an efficient body of serious men and women who were in earnest in the development of their own spiritual lives, and effective in the campaign against vice. An outward sign of the prosperity of the church was the building of a handsome new edifice in the opening years of the pastorate. But this was only one landmark of a constant growth in strength and influence through these eventful years.

To appreciate how eventful these years were we need only to remind ourselves that within their compass fell the great Civil War, and to recall what that war, quite apart from the upheaval it wrought in the whole land, meant especially for the expansion of Pittsburgh. The anxieties, the responsibilities, the labors that were cast at such a time upon such a church and upon such a pastor, it is difficult for us in these quieter times adequately to estimate. Suffice it to say the strain was borne by congregation and pastor with unfailing dignity and success. Dr. Paxton's personal attitude during this great struggle was that of a convinced and enthusiastic loyalist. In the memorial sermon preached upon his predecessor in the pastorate of the church, Dr. Herron, who died December 8, 1860, he already passionately asserts the "sacredness of the compact which bound these States together." He was not a member of the Assembly of 1861, and I do not know what he thought of the famous "Spring Resolutions" passed there. Possibly, like Dr. Charles Hodge and Dr. Robert J. Breckinridge, that they were *ultra vires*. But if so, this did not in his case, any more than in theirs, affect his profound conviction of the righteousness, nay, the sacredness, of the principles asserted in those resolutions. In the Assembly of 1862,

accordingly—now, alas! no longer the Assembly of the whole land—he cast his vote for Dr. Breckinridge's paper on "The State of the Church and of the Country," in which much the same ground was taken.

On the succeeding Thanksgiving Day—November 28, 1862—he preached a striking sermon, in which sounds the note not only of courageous but of optimistic loyalty, which appears to have rung through his whole life in those dark days. I refer to this sermon here that I may take from it a clause which suggests an interesting incident in Dr. Paxton's life, in which some of the primary traits of his character are revealed. I do not quote this clause, you will observe, as a characteristic one: it is quite possible that in calmer days Dr. Paxton might have modified its phraseology. He is speaking of the last months of Mr. Buchanan's administration, and he characterizes them, shortly, as a period when "imbecility filled the Presidential chair." Now in the closing chapter of Mr. George Ticknor Curtis' *Life of James Buchanan* you will find a beautiful letter from Dr. Paxton, describing how, in August, 1860, when events were already hastening to the dreadful gulf which was opening before the nation—after the division of the Democratic party had been hopelessly accomplished and the election of the Republican candidate was practically assured, and after the speech of July 9, in which Mr. Buchanan cast in his lot with the Southern wing of the Democracy—Dr. Paxton held repeated earnest conferences with Mr. Buchanan on the nature of experimental religion and the significance of a profession of faith in Christ, and received from him assurances of his trust in the Saviour and of his purpose of soon uniting with the Church. It is like an oasis in a thirsty land to fall upon this record of faithful pastoral work in the midst of those tumultuous years. What a light it throws upon the intensity of Dr. Paxton's political convictions, that fresh from these intimate interviews, in which his own heart had been aglow with Christian love, his judgment of his interlocutor's political policy remained absolutely unaffected! But above all, what a sense we obtain of his absorption in his pastoral functions! It is a beautiful sight to see him, in the midst of that violent campaign, when men's passions were stirred to their depths with political rancor, sitting quietly in conference with a political opponent whose dispraise was not only on the lips of all his companions but embedded deeply in his own heart, conversing with him day by day on the serious concerns of the soul, and never, apparently, even tempted to permit the feelings engendered by the political strife to mar the perfection

of his pastoral attitude, or to distort his judgment of the purity of heart of his distinguished disciple. "I have never entertained a doubt of the entire honesty of Mr. Buchanan's religious impressions," he testifies years afterward, "or of the reality of his religious convictions."

No doubt the pastoral instinct and skill revealed in such an incident had much to do with the fruitfulness of his Pittsburgh pastorate. But above everything else Dr. Paxton was, in those Pittsburgh days, the preacher. Coming to them in his youthful vigor, he yet brought with him a perfected homiletical art. From the beginning he easily took rank among the first preachers of the two cities, although there were numbered among them men like Drs. Swift and Howard, Drs. Plummer and Kendall, Drs. Jacobus and Wilson, every one of them, as one of their constant hearers phrases it, "a prince unrivaled in his own style and manner." Dr. Paxton's special "style and manner" involved the most elaborate preparation, and particularly the most exact attention to the structure of his sermons. Some felt that, as a result, they were apt to be even "faultily faultless," and to sacrifice something of fervor to methodical development and grace of expression. This was not, however, the general opinion: his audience-room was ever crowded with eager hearers, and he was sought after on every hand for those occasional addresses for which chaste speech is essential. The themes he chose were ordinarily "those that lie at the heart of the Gospel." "He always gave himself plenty of time, and as a rule took the full hour." "He set his sermon squarely on his text as a tree stands on its tap-root: sent out smaller roots all through the context: the trunk was short and stocky; then he threw out the great branches, following each to its smaller limbs and even twigs, until his sermon stood complete and symmetrical and stately like one of the great live-oaks of California." "His literary style," continues my informant, "was clear, methodical and elevated. His appearance, address and action in the pulpit were those of an Apollo. A more graceful man I have never seen in pulpit or on platform. Tall, slender, erect, faultlessly attired, every motion was easy, natural, dignified and all in perfect taste." Such was Dr. Paxton in his prime, as he appeared in the pulpit—a model preacher, worthy of all imitation in matter and manner alike, while in the art of "dividing a text" he was looked upon as beyond the possibility of imitation.

Is it any wonder that he was greedily coveted by the seminary over in Allegheny? Surely he had been destined and trained just that he might teach young men how to preach! The opportunity

to secure his services for this great work opened at last, we may well believe, somewhat unexpectedly. The authorities of Princeton Seminary appeared at the Assembly of 1860 with a request that a fifth professor be granted them—a Professor of Sacred Rhetoric. As they came with the endowment of the chair in their hands, the request could scarcely be denied. The authorities of the Western Seminary at Allegheny, however, felt they must not be outdone by Princeton; and they succeeded in persuading Dr. Paxton to undertake the teaching of sacred rhetoric in that institution as its fifth professor. But as they had no funds provided for his support, with characteristic generosity he gave his services to the seminary for the whole period of his occupancy of the chair (1860–1872) entirely gratuitously.

Precisely what the Directors of the Western Theological Seminary desired of Dr. Paxton, and precisely what he undertook at their importunity, was to come and teach the students to preach as he preached. They saw in him a model preacher, into the likeness of whom they earnestly desired that their students might be moulded. He saw in the task that had come to him unsought an opportunity, not to philosophize upon the principles that underlie the homiletical art, nor to discuss the nature of preaching as a literary form, but simply to show the young men gathered in the seminary how to do it. If there ever was a preacher in the chair of preaching it was Dr. Paxton. At the first, indeed, it may well have seemed to the Allegheny students that there was little essential difference between his lectures and the sermons they were flocking to hear from him Sabbath by Sabbath over in Pittsburgh. He opened his course with a series of what may very well be called sermons on the preachers of the Bible, beginning with Enoch and running regularly down to our Lord and His apostles—sermons marked by all that closeness of scrutiny of the text, faithful eliciting of its substance and powerful application of its lessons which characterized all his preaching. Only, as he was now addressing not a general audience but a body of prospective preachers, the lessons which he pressed upon their consciences were lessons for preachers. In reading over the notes of these lectures, I have been deeply impressed by their value as a preparation for entering upon a formal study of Homiletics. Account for it as we may, the study of the formal arts is apt to be approached by students in a somewhat light spirit; and even what we call “sacred rhetoric” has not always escaped this fate. I cannot conceive, however, a serious-minded student approaching the temple through the propylæum which these opening sermons of

Dr. Paxton's built for it without putting the sandals once for all off his feet. And I am disposed to think that a large part of the power exerted by Dr. Paxton as a teacher of Homiletics was due to the success with which he induced and maintained in his pupils a sense of the holiness and responsibility of a preacher's function. With all the attention he gave to their form, sermons after all were to him interesting chiefly because of their substance and of their purpose: and he kept his students constantly aware of the sacredness of their substance and the holiness of their purpose. When he tells them in these opening lectures that "the true idea of preaching is the explanation of the Word of God"—that "the object of preaching is nothing else but to make clear what the Lord has taught"—he sounds the keynote of his entire Homiletical instruction.

When, these introductory lectures being over, Dr. Paxton passes to the direct inculcation of the art of sacred rhetoric, his main characteristic as a teacher of Homiletics springs at once into its fullest manifestation. I mean his intense practicality. The lectures are analytical and precise: the entire subject of sacred rhetoric is developed in them with formal completeness: but the whole tone and effect is that of a master-workman training his apprentices in the practice of an art. It is perfectly clear that Dr. Paxton is simply showing his pupils how to do what he has himself been accustomed to do with so great success; taking them into his confidence, so to speak, and making them free of the secrets of the trade. And this effect is powerfully reinforced by another striking element in his teaching—what we may call its empirical basis. Discarding all *à priori* theorizing as to what a sermon ought to be, he had set himself to make a survey of the existing sermonic literature with a view to ascertaining what, as an actual fact, good sermons are. His enunciations of the principles of sermon-building had in them, therefore, the vitality that comes from touch with the real.

The results of his exhaustive study of English sermonic literature he incorporated especially in lectures on the various methods of unfolding themes and later on the several classes of sermons. These lectures may justly be regarded as the heart of his instruction in Homiletics. He placed a very high value upon this elaborate piece of inductive work; and if he can be said to have had a hobby it must be discovered in his untiring zeal for sermonic analysis. His own skill in "dividing a theme" was remarkable; and he held it to be the highest accomplishment of a preacher to possess the power to distribute a text into its natural divisions, so that its entire message might be developed in an easy and effective presentation. He there-

fore begrudged no time or labor spent in cultivating this talent in his pupils; he not only presented the subject elaborately in his lectures, accompanied with abundant illustration, but diligently trained his pupils in the practice of the art, and himself set them an example which they might emulate but could scarcely hope to equal.

What now it is particularly interesting to observe is that all this was just as true of Dr. Paxton the first year of his teaching at Allegheny as it was the last year of his teaching at Princeton. One of the surprises which were brought to me by reading over the notes of his first year's lectures at Allegheny was the discovery that his elaborate scheme of sermonic division lay already complete in them. Certain minor adjustments were subsequently made, and the illustrative examples were increased and modified; but the scheme is there in its entirety. All this wide-reaching study of sermonic literature, all this elaborate induction of the proper structure of a sermon,—it had all been carried through by the young pastor for his own personal benefit, and the results were ready for presentation to his pupils from the first. This young pastor, you will see, was certainly diligent in business, and notably illustrated in his own person the prescription for success in sermonizing he was accustomed to give in these words: "Work! work! work!"

The Pittsburgh pastorate came to an end in the midsummer of 1865. The circumstances which brought it to a close recall us to Dr. Paxton's private life. Here, too, he filled out the measure of a normal human experience and was not left without the chastening of sorrow. Shortly after coming to Pittsburgh he married: but soon lost both wife and child. It was not until late in 1855 (Nov. 8) that his household was established by a marriage with one who might well be called a daughter of the church indeed,—Miss Caroline Sophia Denny, whose distinguished father, the Hon. Harmar Denny, had served the church with rare devotion as an elder for a generation, and whose grandfather, Major Ebenezer Denny, had been identified with its fortunes almost from its origin. In her Dr. Paxton found a modern example of that ideal wife described in the closing chapter of Proverbs, and of her the declaration was preëminently true that "the heart of her husband trusted in her." It would be impossible to separate her part from his in the achievements of their joint life. The oldest son of this marriage—in 1865 a boy approaching his fifth birthday—was subject to an asthmatic affection to which the thick air of Pittsburgh was fatal. There was nothing for it but to seek a more salubrious atmosphere.

So soon as it was known that Dr. Paxton was severing his relations with the Pittsburgh church he was besieged with applications for his services. Among other applicants the Board of Education sought him for its Secretaryship. In the end he accepted a call to the First Presbyterian Church in New York, into the pastorate of which he was formally installed on February 1, 1866.

In removing from Pittsburgh to New York, the centre of gravity of his work, so to speak, somewhat changed. In Pittsburgh everything ran up to the pulpit as its head: in New York it was rather the work of administration which took the central place. At no other period of his life was his preaching more admired: but the relative importance of preaching in the impact of his church on the world was less in New York than in Pittsburgh. The First Church of New York was the centre of the most ramified charities. It was veritably the mother church of the city, from which flowed forth nourishment for every religious and benevolent enterprise. "No one can study the history of this church," Dr. Paxton has himself remarked, "without being impressed and amazed at the streams of beneficent influence that have gone out from this source, and at the manner in which this church has been intimately connected with all those great moral, religious, benevolent, philanthropic and patriotic agencies which, from the very earliest times, controlled the formative influences in the growth and development of this great city." Not content with lavishing its fostering care upon charitable organizations—churches, schools, colleges, seminaries, hospitals, asylums—at home, and becoming "literally a 'fountain of living waters'" to the Boards of the Church, it had gone as far afield for objects of its beneficence as worthy needs could be discovered. "Dr. Chalmers' great schemes for the Church of Scotland received their first encouragement here," and through many years continued support. Much of the work of the Waldensian Church in Italy was made possible only by aid from this church, and its theological seminary at Florence was built from this source. Into the midst of this abundant stream of wisely directed beneficence Dr. Paxton came in 1866, when it was running so full that, like Jordan in the time of harvest, it was overflowing all its banks. The contributions of the church to the Board of Foreign Missions alone during his pastorate averaged nearly \$30,000 annually and aggregated more than half a million. Other things were in proportion. To name but a single item, the Presbyterian Hospital was rendered possible only by a gift from Mr. James Lenox. He, of course, was the greatest giver, but not the only great giver. Mrs. Winthrop, for example,

whose splendid bequest this seminary hopes soon to enter into the enjoyment of, placed a large sum annually in Dr. Paxton's hands to be distributed at his discretion.

As pastor of this church Dr. Paxton became, therefore, very much a man of affairs, an almoner to the Church universal. "His labors during this period," as one who knew him well and watched his work with sympathetic eye remarks, "were enormous, and yet they were transacted with a kind of calmness and equipoise which never failed to impress one with the sense of a great deal of reserve power." As pastor of the First Church, he was *ex officio* a member of the Boards of three noble charities: the Presbyterian Hospital, the Leake and Watts Orphan House and the Sailors' Snug Harbor. The Boards of the Church claimed his services: he was elected a member of both the Home and Foreign Mission Boards; and served the former until 1880, as President from 1876 to 1878; and the latter until his death, as President from 1881 to 1883. While at Pittsburgh he had, of course, been a Director of the Western Theological Seminary (from 1851); and he was also a Trustee of Jefferson College (from 1853). Coming to New York he substituted for these the Directorship of the Seminary (from 1866) and the Trusteeship of the College (from 1867) at Princeton—in the former of which he served until his election as professor in the institution (1883), and in the latter until his death. In addition he was chosen Trustee of Union Theological Seminary in 1873, and served until his removal to Princeton in 1883. His appointment as Trustee of the General Assembly (1892) came later, but may be mentioned here for the sake of completeness. All these positions of trust he filled not only with dignity, but with a careful attention to their duties and with a wisdom of counsel which earned the unaffected admiration of his coadjutors. In addition to the cares they brought him, he acted as lecturer on "Homiletics and Sacred Rhetoric" in the Union Theological Seminary, New York, during the years from 1872 to 1875—repeating there his Allegheny lectures to the satisfaction of both the governors and pupils of the institution.

The greatest ecclesiastical event which occurred during Dr. Paxton's New York ministry was, of course, the reunion of the Old and New School branches of the Church. He was of the number of those who did not look with satisfaction on the movement for union. Oddly enough, however, as a member of the Assembly of 1862, when corresponding delegates to the New School body were for the first time appointed, and of that of 1870, when the consummated union was set upon its feet, he was an active factor in both

the beginning and end of the movement. Except so far as was involved in becoming a signatory of the Pittsburgh Circular of 1868-9, I do not know that he took any large part in the debates of the time. When once the union was accomplished, however, he became one of the chief agents in adjusting the relations of the two so-long separated bodies. No one, for example, was more influential than he at the Assembly of 1870 in determining the formal adjustments. And in general it is not too much to say that his attitude of "loyal and affectionate adherence to the interests of the united Church," and his cordial and appreciative intercourse with the formerly New School men, were among the most powerful influences which were working toward the healing of old wounds. When he came to New York, very little active fellowship existed between ministers serving in the two Churches: he was scarcely more than on the footing of speaking acquaintance with his nearest ministerial neighbors of the other communion. Immediately after the union, however, all this was changed. He rapidly formed close friendships with his New School colleagues—with Dr. William Adams, first of all, for whom he cherished a boundless reverence; with Drs. Henry B. Smith, Thomas H. Skinner, Robert R. Booth, Howard Crosby, Charles H. Robinson. He was, of course, elected at once to the famous Ministerial Club, *Chi Alpha*, where his social intercourse with his brethren found a centre; and even, as we have seen, was shortly lecturing in Union Seminary and holding a permanent position on its Board of government. When, at the unveiling of the tablet to Dr. Archibald Alexander's memory, at Princeton Seminary, he declared in his half-humorous way, "It is wicked now for any one to have memory enough to recollect that there was ever anything but one happy, undivided Presbyterian Church," he preached nothing but what he practiced.

With the origin of the General Presbyterian Alliance also he had a somewhat close connection. He was a delegate to the first meeting of its Council, at Edinburgh (July, 1877), and delivered there an address on Home Missions in America. It fell to him to preach the opening sermon at the second Council, which met in Philadelphia, September, 1880. Meanwhile he had been sent to the General Assembly of 1880, and had been elevated to its Moderatorship by acclamation—an honor which has been accorded to very few in the history of the Church. At the opening of the ensuing Assembly (1881) he preached what seems to me at least an even more notable sermon than the much-admired discourse which he delivered at the opening of the Alliance. These two meetings of the Alliance and

the five Assemblies which have been adverted to—those of 1860, 1862, 1870, 1880, 1881—seem to be all those to which he was accredited as a Commissioner. He never shirked any duty that was laid upon him, but he did not seek the supreme court of the Church as his chosen field of labor. He had been twelve years in the ministry before he was sent to the Assembly: he remained twenty-three years in the ministry after his last service as a member of the Assembly. They were a curiously notable series of Assemblies, however, in which he served: 1860, when the great debate on the organization of the Boards, running out in its ramifications into the whole theory of Presbyterianism, was held, and Drs. Hodge and Thornwell met in titanic conflict; 1862, in the midst of the excitement of the war, when the air was palpitant with internecine strife; 1870, when the union between the two Churches was given effect in an infinite variety of adjustments; 1880 and 1881, when the debates on the Revised Book of Discipline took place and the reorganization of the Synods was effected.

And now we approach the last stadium of Dr. Paxton's active service. In 1883 he came to Princeton to take up the work of the Chair of Ecclesiastical, Homiletical and Pastoral Theology, made vacant by the resignation of Dr. McGill. His church, which had grown steadily under his hands from the 257 members it reported in 1866 to the 409 it reported in 1883, and whose affection for its pastor had grown with the years, was loath to give him up. He himself, to whom preaching was as his vital breath, was loath to give it up. The professor's chair was no novelty to him; but the professor's chair alone—it was difficult for him to reconcile himself to that. One of his early pupils at Princeton recalls a scene on the occasion of a visit of Mr. Moody to Princeton, when Dr. Paxton was with that great revivalist in the inquiry room. "I see him now," he writes, "his face working with emotion, too much overcome at one time by his feelings to be able to lead in prayer. The next day in the classroom he told us he was homesick for the pastorate." But God's work must be done; and Dr. Paxton was accustomed to do it: and he felt at least that next to preaching itself the training of preachers was the most blessed of services.

The chair to which he consecrated the remainder of his life, it will be observed, was a much more comprehensive one than that which he had occupied at Allegheny and New York. It included, as he was accustomed to point out, three separate branches of instruction. During the first years of his occupancy of it, he naturally fell back upon his Allegheny lectures in Homiletics and directed

his energies to the creation of a course of lectures in Church Government, using meanwhile, in *Pastoral Theology*, a text-book which he supplemented from his own experience. In 1888 and 1889 he turned back to the lectures on Homiletics and largely remodeled them, retaining, however, permanently the core of his Allegheny lectures. I suppose we all recognize that it was in these Homiletical lectures, supplemented by his practical drilling of the students in preaching and text-dividing, that Dr. Paxton's work of instruction culminated.

As at Allegheny so at Princeton it was his practical genius which informed all his teaching. No note is struck more persistently by his pupils in their reminiscences of his classroom than this. Says one: "I found his course exceedingly helpful. I can hardly conceive of a more thorough and suggestive series of lectures on Homiletics than that which he gave us. . . . I found them practically of the greatest value in my own work as a preacher; so much so that when I went to India I delivered in Hindustani the substance of his course, in a brief series, to the students in the training-school for preachers with which I was connected." Says another: "He was eminently a pastor in the pastoral chair. The teaching was concrete. . . . He taught not so much the philosophy as the art. . . . but with devotional spirituality, on a high level and with just balance. . . . His teaching of ecclesiastical law was especially pleasant. He was a stout Presbyterian, and bated no jot of constitution or deliverance, but he was not dry nor deadly technical. He evidently knew the law and had seen its practical workings, but he never forgot that the great thing was the life and progress of the Church, and that ecclesiasticism was not an end in itself." Says yet another: "The most valuable part of Dr. Paxton's work, as far as I was concerned, was his *Pastoral Theology*. Many of the suggestions he gave me I found to be workable and helpful. I was especially helped by his cautions what not to do. I may say that in practical work outside the pulpit, Dr. Paxton gave me more help than any one I have ever known."

With all this, however, it was not after all his practical genius which was the chief note of Dr. Paxton's work in the seminary. That was rather what one of his pupils we have just quoted calls his "devotional spirituality." Above everything else his heart was set on quickening in his students' minds a sense of the sacredness of their calling and on fanning the fires of their spiritual life into a blaze. A fervent and devoted heart he held to be the best preparation for preaching the Gospel. His sermons, his conference talks—both

of which were greatly enjoyed by his pupils,—his prayers, in which he was mighty before God, and indeed his whole intercourse with the student body wrought together powerfully to this result. He had a happy habit of addressing a few words to each class at the opening of the scholastic year, with a view to awakening them to a sense of their opportunities and responsibilities as soldiers of Christ. Some of the memoranda of these little addresses have got caught between the leaves of his lecture-notes, and so have come to our hands. Here is a sample of them, addressed to the Senior class:

“Have known you well as Juniors and Middlers.
 Congratulate you on your advancement as Seniors.
 Involves responsibility.
 Influence of Senior Class.
 Think of your position.
 Good use of this year.
 1. Try to grow in piety.
 2. Don't trifle away time upon
 Too much preaching,
 Seeking a call.”

It is particularly needful to attend to these traits in Dr. Paxton's work in the seminary, because there lay behind them a definitely formed and tenaciously held theory of the functions of theological seminaries which he never lost an opportunity to enunciate and enforce. To him theological seminaries were specifically training-schools for the ministry, and he earnestly desired that they should be administered strictly on this principle and to this end. There was nothing he feared more than “scholasticism” in our seminaries. The liveliness of this fear, I cannot but think, betrayed him now and again into judgments and expressions which were somewhat extreme. He was perfectly clear that the minister should be soundly educated, and, indeed, when that is possible without loss of spiritual power or spiritual opportunity, profoundly learned: and he was ready to grant that, therefore, rich provision for communicating knowledge must be made in our seminaries. But he was perhaps overapt to see the spectre of “scholasticism” lurking behind measures the practical value of which for the average ministerial preparation was not immediately apparent. After all said, however, what he took his real stand upon was the perfectly sound position that our theological seminaries are primarily training-schools for ministers, and must be kept fundamentally true to this their proper work.

From this point of view he was never weary of warning those who were charged with the administration of these institutions against

permitting them to degenerate into mere schools of dry-as-dust and, from the spiritual standpoint, useless learning. A very fair example of his habitual modes of thought and speech on this subject may be read in the charge which he delivered to his life-long friend, Dr. A. A. Hodge—whom he loved as a brother and admired as a saint of God—when Dr. Hodge was inaugurated as professor in this seminary. Permitting himself greater freedom, doubtless, because he knew he was addressing one sympathetic to his contentions, he becomes in this address almost fierce in his denunciations of a scholastic conception of theological training, and insistent to the point of menace in his assertion of the higher duty of the theological instructor. Pointing to the seminary buildings—he was speaking in the First Church—he exclaimed: “There stands that venerable institution. What does it mean? What is the idea it expresses? . . . Is it a place where young men get a profession by which they are to make their living? Is it a school in which a company of educated young men are gathered to grind out Theology, to dig Hebrew roots, to read Patristic literature, to become proficient in ecclesiastical dialectics, to master the mystic techniques of the schoolmen, and to debate about fate, free-will, and the divine decrees? If this be its purpose, or its chief purpose, then bring the torch and burn it! . . . We do not in any way depreciate a learned ministry. We must have learning. . . . But whenever in a theological seminary learning takes the precedence, it covers as with an icicle the very truths which God designed to warm and melt the hearts of men. . . . No, no, this is not the meaning of a theological seminary. . . . It is a school of learning, but it is also a cradle of piety.” Accordingly he exhorts in almost flaming speech the individual professor to look well to his personal responsibility. Let no one dare say, he cries, that his business is to teach only a certain section of theological science. His duty is not merely the impartation of “a certain *quantum* of information on a given subject,” but to take his part in the training and inspiring of men to save souls. “I stand here to-day,” he solemnly declares, “to say to you and to every member of this faculty, ‘This is your department!’” “The professor’s study must be a Bethel in direct communication with heaven; and a theological seminary must be a Bochim from which strong cries for help are constantly going up.” Such was Dr. Paxton’s ideal of a seminary. He preached it without cessation. And he lived up to it. His own study was a Bethel: his own classroom was a Bochim.

I have said nothing about Dr. Paxton’s literary output. It is a

subject which does not suggest itself with reference to him. The *cacoethes scribendi* is a disease to which he was immune. He had no literary ambitions. His chosen method of expression was oral: with this I will not say merely he was content; he seemed to have even a distaste for the pen and a positive dislike for print. He did not even write his sermons; and we may be sure that he wrote his lectures only as a concession to a hard necessity. To write for the sake of writing, to print for the sake of printing, would have seemed to him almost a superfluity of naughtiness. I believe the only review article he ever printed was one on "The Call to the Ministry," which he gave me for the first number of *The Presbyterian Review*, of which I was an editor; and even that had not been written in the first instance for publication. He also gave me for that and the next number a couple of short book notices; and later—for *The Presbyterian and Reformed Review*—a loving obituary tribute to his old friend, Mr. A. D. F. Randolph. I am very proud of these tokens of his regard, knowing well that nothing but affection can account for them. It could not be, however, but that some of the sermons of a man so justly famous for his sermons should find their way into print: and naturally a number of the occasional addresses of one so sought after for occasional addresses failed to evade publication. Thus it happens that, after all, a considerable body of printed material remains to preserve to us some suggestion of this winning speaker's manner. Some thirty separate items have come under my eye. Among them perhaps special mention should be made of his elaborate scheme of Divisions of Sermons which he permitted late in life to be printed, not published, for the use of his classes. Those who are fortunate enough to possess copies of it will feel that they have in it a part of Dr. Paxton himself.

Dr. Paxton was permitted to labor among us here in Princeton for a period of twenty years. He had already entered his sixtieth year when he came to us (1883): he was approaching his seventyeighth birthday when he was impelled to seek relief from his responsibilities; and he had reached his eightieth year and had completed the full tale of twenty years of service before he ceased to deliver lectures in the seminary. The burden of years as they gathered upon his shoulders never dimmed his eye, nor bowed his form, nor halted his step. But yielding to the requisitions of his physicians, he asked to be released from the cares of office at the close of the academic year of 1901-1902. During the protracted illness of Dr. William Henry Green, he had, in addition to the conduct of his chair of instruction, discharged also many of the duties

of head of the seminary: and from February 10, 1900, when Dr. Green died, he had been formally, as well as really, its head. What it meant to him to unbuckle the harness he had so long worn no one will ever fully know. He has himself, in his eulogium on his predecessor in the pastorate of the First Church of Pittsburgh, eloquently portrayed the trials which accompany such an experience. If he passed through such a testing time it was concealed from the observer. It impressed no frown upon his brow: it wrung from his heart no repining cry.

Nor, in any true sense of the word, can it be said that his work was over when he turned away for the last time from his classroom door, and descended forever the pulpit steps—that pulpit which had, through all these years, been his throne from which he ruled as king. Changed, not completed, his work: perhaps we should not even say changed. For Dr. Paxton's power always lay more in what he was than in what he did, and the best of all his sermons was the sermon he preached by his life—by the benignity of his bearing, the thoughtful charity of his intercourse with men, the very glow of his serene countenance.

Affectionate in look
And tender in address, as well becomes
A messenger of grace to guilty men,

he was the living embodiment of Cowper's ideal of the faithful pastor. Students have declared that it was a benediction simply to sit in the Oratory of Stuart Hall and look upon his devout countenance as he sat on the platform. Ladies have remarked that to encounter him casually in the street of a morning brought a blessing upon the day. "No one could fail to see the reflection of the Lord upon his face," or "to feel faith revived and courage strengthened and love deepened as they listened to his cheery voice and perceived whence the springs of his life flowed." And so, as he went back and forth to the devotional exercises of the seminary, of which he was a faithful and devout attendant to the end; and as he walked daily through the streets; though his voice was no longer heard in classroom or pulpit, he was still our teacher and our preacher.

"There will be work for you at the last," says Dr. Robertson Niccoll, in one of his searching addresses—"not the old work. . . . The misery in which Christian lives often close is largely due to the attempt to continue work for which the toiler has ceased to be fit. Leave that, and there is other work. The cities of Israel are not gone over. . . . The orator may have to content himself with

pen. The preacher may have to step from prominence to obscurity. But whosoever has passed over the enchanted ground to Beulah is a mighty influence. His force is not to be measured by the old tests, but it radiates from him continually. It keeps silently conquering new fields and is unspent at death." We have seen these words fulfilled before our eyes. During these last years Dr. Paxton abode in the land of Beulah, and there radiated from him

The splendour of a spirit without blame.

At the last the end came with a certain suddenness, but with no shock. There was nothing in its circumstances to mar the impression of the peaceful days which preceded it. Even while on earth he had flung his heart before him—like the Bruce's—into heaven. It had been observed that he had talked much of the heavenly rest during the last months. It seemed in no wise strange that he should go whither his heart had preceded him. He came to his grave in a full age, like as a shock of corn cometh in its season; and as we laid the body away in the profound conviction that—as the beautiful words in our Larger Catechism express it—it shall "even in death continue united to Christ and rest in its grave as in its bed, till at the last day it be again united with its soul"—what could our hearts say, except

O weary champion of the cross, lie still:
Sleep thou at length the all-embracing sleep:
Long was thy sowing day, rest now and reap:
Thy fast was long, feast now thy spirit's fill.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

IV.

ROYAL TITLES IN ANTIQUITY: AN ESSAY IN CRITICISM.

ARTICLE FOUR.

THE TITLES OF THE GREEK KINGS.

THE following article is the fourth of a series, whose design is to show that the statements made by Dr. Driver in his *Literature of the Old Testament*, pages 545 and 546, with regard to the titles of the kings of Persia, cannot be accepted unqualifiedly, and that the impression left by his notes and proofs is misleading and fallacious. In the first article, which occupied pages 257-282 of the number of this REVIEW for April, 1904, the author, after giving a full citation of Dr. Driver's remarks and notes upon the subject, proceeded to give an enumeration, as complete as possible, of the titles and designations of the kings of Persia. In the second article, which occupied pages 465-497 of the number for July, 1904, the titles of the kings of Babylon and Assyria were presented in like manner. In the third article, which appeared on pages 618-664 of the number for October, 1904, and on pages 55-80 of the number for January, 1905, were presented the titles of the kings of Egypt down to the time of the conquest by Alexander. In the present article will be given the titles of the Greek kings. In the next, and, as we hope, the last article, we shall present the titles of the Parthian kings, the titles found on the early Semitic alphabetic inscriptions, and in the Hebrew Bible; and we shall, then, conclude with a classification of the titles, and with an argument designed to show that the assault upon the genuineness of the Books of Ezra-Nehemiah, based upon the use which their writers made of the titles of the kings of Persia, is not supported by these facts.

In the present article, we shall give, first, the titles which have been gathered from the inscriptions in the Egyptian, in the cuneiform, and in the Greek (adding in large measure the titles found in the papyri); secondly, we shall give the titles gathered from the great Greek historians from Herodotus to Josephus; and thirdly, we shall give the titles found in Hercher's collection of Greek letters.

I.—A. THE TITLES OF THE GREEK KINGS, AS FOUND ON THE MONUMENTS OF EGYPT.*

A. I.—*Titles of Alexander, the Great, and of His Children.*

1. (1) a. "K. E., † Meriamensetepenra, son of the Sun, Aleksandres." Lepsius, *Königsbuch*, 684, C, D.

b. "K. E., Meriamensetepenra." *Id.*, 684c.

c. "K. E., Meriamensetepira." *Id.*, 684d.

d. "Son of the Sun, Saamen-Aleksandres." *Id.*, 684e.

e. "K. E., Meriamensetepenkara." Brugsch, *Thesaurus*, 852.

(2) a. "H., Heqqennu." Lepsius, 684A.

b. "Horus-Ra, Heqqunnukensemti." 684a.

c. "Horus (with the double crown)-Ra, Māqemt."

(3) "K. E., the good god, lord of the two lands, lord making things, lord of crowns (or risings), Alekandres." Brugsch, *Thesaurus Inscriptionum Ægyptiacarum*, Fifth Part, page 852.

(4) "Horus (with the double crown)-Ra, Heqqennu, K. E., lord of the two lands, lord crowned (or rising) on the throne of Horus, son of the Sun, Aleksendres." *Id.*

(5) "Argsandrs." *Id.*

(6) "Algsantrs." *Id.*

(7) "King Argsndros." *Id.*

2. (1) a. "K. E., lord of the two lands, Meriamensetepenkara." Brugsch, *Thesaurus*, 852.

b. "K. E., Meriamensetepenra." Lepsius, 685b. ‡

c. "Son of the Sun, Pelipusa." *Id.*, C.

d. "Son of the Sun, Phiuliupuas." *Id.*, E.

e. "Son of the Sun, lord of the crowns (or risings), Pelipusa." Brugsch, *Thesaurus*, 852.

(2) a. "Horus-Ra, Ra . . . tauī." Lepsius, 685A.

b. "Horus, Kanekhtmerimaat." *Id.*, a.

c. "Horus-Ra, Kanekhtmeriamen." Brugsch, *Thesaurus*, 852.

(3) a. "Lord of the shrines of Nekhebt and Uatchet, Heqsemti." Lepsius, 685B.

b. "L. S., Heqsemti, son of the Sun, lord of the crowns (or risings), Phiuliupuas." Brugsch, *Thesaurus*, 852.

* This part of this article continues Article III, Part II.

† We repeat here that K. E. stands for King of Upper and Lower Egypt; H., for Horus; L. S., for Lord of the Shrines of Nekhebet and Uatchet; and H. G., for Horus of Gold. These, it will be remembered, are the formulas introducing the four official names of every Pharaoh.

‡ Brugsch says in *Thesaurus*, 852: "Die von Lepsius (No. 685, *Königsb.*) aufgeführten Titel sind zweifelhaft."

- (4) "Horus of gold, ?" Lepsius, 685C.
- (5) a. "Lord of the two lands, Meriamensetepenra(?). " *Id.*, 685D.
 b. "Lord of the two lands, Rauserka-Meriamensetepenra(?)." *Id.*, 685d.
- (6) "Lord of crowns (or risings), Pirrippas." *Id.*, 685e.
- (7) "Pirpos." Lepsius, 852.
- (8) "The good god, Pelipusa, beloved." Budge, *History*, VII, 162.
3. (1) a. "K. E., lord of the two lands, Ḥāābāmensetepenra." Brugsch, *Thesaurus*, 853.
 b. "K. E., Ḥāābamensetepenra." *Id.*, d.
 c. "K. E., lord of the two lands, son of the Sun, lord of crowns (or risings), Aleksandres." Budge, VII, 164.
 d. "Son of the Sun, Aleksadres(?), the ever living." Brugsch, 853.
 e. "Son of the Sun, Arksantres." Lepsius, 686d.
- (2) a. "Horus, Heqqen." Budge, VII, 165.
 b. "Horus, Ḥunuserpeḥpeḥ." Brugsch, 853a.
- (3) "L. S., Merineteru, rānfāuten[a]tefef." Brugsch, 853b.
- (4) "H. G., Heqqenemtatcherf." *Id.*, c.
- (5) "King Argsndrs, son of Argsndrs." *Id.*
- (6) "Lord of the two lands, Ḥāābāmensetepenra." Lepsius, 686c.
- (7) "Horus-Ra, Heqqennu, K. E., lord of the two lands, the lord rising on the throne of Horus, son of the Sun, Aleksandres, giver of life." Budge, VII, 167.
- (8) "The majesty of the young Horus, mighty in twofold strength, L. S., beloved of the gods, to whom have been given the dignity and rank of his father, the golden Horus, the strong one in all the land, K. E., the lord of the two lands, Ḥāā-āb-Rā-setep-en-Āmen, son of the Sun, Arksāntres, living for ever, beloved of the gods of Pe and Tep." *Id.*, 169.
- (9) "King of the two lands, and of foreign lands." *Id.*, 170.
- (10) "Head of the Asiatics." *Id.*
- (11) "Majesty." *Id.*
- (12) "Pharaoh, life, [health, strength], Alexander the foreigner(?), the son of Alexander." *Id.*, 174.

A. II.—Titles of the Ptolemies.

1. (1) a. "K. E., Meriamensetepenra, son of the Sun, Pṭulmis." Lepsius, 687D, E.
 b. The same plus *netch neter* = *soter*. Brugsch, 853.
 (2) "The great prince in Egypt, Pṭluis." Brugsch, 853.

- (3) "Pdlmis phšdrpn, *i.e.*, Ptolemy the Satrap." *Id.*
- (4) "Ptolemy, the son of Ptolemy, the god who wards off evil." *Id.*
- (5) "Ptlmis." *Id.*
- (6) "Ptolemy soter (psutr)." *Id.*, 854.
- (7) "King Ptolemy, the son of king Ptolemy, the god who wards off evil." *Id.*, 854.
- (8) He and his queen Berenice, together, were called: *a.* "The two savior gods." *Id.*, 853.
- b.* "The gods who ward off evil." *Id.*, 854; or,
- c.* "The gods who save as the king alone." *Id.*, 854.
2. (1) *a.* "K. E., Rauserkaàmenmeri, son of the Sun, Ptlumis." Lepsius, 689*D*, *E.*
- b.* "K. E., Rauserkaàmenmeri." *Id.*, *f.*
- (2) *a.* "Horus (with the double crown)-Ra, Hunnuqenu." *Id.*, *A.*
- b.* "Living Horus-Ra, Hunnu-qenu." Brugsch, 855 (Pithom stele).
- (3) "L. S., Urpeḥpeḥ." Brugsch, 855*b.*
- (4) "Horus of gold, Sekhanestefef (or sekhanesatefef)." Brugsch, 855*c.*
- (5) "Suten-neter, Rauserkaàmenmeri." Lepsius, 689*l.*
- (6) "Lord of the two lands, Rauserkaamenmeri." *Id.*, *i.*
- (7) "The god, Merisen (Philadelphos)." *Id.*, *F.*
- (8) "King." Brugsch, 856. Arsinoe was the sister of a king. (Stele 88, Vienna).
- (9) "Brother." *Id.*
- (10) "Lord of the two lands." *Id.*
- (11) "Ptlumis pemersen = Ptolemy Philadelphus." *Id.* (in contracts).
- (12) For him together with his sister and wife Arsinoe the following titles occur:
 - a.* "Ptualmis, Arsenat, Neterui senui (*i.e.*, the divine *adelphoi*)."
- (13) "Lord of the two lands, Rauserkaàmenmeri, lord of the crowns (or risings), Ptlumis, giver of life and power." Budge, VII, 206.
- (14) Lepsius adds *Rakheperka* and
- (15) "The divine father Ptualmis." See *Königsbuch*, 687*a* and *c.*
- (16) The following titles, taken from Budge's *History of Egypt*, VII, 209-211, are translations of an inscription at Philæ. See Lepsius, *Denkmäler*, IV, pl. 7*b.* "Beautiful god, divine hawk, protector of Egypt, son of the Sun, Ptolemy of Khnemu, Lord of Senmut, beloved."

(17) "Beautiful god, emanation of Åtem himself, King of the South and North, Uxr-ka-Ra-meri-Åmen, of Horus, son of Isis, beloved."

3. (1) *a.* "K. E., Au-en-neterui-senui-setep-en-Ra-sekhem-ankh-Åmen." Brugsch, *Thesaurus*, 857*d.*

b. "Son of the Sun, Ptualmis, the ever-living, beloved of Ptaḥ, the heir of the divine brothers." Brugsch, *Thesaurus*, 857.

c. "Son of the Sun, Ptualmis, the ever-living, beloved of Ptaḥ." *Id.*, *e.*

d. *Idem* plus "heir of the two divine brothers." Lepsius, 692*l.*

e. "Son of the Sun, Ptualmis, beloved of Ptaḥ, heir of the two divine brothers." Lepsius, 692*m.*

f. "Son of the Sun, Ptualmis, living for ever, the beneficent god." Brugsch, *Thesaurus*, 858.

g. "K. E., Lord of the two lands, Neterui-senui-āu-en-Rā-setep-Åmen-sekhem-ānkh-en, son of the Sun, lord of diadems, Ptualmis-ankh-tchetta-Ptaḥ-meri." Budge, VII, 211.

h. "Son of the Sun, lord of crowns (or risings), Ptulmis, beloved of Ptaḥ, living for ever." Lepsius, 692*i, k.*

(2) *a.* Horus-Ra, Heknu-neteru-neru(?)-ḥerf-em-seshepf-suteniut-em-tefef." Lepsius, 692*A.*

b. "Horus-Ra, Heknu-neterui-neru(?)-ḥerf." *Id.*, *a.*

(3) "L. S., Qennu-netchet-neteru-menkh-en-ta-mert." *Id.*, *B.*

(4) "Horus of gold, Urpeḥpeḥ-arikhu-nebḥebset-Ptaḥ-mā-athi-mā-Ra." *Id.*, *C.*

(5) "The beneficent god (Peneter-menkh)." *Id.*, *F.*

(6) "Lord of the crowns (or risings), Ptulmis, beloved of Ptaḥ, living for ever." *Id.*, *h.*

(7) "Lord of the two lands, heir of the two divine brothers (adelphoi), chosen of Ptaḥ, living like Ra." *Id.*, *g.*

(8) "King(?) Ptualmis, beloved of the beneficent gods, the beneficent god, lord of valor." *Id.*, *n, o.*

(9) Along with his sister-wife Berenice we find the titles:

a. "K. E., Ptualmis, living for ever, beloved of Ptaḥ and the queen (ḥeqt) Berenikat, the beneficent gods." Brugsch, *Thesaurus*, 857.

b. "The divine father, Ptualmis, the ever-living, beloved of Ptaḥ, the triumphant and the divine mother Bereniket, the triumphant, the divine majesties." Brugsch, 858.

c. "The divine father, of his fathers [beloved] (*i.e.*, Philopator), Ptualmis, the divine benefactor and the divine mother, of his mothers [beloved], Bereniket, the divine benefactress." *Id.*

d. "Ptualnis, the triumphant, and Berenik, the beneficent princess." *Id.*

4. (1) a. "K. E., Neterui-menkhui-âu-en-Ptah-setep-en-User-ka-Ra-Amen-sekhem-ankh, son of the Sun, Ptualmis, the ever-living, beloved of Isis." Lepsius, 694*D*, *E*.

b. "K. E., Neterui-menkhui-usekhui-âu-en-Ptah-setep-en-user-ka-Ra-Amen-sekhem-ankh." Brugsch, 858*d*.

c. "Son of the Sun, lord of crowns (or risings), Ptualmis, living for ever, beloved of Isis." *Id.*, *e*.

d. "Ra, son of Ra, Ptualnis, the god, of his father [beloved]." *Id.*, *e*.

(2) a. "H., Hunnu-qen-sekha-nes-tefef." Lepsius, 694*A*.

b. "Living Horus-Ra, the valorous son crowned with the royalty of his father." Brugsch, *Thesaurus*, 858.

c. "Horus-Ra, Hunnu-qen." Lepsius, 694*d*.

(3) "L. S., Urpeḥpeḥ, menkh-âb-kher-neteru-nebu-netchti-ḥe-memu." Lepsius, 694*B* (Brugsch omits the *neb*. See p. 858).

(4) "Horus of gold, seutcha-utchat-nut, sekhesef-heru-maâu, semen-hepu-Tehuti-ââ-mâ-neb-ḥebu-seṯu-Ptah, mâ-athi-mâ-Ra." Lepsius, 694*C*.

(5) "The god, beloved of his father (or loving his father)." *Id.*, *F*.

5. (1) a. "K. E., Neterui-merui-[a]tui-âu-setep-en-Ptah-user-ka-Ra-Âmen-sekhem-ankh, son of the Sun, Ptualmis, ankh-tchetta-Ptah-meri." Lepsius, 696*D*, *E*.

b. *Id.*, except adds "giver of life." Budge, VIII, 3.

c. "K. E., Âu-neterui-merui-[a]tui-setep-en-Ptah-user-Ra-sekhem-ankh-Âmen-[mâ-ankh-Ra.]" Brugsch, *Thesaurus*, 861.

d. "Son of the Sun, Ptalmis, living for ever, beloved of Ptah." Lepsius, 696*b*.

e. "K. E., Neterui-merui-[a]tui-âu-Ptah-setep-en-User-ka-Ra-Âmen-sekhem-ankh, son of the Sun, Ptualmis, the triumphant, beloved of Ptah, the god Epiphanes." Brugsch, *Thesaurus*, 862.

(2) a. "H., Hunnu-khaui-em-suten-ḥer-âst-tefef." Lepsius, 696*A*.

b. "Living Horus-Ra, Hunnu-kha-em-suten-ḥrà-âst-tefef." Brugsch, *Thesaurus*, 860*a*.

(3) "L. S., Great in power, establishing Egypt, beautifying the land of Egypt, pious to the gods." *Id.*, 860*b*.

(4) "Horus of gold, renewing the life of men, lord of the *sed* festival like Ptah, a prince-like Ra." *Id.*, 861*c*.

(5) a. "Pe-neter-per, the god Epiphanes." Lepsius, 696*F*.

b. "Pe-neter-per-neb-neferu, the god, rising (like the sun), lord of good things." Brugsch, *Thesaurus*, 862*f*.

(6) "The son of Ptualmis and Arsenat, the father loving gods." Brugsch, *Thesaurus*, 862g.

(7) "King Ptolemy, the son of Ptolemy, the god Epiphanes, the good, because he is gracious." *Id.*, 862.

(8) "Ptualmis, Avenger of Egypt." *Id.*, 862. Lepsius, 696d.

(9) "The living god, the beautiful (or good), the emanation of Ra, son of the lords of Khemennu." Budge, VIII, 18.

(10) "Son of the white crown, child of the red crown, nursling of the goddess Ur-ḥekat." *Id.*

6. Only known by the title, "The divine father (Peneter-atef, or tefef)."

7. (1) a. "K. E., Neterui-perui-āu-kheper-Ptaḥ-setep-en-Ra-Āmen." Brugsch, *Thesaurus*, 864d, ex. 3.

b. "K. E., Neterui-ubenui(?)-āu-en-Ptaḥ-setep-en-Ptaḥ(?)-kheper-sekhem-ankh-Ra-Āmen-āri-Maat." *Id.*, ex. 1.

c. "K. E., Neterui-ubenui(?)-āu-en-Ptaḥ-kheper-setep-en-sekhem-ankh-āri-Maat-Rà-Āmen." *Id.*, ex. 2.

d. "K. E., Neterui-perui-āu-kheper-Ptaḥ-setep-en-Rà-Āmen-āri-Maat." *Id.*, 4.

e. "Son of the Sun, Ptualmis, living for ever, beloved of Ptaḥ, the god, beloved of his mother." *Id.*, e.

f. "K. E., Neterui-ubenui(?)-āu-en-Ptaḥ-setep-āri-maat-en-Rà-Āmen-er-ḥeh." Lepsius, 699g.

g. "K. E., Neterui-perui-āu-en-Ptaḥ-setep-en-Rà-Āmen-meri." *Id.*, h.

(2) "Horus-Ra, Āmen em Khat (*i.e.*, of the body of Amen), twin of Apis, etc."

(3) "L. S., em-Maat-sekha-ensu-tefef." Brugsch, *Thesaurus*, 864b.

(4) "Horus of gold, Urpeḥpeḥ-neb-ḥebu-seṯ-mà-atefef (or tefef), Ptaḥ-mà-Āmen-tef-neteru-(var. + athi), mà-Ra." *Id.*, 864c.

(5) "Ptualmis, living for ever, beloved of Ptaḥ." *Id.*, 864.

(6) "Ptualmis, beloved of Ptaḥ, the triumphant, the god, beloved of his mother." *Id.*, 865.

(7) "The god, beloved of (or loving) his mother." Lepsius, 699F.

(8) "Neterui-perui-āu-Ptaḥ-kheper-setep-en-Rà-Āmen-āri-Maat-en." *Id.*, f.

(9) "Neterui-perui-ābui(?)-āu-Ptaḥ-kheper-setep-en-Rà-Āmen-āri-Maat." *Id.*, i.

(10) "The god Āmen, mother beloved (or loving)." *Id.*, k.

(11) The king and his sister-wife, Cleopatra II, are called: "The gods loving the mother." Lepsius, 700f-n.

(12) Ptolemy VII, Cleopatra II, and Ptolemy IX together are called:

"K. E., Neterui-perui-āu-Ptaḥ-kheper-setep-en-Rà-Āmen-àri-Maat, son of the Sun, Ptualmis, living for ever, beloved of Ptaḥ, and(?) the brother K. E., Ptualmis, the ever-living, beloved of Ptaḥ, and their sister, the princess, mistress of the two lands, Klāua-petreta, the gods mother-loving, the gods brother-loving, the beneficent gods, the father-loving gods, the illustrious gods, the gods beloved of their mother." Brugsch, *Thesaurus*, 865.

8. (1) "Ptualmis, the ever-living, . . . the father-loving god." Brugsch, *Thesaurus*, 865.

(2) "The god, the child beloved of his father." *Id.*

9. (1) *a.* "K. E., Neterui-perui (ubanui(?))-āu-en-Ptaḥ-setep-en-àri-Maat-Rà-Āmen-sekhem-ankh, son of the Sun, Ptualmis, living for ever, beloved of Ptaḥ, the beneficent god." Brugsch, *Thesaurus*, 865.

b. "K. E., Neterui-perui (ubanui(?))-āu-en-Ptaḥ-setep-en-àri-Maat-Rà-Āmen-sekhem-ankh." *Id.*, 866*d.*

c. "Son of the Sun, Ptualmis, the ever-living, meri Ptaḥ." *Id.*, *e.*

d. "K. E. (*i.e.*, double Uraeus), Neterui-perui (ubanui(?))-āu-Ptaḥ-setep-en-àri-Maat-en-Rà-Āmen-sekhem-ankh." Lepsius, 705*q.*

e. "K. E. (*i.e.*, Ra-Shuti), Neterui-perui (ubanui(?))-āu-Ptaḥ-setep-àri-Maat-Rà-Āmen-sekhem-ankh." *Id.*, *r.*

f. "K. E. (not represented by the usual signs, but by the figures of two persons sitting, one with the crown of Lower Egypt, the other with the crown of Upper Egypt), neterui-perui (ubanui(?))-usekhui(?)-āu-en-Ptaḥ-setep-en-àri-Maat-Rà-Āmen-sekhem-ankh." *Id.*, *s.*

g. "Son of the Sun (messu-Ra), Ptualmis, living for ever, beloved of Ptaḥ." *Id.*, *t.*

(2) *a.* "Horus (with the crown)-Ra, Ḥunnu-ḥekenut-em-ankhef-ḥer-nest-tefef-bener-sep-ḥunt-tcheser-mes-khāauf-ḥer-ḥepu-ankh." Brugsch, *Thesaurus*, 866*a.*

b. "Horus (with the crown)-Ra, Ḥunnu-ḥeken . . . -neteru-neru(?)-ḥer-fa-seshep."

c. "Horus, Ḥunnu-ḥekenut-ḥer-àst-tefef-tàt-tcheser-er-enti-sute-niu-neteru-setep-en-Temu-tchesef." Lepsius, 705*g.*

d. "Horus, Ḥunnu-ḥer-tep-pet-paut-sa-Āusār-mes-Āuset." *Id.*, *h.*

(3) "L. S., Seheràbtau." Brugsch, *Thesaurus*, 866*b.*

(4) "Horus of gold, Urpeḥpeḥ-neb-ḥebu-seṭu(?)-tefef-Ptaḥ-mà-Āmen-tef-neteru-àthi-mà-Ra." *Id.*, 866*c.*

(5) *a.* "Menkh-neter." *Id.*, *u.*

b. "Peneter-menkh." *Id.*, r.

c. "Peneter-menkh-neb-qen." *Id.*, x, y.

d. "Peneter-menkh-setep-tefef." *Id.*, z.

(6) "Ptualnis, son of Ptualmis, the ever-living, beloved of Ptaḥ, the god euergetes." Brugsch, 866 *Edfu*.

(7) The following titles of Ptolemy IX and his sister Cleopatra (and his wife Cleopatra) occur together:

a. "Like his father, Ptaḥ, father of the gods, like Ra, K. E., Neterui-perui-(or ubenui)-āu-en-Ptaḥ-setep-en-āri-Maat-Rà-Āmen-sekhem-ankh, son of the Sun, Ptualmis, the ever-living, beloved of Ptaḥ, and his sister, the queen, lady of the two lands, Clauapatrat, and his wife, the queen, lady of the two lands, Clauapatrat, neteru-menkhu, son (and) daughter of the king Ptualmis and Clauapatrat, neterui-perui." Brugsch, *Thesaurus*, 867.

b. "The kings Ptolemy and Cleopatra, his sister, the children of Ptolemy and Cleopatra, the gods Epiphanes." *Id.*

c. "K. E., Neterui-perui-āu-en-Ptaḥ-setep-en-āri-Maat-Rà-Āmen-sekhem-ankh, son of the Sun, Ptualmis, the ever-living, beloved of Isis, (and) the sister-wife, queen, lady of the two lands, (and) Clauapatrat, sister-wife, of the son of the Sun, Ptualmis." *Id.*

d. "K. E., Neterui-perui(ubenui(?))-āu-en-Ptaḥ-setep-en-āri-Maat-Rà-Āmen-sekhem-ankh, (and) his sister, the queen, lady of the two lands, Clauapatrat, the gods euergetes." *Id.*

e. "K. E., Neterui-perui(ubanui(?))-āu-en-Ptaḥ-setep-en-āri-Maat-Rà-Āmen-sekhem-ankh, son of the Sun, Ptualmis, beloved of Ptaḥ, the victorious, the god euergetes and his wife, the queen, lady of the two lands, Clauapatrat." *Id.*, 868.

f. "The kings, Ptolemy and Cleopatra, his wife, the gods euergetes." *Id.*

g. "The queen, lady of the two lands, Cleopatra, the queen, wife of the son of the Sun, Ptualmis, the ever-living, beloved of Ptaḥ, the gods euergetes."

h. "King Ptolemy, the god euergetes, son of Ptolemy, and the queen Cleopatra, his wife, the goddess euergetes." *Id.*, 869.

i. "The living Horus, Hunnu-ḥekenut-em-ankhef-ḥer-nest-tafef-bener-sep-ḥemt-tcheser-mes-khauf-ḥer-ḥepu-ankh, L. S., Seher-āb-taui, Horus of gold, Ur-peḥpeḥ-neb-ḥebu-seṭu(?)-mā-tafef-Ptaḥ-Āmen-taf-neteru-Ra-mā, K. E., neterui-perui(ubanui(?))-āu-en-Ptaḥ-setep-en-āri-Maat-Āmen-Rà-sekhem-ankh, son of the Sun, Ptualmis, the ever-living, beloved of Ptaḥ, and his wife, the queen, lady of the two lands, Cleopatra, the gods euergetes." *Id.*, 868.

k. "Son of the Sun, Ptualmis, the ever-living, beloved of Ptaḥ,

(and) his wife, the queen, lady of the two lands, Clauapatrat, the gods euergetes." *Id.*, 868.

l. "The king neterui-perui-(ubanui(?))-āu-en-Ptaḥ-setep-en-āri-Maat-Rà-Āmen-sekhem-ankh, son of the Sun, Ptualmis, beloved of Ptaḥ, maat-kheru, neter-menkh, and his wife, the queen, lady of the two lands, Cleopatra (Clauapatrat)." *Id.*

m. "K. E., Neterui-perui-(ubanui(?))-āu-en-Ptaḥ-setep-en-āri-Maat-Rà-Āmen-sekhem-ankh, and the goddess, his sister, the queen, lady of the two lands, Claupetra, and his wife, the lady of the two lands, Claupetra, the gods euergetes (neterui menkhui)." *Id.*, 869 *Edfu*.

n. The same at Ombos except *neteru menkhu* (i.e., plur. instead of dual) plus *neb gen*; and after the king's name *Peneter-menkh-neb-gen*. *Id.*, 869.

o. "King Ptolemy and the queen Cleopatra, his sister, and the queen Cleopatra, his wife, the gods euergetes." *Id.*

p. "King Ptolemy, the well-doing (p-menkh), son of Ptolemy and of Cleopatra, the gods epiphanes; and the queen Cleopatra, his sister (and) his wife, the goddess well-doing (temenkhet)." *Id.*

10. "Cleopatra III and Ptolemy X."

(1) "The queen Cleopatra and the king Ptolemy, Philometor Soter." Brugsch, *Thesaurus*, 870.

(2) "The mother-loving gods, who are saviors." *Id.*

(3) "Living Ḥerut-Ra, lady of the two lands, Clauapetrat, and her son." *Id.*

(4) "Living Horus-Ra, tcheser-messu-ḥer-ḥepu-ankh, etc." 870a.

(5) "L. S., Sekhà-sutenet-mutef-ḥer-nest-tefef-Āmen-tef-neteru-suteni-Āmon- . . . semen-hepu (var. maāu)-Tehuti-āāui(?)-mà." *Id.*, 870b.

(6) a. "K. E., lord of the two lands, neterui-menkhui . . . ankh." *Id.*, c.

b. "K. E., lord of the two lands, Neter-menkh-neteret-meri-māt-s-netch-āu-Ptaḥ-en-setep-en-āri-Maat-Rà-Āmen-sekhem-ankh." *Id.*

(7) "Son of the Sun, lord of crowns (or risings), Ptualmis, living for ever, beloved of Ptaḥ, neterui (var. neteru)-mut-meri." *Id.*, d.

(8) "The living Horus-Ra, Ka-nekht-mà-athi-teṭ-em-per-ta-mert-ankh-ḥepu-mà-erṭa-nef-netch-ḥebu-seṭu(?)-āshau-uru-àn-mà Ptaḥ-Āmen-tefef-neteru(!)." *Id.*, 871a.

(9) "L. S., Ur-peḥpeḥ-khent-sha?-ḥeḥ-semen-hepu-mà-Tehuti-āāui-neb-shefit-mà(!)-neb- -teṭteṭ-suteniu-mà-Ra-em-āu-ābu-heq-āmi-en-maāu(?)-ḥetep-ḥer-nest-suten-ārinef (var. erta)-ankh-teṭ-user-àn-Āusar." *Id.*, b.

(10) "King Ptolemy, whom people call the victorious, who was crowned a second time with the diadem of Isis and Osiris." *Id.*, 871.

(11) "King Ptolemy, who took possession of Egypt, when he was crowned the second time as king." *Id.*

(12) "The son of the Sun, Ptualmis, the ever-living, beloved of Ptaḥ." *Id.*

(13) The following titles are from the time of Ptolemy, the Tenth's, second rule:

"Son of the Sun, lord of crowns (or risings), Ptualmis, the ever-living, beloved of Isis." *Id.*, 875.

(14) "Living Horus-Ra, tcheser-mesu-ḥer-ḥepu-(sa)-ānkh." 875*B*, *a*.

(15) "K. E., lord of the two lands, neterui-menkhui-āu-setep-en-Ptaḥ-àri-Maat-en-Rà-Āmen-sekhem-ankh." Brugsch, *Thesaurus*, 875*c*.

(16) "K. E., Neterui-menkhui-āu-en-Ptaḥ-setep-en-àri-en-Maat-Rà-Āmen-sekhem-ankh-em, son of the Sun, Ptualmis, the ever-living, beloved of Isis, the god of deliverance." *Id.*

(17) "L. S., Ur-peḥpeḥ-tcheser-hetch-īr-meri," etc. 875*b*.

(18) "The queen, lady of the two lands, princess great of favor, Berenice, royal wife, royal sister, and the son of the Sun(?), Ptualmis, called Alexander, the ever-living, beloved of Ptaḥ, the gods Philometor." *Id.*, 875.

11. (1) "K. E., lord of the two lands, Neterui-menkhui-āu-en-Ptaḥ-setep-en-àri-Maat-Rà-Āmen-en-sekhem-ankh [Pe-neter-mutef-meri]. Brugsch, *Thesaurus*, 874*d*.

(2) "Son of the Sun, Ptualmis, called Alexander, the ever-living, beloved of Ptaḥ." *Id.*, *e*.

(3) "K. E., Neterui-menkhui-āu-Ptaḥ-setep-en-àri-Maat-Rà-Āmen-semen-ankh, son of the Sun, Ptualmis, called Alexander, the ever-living, beloved of Ptaḥ." *Id.*, bottom.

(4) *a*. "Horus-Ra, Ptaḥ(!)-em-khet-up-ṭet(?) -nes-ḥepu-ḥer-mes-khen-ū-ānerui[f](?)." Budge, VIII, 69, and Brugsch, *Thesaurus*, 874.

(5) *a*. "Horus of gold, Āa-āb." Budge, VIII, 69.

b. "Horus of gold, Āa-āb-neteru-meri," etc. Brugsch, *Thesaurus*, 873.

(6) "L. S., Seher-āb-taui." Budge, VIII, 69.

(7) "The queen Cleopatra, the goddess euergetes, and king Ptolemy, called Alexander, her son." *Id.*, 872.

(8) *Id.*, minus "her son." *Id.*

(9) "King Ptolemy, called Alexander, beloved of Ptaḥ." *Ibid.*

(10) "King Ptolemy, called Alexander, and the queen Berenice, his sister, the gods Philometor." *Ibid.*

(11) "King Ptolemy, called Alexander, beloved of Ptaḥ, and the queen Cleopatra, the goddess euergetes, and Berenice, his sister." *Id.*, 873.

12. (1) "The great king (Perāa) Ptolemy, the god Dionysus-Neos, Philopator, Philadelphus, and the ever-living kings (Peru-āau)." Brugsch, *Thesaurus*, 876.

(2) *a.* "K. E., Pe-neter-āu-en-enti-neḥem-Ptaḥ-setep-en-àri-Maat-Āmen-nu-Ra." Brugsch, *Thesaurus*, *id.*, *a.*

b. "K. E., lord of the two lands, Pe-neter-enti-neḥem-āu-Ptaḥ-setep-en-àri-Maat-Rā-Āmen-sekhem-ankh." *Id.*, *a.*

(3) *a.* "Son of the Sun, Ptualmis (var. Ptulmis), the ever-living, beloved of Ptaḥ-Isis."

b. "Son of the Sun, Ptualmis, the ever-living, beloved of Isis, Philopator, Philadelphus." *Id.*, bottom of page.

(4) *a.* "Horus-Ra, Ḥunnu-nefer-bener-mert-sheps." Brugsch, *Thesaurus*, 877*a.*

b. "Horus-Ra, Nekht-khau-ḥer-mes-ḥepu-ankh." Budge, VIII, 85.

(5) "L. S., Rekhit-ḥer-kaf-ḥer-ṭua-khnem-sheps-?-khaa-(var. + usekh)-em-ḥetchet-(var. ḥetch)-senui-en-sehennu-em-ḥā-netchet-(var. omit)-mā-(var. + netch-tefef)-?theḥen-? ?." Brugsch, *Thesaurus*, 877*b.*

(6) *a.* "Horus of gold, Āa-āb-athi-neb-qen-nekht-sa-Āuset-mā." *Id.*, *c.*

(7) "Horus, Ka-nekht-ṭet-uben-en-ta-mert-mā-ḥepu-sa-ankh-ka-em-athi-qen-nekht-mā-Āuset." *Id.*

13. (1) "King Ptolemy, son of Ptolemy, and . . . and the queen Cleopatra, surnamed Trupina, the gods Philopator, Philadelphus." Brugsch, *Thesaurus*, 878.

(2) "Living Horus-Ra, Āa-āb-athi-neb-qen-nekht-Āuset-mā-sa-Ra-neb-khau-Ptualmis, the ever-living, beloved of Ptaḥ and his sister, wife, the queen, lady of the two lands, Clauapetrat, surnamed Trupenet, the gods Philopator, Philadelphus." *Id.*

(3) "K. E., lord of the two lands, Pe-neter-neḥemet-āu-setep-en-Ptaḥ-àri-Maat-en-Rā-Āmen." *Id.*

(4) "Horus of gold, Āa-āb-athi-neb-qen-mā-Āuset, son of the Sun, lord of crowns (or risings), Ptualmis, the ever-living, beloved of Ptaḥ, and the royal sister (and) wife, the queen, lady of the two lands, Clauapetrat, surnamed Trupina, the gods Philopator, Philadelphus." *Id.*

14. (1) "Queen Cleopatra, the goddess, who loves her father, and her brother, and the king Ptolemy, surnamed Kisros, the god, loving his father and his mother." Brugsch, *Thesaurus*, 879.

(2) "The living Horus, ? Ur-pehpeh-sheps-Net-neb-?-seurs-? nefer?-?, lady of the two lands, Clauapatrat, the goddess Philopator, and her son, the King of Egypt (and) lord of the two lands, Ptualmis, son of the Sun, lord of crowns (or risings), Kisrs, the ever-living, beloved of Ptaḥ (and) Isis, the god Philapator, Philometor." *Id.*, 879.

(3) "The queen, lady of the two lands, Cleptras and her son Kisrs." *Id.*

(4) "Horus, Hunnu-nefer-K. E., lord of the two lands, Ptualmis, son of the Sun, lord of crowns (or risings), Kisrs, the god Philopator, Philometor."

(5) "King Ptolemy, surnamed Cæsar, the god Philopator, Philometor." *Id.*

(6) "Cluptrat, the goddess Philopator." *Id.*

I.—B. THE TITLES OF THE GREEK KINGS IN THE CUNEIFORM INSCRIPTIONS.

1. "Alexander" alone, Bu. 88-5-12, 619 (see *Cuneiform Texts*, IV); "Antiochus" alone, Bezold's *Catalogue of Cuneiform Tablets*, 1558; *Keilschriftliche Bibliothek*, III. II. 139, IV. 317; Z. A., III. 150; "Demetrius" alone, Z. A., III. 148.

2. "Alexander, king of kings." Bezold's *Catalogue of Cuneiform Tablets*, 1543.

3. "Alexander, the son of Alexander." Z. A., III. 150; K. B., IV. 313.

4. "Seleucus, the king," Z. A., III. 151; Bu. 88-5-12, 514; *Cun. Texts*, IV; K. B., III. II. 139 bis, IV. 317, 319; "Demetrius, the king," Bezold's *Cat.*, 662; Reissner, *Sum. Bab. Hymnen*, No. 21, p. 44; Nos. 26, 54(?); "Antiochus, the king," K. B., IV. 317; Z. A., III. 151; Reissner, *Sum. Bab. Hymnen*, No. 1, Rev. 34; "Alexander, the king," Reissner, *Sum. Bab. Hymnen*, No. 14, Rev. 40, and in No. 17, Rev. 11.

5. "Antiochus, king of the lands." Bezold's *Cat.*, 561; K. B., III. II. 139.

6. "Antiochus, the third, the king." Reissner, *Sum. Bab. Hymnen*, No. 25, Rev. 29.

7. Antiochus Soter calls himself "the great king, the powerful king, the savior king, the king of Babylon, the king of the lands," etc. *Révue d'Assyriologie et d'Arch. orientale*, I. 104.

8. "King of the lands" alone. Same *Review*, and article at end.

9. "Antiochus, the great king, the mighty king, the king of nations, the king of Babylon, the king of the lands, the restorer of Esagil and Ezida, the princely son of Seleucus, king of the Macedonians, the king of Babylon." *K. B.*, III. II. 136.

10. "The son of De[metrius]." *Z. A.*, III. 149.

11. "Seleucus, king of the Macedonians, king of Babylon." *K. B.*, III. II. 136.

12. "Seleucus, the king, his (*i.e.*, Antiochus') son." *K. B.*, III. II. D. 138 *bis*.

I.—C. THE TITLES OF THE GREEK KINGS IN THE GREEK INSCRIPTIONS.

1. The name of the king alone. From *C. I. G.* (P. E. I. V.), "Philip," 950. 58; "Alexander," 1371. 5(?); "Lysimachus," 750. 4, 9; "Seleucus," 750. 1; "Nabius [of Sparta], 497. From *C. I. A.*, "Alexander," 591b. 12; "Antigonos(?)," 234b. 14; "Cassander," 371c. From *Ins. Att.*, "Attalus," 1670; "Cassander," 253, 266, 331; "Lysimachus," 732A, "Alexander [the Great]," 161 *bis*, 240 *bis*; "Antigonos," 239; "Demetrius," 314, 239(?), 317. From *I. G. I.*, II., "Alexander," 526a, 6, 14, 34, 39; c 24, d 2, 645a, 1, 3; "Ptolemy," 498. 25.

2. "King" alone. *C. I. G.* (G. S.), I. 223. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14; 102, 188. So *I. G. I.*, III. 466, II. 8.

3. The title followed by the name. In *C. I. G.* (P. E. I. V.), "King Lysimachus," 750. 40; "King Eumenes," I. 37. In *C. I. G.* (G. S.), "King Attalus," I. 45; "King Demetrius," I. 5, 6; "King Eumenes," 15; "King Lysimachus," 279; "King Ptolemy," 298, 3498; 298. 5, 10, 23. In *C. I. A.*, "King Antigonos," 264d. 7, 11; (Gonates) 323b, 591b; "King Demetrius," 252d, 614b, 10, 36; "King Philip," 619b. 5; "King Eumenes," 441d. 8, 441f. 6; "King Ptolemy," 309b. 10, 417b. c; "King Seleucus," 318c, frag. d. 22. In *Ins. Att.*, "King Ptolemy," 332, 381; "King Antiochus," 840; "King Attalus," 384, 385; "King Eumenes," 433, 434, 435, 436; "King Cassander," 297(?); "King Lysimachus," 314, 319; "King Alexander," 737 *ter*; "King Antigonos," 238; "King Demetrius," 300 *bis*, 263, 264, 306. In *I. G. I.*, III, "King Ptolemy," 327. 1; IV, *id.*, 466. I. 4, II. 4; "King Philip," 91; II. "King Alexander," 526b. 18, d. 10, 25; "King Antigonos," 526c. 30; "King Attalus," 42.

4. "Antigonos the king." *Ins. Att.*, 200; "Demetrius, the king," *id.*, 301.

5. "Amyntas, Mak. rex." *C. I. G.* (G. S.), I, 3055, l. 7.
6. "The brother of King Eumenes" (*i.e.*, Attalus). *I. G. I.*, II, 639.
7. "Antigoni Demetrius, the Macedonian." *C. I. G.* (P. E. I. V.) 1419.
8. "Amyntas Perdiccas, king of the Macedonians." *C. I. G.* (G. S.), I, 3055.
9. "Attalus the son of King Attalus," *Ins. Att.*, 966, 1170; "Attalus the son of King Eumenes," *C. I. G.* (P. E. I. V.), 139; "Alexander the son of Craterus," *C. I. A.*, 371. 2. 15 *seq.*, comp. 161.
10. "King Attalus Philadelphus," *C. I. G.* (P. E. I. V.), 1, 38, 5.
11. "King Attalus, the son of King Attalus," *I. G. I.*, II, 639; "King Philip, the son of King Damatrius," *C. I. G.* (P. E. I. V.), 427; "King Eumenes, the son of King Attalus," *C. I. G.* (P. E. I. V.), 898, and *Ins. Att.*, 966; "King Ptolemy, the son of King Ptolemy," *Ins. Att.*, 966, 966A. 41.
12. "Demetrius his (*i.e.*, Antigonus') son." *C. I. A.*, 264d. 13.
13. "The beneficent King Nicomedes." *C. I. G.* (P. E. I. V.), 558. 24.
14. "Nicomedes (the) king, son of Nicomedes the Illustrious (Epiphanes)." *C. I. G.* (P. E. I. V.), 1135. 1.
15. "King Ptolemy and Queen Cleopatra, the Gods, Philomatores," etc., *C. I. G.* (P. E. I. V.), 854, *Ins. Att.*, VI. 468; "King Ptolemy and Queen Arsinoe the Gods Philopatores," *I. G. I.*, IV.
16. "The elder King Ptolemy." *Ins. Att.*, 331.
17. "King Ptolemy, the son of the elder king Ptolemy." *Ins. Att.*, 968. 46, VIII. 464.
18. "King Antiochus, the son of King Antiochus Epiphanes." *Ins. Att.*, 969 *bis*.
19. "King Ptolemy, the God Euergetes." *I. G. I.*, III. 204.
20. "Soter (Savior) (?)." *I. G. I.*, III. 463. 2.
21. "Ptolemy, the son of Ptolemy and Berenice, the Gods, Euergetes." *I. G. I.*, II. 498. 1.

I.—D. TITLES OF THE GREEK KINGS IN THE PAPYRI.

1. "Alexander" alone. Tebtuni Papyri, 104. 5, 105. 9, 106. 4, 109. 8, 176.
2. "The first Amyntas, the father of Philip." Oxyrhynchus Papyri, Part I, p. 36.
3. "Ptolemaios Theos neos Dionysos Philopator Philadelphos." Oxyr. Pap., II. 236
4. Same as last, minus *neos Dionysos*. *Id.*

5. "Queen Cleopatra, goddess Euergetes, and King Ptolemy, called Alexander, the God Philometor." Fayum Pap., 103.

6. "Queen [Cleopatra and King Ptolemy the Gods] Philometores [the Saviors]. Fayum Pap., p. 101.

7. "King Ptolemy and Queen Cleopatra the sister and Queen Cleopatra the wife." Tebtuni Pap., I. 20. Again on p. 60 and p. 147, and on p. 511 (the last adds "the Gods Euergetes").

8. "The Gods Brethren" of Ptol. Philadelphos. Teb. Pap., 6. 17; 176.

9. "The Gods Euergetes." Teb. Pap., 6. 18; 176.

10. The following titles are used of Ptolemy Philopator:

(1) "Gods Philopatores." Teb. Pap., 6. 18; 176.

(2) "Pappos of the king." Teb. Pap., 62. 29, 36.

(3) "Pappos." *Id.*, 62. 315.

(4) "Propappos." *Id.*, 63. 38, 64(a). 19.

(5) "Propappos of the king." *Id.*, 63. 37, 64(a). 15.

(6) "Ptolemy and Arsinoe, the Gods Philopatores." *Id.*, 176.

11. The following titles are used of Ptolemy Epiphanes:

(1) "The Gods Epiphanes." *Id.*, 6. 18, 176.

(2) "Father." *Id.*, 62. 316.

(3) "Father of the king." *Id.*, 30. 26, 62. 38, 55.

(4) "Pappos." *Id.*, 63. 50, 64(a). 23.

(5) "Pappos of the king." *Id.*, 63. 39.

(6) "Ptolemy, the son of Ptolemy and Arsinoe, the Gods Philopatores." *Id.*, 176.

12. The following titles are used of Ptolemy Philometor:

(1) "The Gods Philometores." *Id.*, 6. 19.

(2) "Adelphos." 61b. 70, 71, 62. 57, 115, 317.

(3) "Brother of the father of the king." 63. 51, 64(a). 24, 72. 47.

(4) "Brother of the father." 63. 94, 64a. 45.

13. Ptolemy Eupator is called "The God Eupator." *Id.*, 6. 19.

14. The following titles are used of Ptolemy Euergetes II:

(1) "The Gods Euergetes." *Id.*, 6. 3, 19; 11. 17.

(2) "The father." *Id.*, 63. 94, 65. 16.

(3) "The father of the king." *Id.*, 63. 51, 95, 64(a). 24, (b). 16.

15. Ptolemy Soter II is mentioned in the title: "Queen Cleopatra and King Ptolemy the Gods Philometores, the Saviors." *Id.*, 78. 13.

16. Ptolemy Alexander I is mentioned in the following titles:

(1) "Cleopatra Goddess Euergetes, and Ptolemy, who is called Alexander, the Gods Philomatores, the Saviors." *Id.*, 166.

(2) The same as last, omitting "the Saviors." *Id.*, 105. 8.

(3) "Ptolemy, who also is Alexander, the God Philometor and Queen Berenice, the Goddess Philadelphos." *Id.*, 106. 3.

(4) "Ptolemy, who is called Alexander, the God Philometor." *Id.*, 109. 6.

(5) "Ptolemy, who also is Alexander, the God Philometor." *Id.*, 109. 6.

(6) Same as last, omitting "the God Philometor." *Id.*, 166.

(7) "Ptolemy [who also is Alexander the God] Philometor and Berenice." Oxyr. Pap., 802.

(8) Same as last, omitting "Berenice." 824.

17. "King" alone, Teb. Pap., 5. 1. 246; 6. 8.; 7. 1; 30. 26; 36. 8; 48. 13; 49. 21; 50. 45; 61(a). 146; 62. 29, 38, 57, 115, 116, 309, 318; 63. 33, 39, 51, 95; 64(a). 15, 24, 46; 65. "Queen" alone, 5. 1; 6. 9; 78. 13; 86. 25; 90 introd.; 210. Oxy. Pap., 671. 4, 14(?), 21; 684. 7, 12, 17.

II. THE GREEK TITLES IN THE GREEK HISTORIANS.*

1. Name only. So Herodotus ordinarily, *e.g.*, Cræsus, I. 6⁴, † 7¹, 26², 27³, 28¹, 30⁴, 31², 33², *et al. mult.*; Psammetichus, II. 2³, 30³, 151⁴. 152², 153, 154², 157, 158, 161; Mena, II. 4; Sesostris, II. 107², 108, 110, 111; Proteus, II. 112, 114², 115², 116, 118, 121; Amasis, II. 134, 162⁷, 163, 169³, 172⁴, 174, 175, 176², 177, 178, 180, 181⁶, 182, III. 1, and other kings of Egypt often; Cyrus, I. 113², 114⁴, 115, 116, 120, 121, 122², 123⁶, 124, 125³, 126⁴, and often; Cambyses, III. 1-75 often; Darius, III. 70-160, IV. throughout, and often elsewhere; Xerxes, scores of times; so also of Amyntas of Macedon, V. 17, 18⁶, 19³, 20; Alexander, V. 20³, 21, 22², and often; Leonidas, VII. 205², 206, 207, 219, 220³, 221, 222³, 223, 224, and often, and Pausanias, IX. 53³, 55³, 56, 57², and often; and other kings often in like manner.

So Thucydides, *e.g.*, Perdiccas, I. 58, 61, 62², II. 29², IV. 79³, 83⁶, 103, 124⁴, 125, and elsewhere; Pausanias, I. 95³, 96, 128, 129³, 130, 132², 133², 134, 135²; Arrhibæus, IV. 83³; Cyrus, I. 13; Darius, I. 16; Xerxes, I. 14, 118, 129, III. 56; Agis, V. 58², 59, 60³, and often.

So Xenophon, in *Cyropædia*, of Cyrus hundreds of times; of Astyages, Bk. I. 3¹⁶, 4²³; of Cyaxares, Bk. I. 4³, 6⁴, V. 5²⁶, and often; of Cræsus, VII. 2¹³, and often; of Abradatus, VI. 3⁵, 4⁶. In the *Ana-*

* The following editions have been used in the looking up of the material given in II, to wit: *Herodotus*, by Dindorf, Paris, 1844, and Gaisford's edition, Oxford, 1840; Boehme's *Thucydides*, Leipzig, 1857; Dindorf's *Xenophon*, Leipzig, 1856; Müller's *Fragmenta Ctesiae Cnidiæ*, Paris, 1844; Büttner-Wobst's *Polybius*, Leipzig, 1882; Vogel's *Diodorus Siculus*, Leipzig, 1888; Meineke's *Strabo*, Leipzig, 1895; and Niese's *Josephus*, Berlin, 1887-1895.

† The small numbers denote the number of times the name occurs in the section.

basis, of Darius II. Bk. I. I²; Artaxerxes, Bk. I. I *ter*, II. 4²⁵, I 8, 26; Xerxes I. Bk. II. 9, III. 2, 13; Syennesis, I. 2. 26, 27; 4. 4. In the *Hellenica*, of Agis, I. 1. 33, 34, 35; II. 2. 7, 11, 13, and often elsewhere; Agesilaus, III. B. 1, 2, 4³, 4. 2², 3, 6², and often; Amyntas, V. 2. 13, 38; 3. 9; Darius, II. 1. 8.

So Diodorus Siculus, *e.g.*, Cyrus, IX. 21, 24, 31³, 32, and often; Xerxes, XIV. 25², VIII. 1²; Darius, XIII. 37, 40; Archelaos, XIII. 49; Agis 13. 9; Pausanias, XIII. 75; Artaxerxes, XIII. 108, XIV. 19, 20³, 22; Alexander [the great], XIII. 108²; Psammetichus, XIV. 35², 24, XV. 90, 91, 92²; Cræsus, IX. 25³, 26³, 31⁵, *et al.**

So Ctesias (see *Fragmenta a Carolo Mullero*). In the *Persica*, Cyrus, 1, 2³, 3³, 4⁴, 5³, 6³, 7², and often; Cambyzes, 9³, 10⁴, and often; Darius, 15², 17⁵, 19², *et al.*; Xerxes, 20², 21, 22³, 23², 24, 25³, and often; Artaxerxes, 30³, 31², and often; and in like manner the names of all the Persian kings until Artaxerxes the Second inclusive; Amyrtæus, 9; Inarus, 32³, 33², 34³, 36²; Euagoras, 63⁷; Semiramis, XVI. *ter*, XVII. *bis*, XVIII. *fin*, and often.

So Strabo, *e.g.*, Cyrus, 512², 517, and often; Xerxes, 518, 591, 634, 636; Astyages, 524; Alexander, 508, 509, 513, 517², 524, 529; Cambyzes, 475, 736, 790, and often; Darius, 98, 180, 301, and often; Sebastos (Augustus), 657; Semiramis, 529.

So Polybius, *e.g.*, Philip, IX. 28. 3; 30. 1, 7; Alexander, IX. 28. 8; Cleomenes, IX. 29. 8, 10; Ptolemy [Lagus], I. 63. 7; V. 67. 6, 10; II. 41. 1; Antigonus, IX. 29. 7; I. 63. 7; Demetrius, IX. 29. 5; I. 63. 7; Cassander, IX. 29. 5; Perseus, XXX. 17 *ter*; Philip, V. 12 *ter*, 13 four times, 14 *bis*; Kotus, XXX. 17 *bis*, *et al. mult.* in like manner.

So Josephus, in *Antiquities*, Hezekiah, IX. 267, 276, 278; X. 1, 30, 34; Hosea, IX. 259, 260, 278; Sennacherib, X. 2, 21, 23; Bala-dan, X. 31, 34; Necho, X. 75, 76, 85. Likewise, in *c. Apion*, Amen-ophis, §§ 95, 251, 266, 276, and many other names, as on pages 16 and 34 of Niese's edition.

2. The title "king" alone is used. So by Herodotus, of Ramp-sinitus, II. 121, twelve times; of Cræsus, II. 27 *bis*, 32 *bis*, 35 *bis*, 36; and in numerous instances of other kings, not Persian.

So by Thucydides, but only apparently of the Persian kings. Xenophon, also, seldom uses the title alone except for the king of Persia. But see *Cyropædia*, III. 3, V. 26, of the king of Assyria; VII. 28, 29, 32, and elsewhere. Ctesias, also, of the king of Persia alone. Polybius frequently of any king of whom he writes. Thus of Philip, XXIII. frequently, of Antiochus, XXI. in almost every

* Only fifteen books of the history of Diodorus Siculus have been cited in this article.

section a number of times; of Eumenes, XXII. 7, 8 *bis*; of Antiochus Epiphanes, XXIX. 27 *ter*; of Ptolemy, XXII. 17, 22, XXIV. 6.

Diodorus Siculus, of the kings of Egypt, I. 45, following, frequently; but he uses the title seldom in general. Strabo, as we might expect, on account of the character of his writings, uses the title alone in but a few cases, *e.g.*, 524, 531. Josephus uses the title alone of a great many kings, *e.g.*, *contra* Ap., 77, 82, 92, 121, 142, 192, 194, 207, 232, 234, 236 *ter*, 237, 255, 257, 258, 259, 267, 274, 312, 314.

3. The name followed by the title. So Herodotus (but seldom), *e.g.*, "Psammetichus king," II. 30, 154; "Sesostris king," II. 137; "Rhampsinitis king," II. 124; "Amasis king," II. 145 *bis*; "Necho king," II. 158.

Likewise Thucydides, of "Darius king," VIII. 37, and Xenophon, in *Cyrop.*, VIII. 8; "Artaxerxes the king," and without the article *Hellenica*, V. 1. 31; and "Agesipolis, the king," *Hellenica*, V. 3. 8.

So Ctesias, of "Artaxerxes the king," § 42; and of "Stabrobates the king," § 19.

So likewise Polybius, *e.g.*, "Antiochus the king," XXXI. 9, XXI. 10, 11, and fragment 54; "Eumenes the king," XXI. 3, 10, 16, 43; "Ptolemy the king," III. 2, XXII. 7, XXIV. 6, XXX. 9, 19; "Philip the king," XXI. 31, XXII. 13, XXV. 3; "Seleucus the king," XXII. 6; "Pharnaces the king," XXIV. 14; "Prusias the king," XXX. 18.

So Diodorus Siculus, *e.g.*, "Stabrobates the king," II. 19. 4; "Tachos the king," XV. 92. 1, 2; "Pleistonax the king," XIII. 75; "Darius the king," X. 19, XIII. 70. 3, 104. 3; "Xerxes the king," XI. 1, 56, XII. 76(?); "Artaxerxes the king," XV. 41, 70. 2.

So Strabo, of "Mithridates the king," § 628 (to distinguish from another Mithridates.)

So Josephus, in *Antiquities*, of "Cyrus the king," XI. 3, 5, 99; of "Darius the king," XI. 34, 302; of "Xerxes the king," XI. 183; of "Nebuchadnezzar the king," XI. 14; of "Darius the king" (Codomannus), 311, 321; of "Hezekiah the king," X. 24; of "Antiochus the king," XII. 364, 390. In *contra* Apion, of "Ithobal the king," 156; of "Solomon the king," 108; of "Amenophis the king," 240, 247; of "Alexander king" (without article?), 183, 200; of "Antigonus king" (without article?), 213.

4. The title followed by the name:

Thus, Herodotus speaks of "King Amasis," II. 154; of "King Darius," V. 17, 18, VI. 20, 118, VII. 152, III. 65.

Thucydides speaks of "King Xerxes," I. 129 (letter heading); "King Artaxerxes," I. 104; "King Darius," IV. 102, VI. 59 *bis*, VIII. 37 *bis* (in treaty).

Xenophon, in the *Anabasis*, I. 1, speaks of "the king (ruling one) Artaxerxes."

Ctesias speaks of "King Artaxerxes," Frag. IV-VI. 63.

Polybius speaks of "King Agron," II. 3; of "King Eumenes," XXI. 42, XXII. 6 *bis*; of "King Ptolemy," XXII. 7; of "King Antiochus," XXI. 16; of "King Philip," XXIII. 10; of "King Ariarthes," XXXII. 10; and of others in like manner.

Diodorus Siculus speaks of "King Tacho," XV. 92. 1, 2, 93. 2; "King Xerxes," XI. 5. 4, 69. 1; of "King Artaxerxes," XIV. 22. 1, 25. 1, XV. 91. 7.

If Strabo uses this form, I have failed to note it.

Josephus uses it in *Antiquities*, of Nebuchadnezzar, X. 211, XI. 10; Cyrus, XI. 12 (letter); Darius, XI. 104 (letter), 116, 118 (letter); Cambyses, XI. 26; Xerxes XI. 122, 159 (and βασιλεύοντος Λέρξου XI. 168); Ptolemy, XII. 45 (letter), 51 (letter), 196; Antiochus, XII. 137, 138, 148, 246, 262 (letter), 293, 297, 354, 386; of Hezekiah, IX. 268, X. 36; of Hosea, IX. 278; of Sennacharib, X. 18, 20, and elsewhere. Also in *contra* Apion, of Tethmosis, 94; Solomon, 109, and Amenophis, 254.

5. The name of the nationality is used to denote the king.

So Herodotus uses the title "the Lydian" to denote Alyattes, king of Lydia, I. 22; "the Ethiopian" of Sabakos, II. 137, 152; "the Persian" for kings of Persia often, see Article I.

Thucydides uses it of "the Mede," I. 69, 74.

Xenophon, in the *Cyropædia*, uses this form frequently to denote kings, *e.g.*, "the Indian," III. 2, VI. 2, and elsewhere; "the Assyrian," V. 25, and often; "the Susian," VI. 23. So in the *Anabasis*, II. 4. 26, and *Hellenica*, V. 2. 35, "the Persian."

Josephus, in the *Antiquities*, X. 15, "the Assyrian"; X. 130, 106, "the Babylonian."

6. The name is followed by the nationality.

So Herodotus, I. 25, "Alyattes, the Lydian"; "Astyages, the Mede"; "Darius, the Persian," II. 158, 110; "Sesostris, the Egyptian," II. 110; "Alexander, the Macedonian," IX. 10.

Thucydides speaks of "Pausanias, the Lacedæmonian," I. 128.

Xenophon, in the *Cyropædia*, mentions "Cræsus, the Lydian," II. 1. 5, and "Abradates, the Susian," VI. 2, 7.

Polybius speaks of "Cleomenes, the Spartan," XXXIX. 8; Ctesias of "Inaros, a Libyan," Frag. IV-VI. 32. Diodorus Siculus

speaks of "Cyrus, the Persian," II. 34. 6, IX. 20. 4, 31. 1, 32, 35. 1; "Cambyses, the Persian," X. 14. 2; "Crœsus, the Lydian," IX. 29; "Agesilaos, the Spartan," XV. 88. Strabo seems not to use it; but Josephus, in *contra* Apion speaks of "Cyrus, the Persian," 159.

7. The name of the nationality, followed by the personal name, *e.g.*, Herodotus, II. 33, "the Ammonian Elearchus"; II. 107, "the Egyptian Sesostris"; II. 152, "the Ethiopian Sabakos." So also Xenophon, in *Cyropædia*, I. 1, "the Persian, Cyrus."

8. Herodotus reverses number 7, *e.g.*, "Sesostris, the Egyptian," II. 110; "Darius, the Persian," II. 110, 158.

9. The name followed by the name of the father.

So Herodotus, of "Crœsus, son of Alyattes," I. 6; "Caudaules, son of Myrsus," I. 7; "Gyges, son of Dascylus," I. 8; "Alyattes, son of Sadyattes," I. 18; "Astyages, son of Cyaxares," I. 46; "Apries, the son of Psammetichus," II. 161; "Cyrus, the son of Cambyses," III. 69, VII. 51, I. 46, 73, 207; "Cambyses, son of Cyrus," III. 1 *bis*, 44, 61, 64, 66; "Smerdis, son of Cyrus," III. 61, 63, 65, 67, 68 *bis*, 69, 71, 74 *bis*, 75, 88; "Darius, son of Hystaspes," III. 70, 88 *bis*, 140, VI. 97, VII. 1; "Xerxes, son of Darius," VI. 97, VII. 186; "Artaxerxes, son of Xerxes," VI. 97, VII. 106, 151; "Cleomenes, son of Anaxandrides," V. 39; "Pausanias, son of Cleombrotus," IV. 81, IX. 10; and in like manner in numerous instances of others elsewhere.

So Thucydides, of "Pausanias, son of Cleombrotus," I. 94 (not usual with Thucydides in the case of kings).

So Xenophon, in *Cyropædia*, of "Cyaxares, son of Astyages," I. 5. 2, 4; and in *Hellenica*, of "Archidamus, the son of Agesilaus," V. 4. 25 (not usual by Xenophon in the case of kings).

Ctesias uses this form of "Darius, the son of Hystaspes," Frag. IV-VI. 14.

Polybius uses it of "Philip, the son of Amyntas," II. 48; of "Antigonus, the son of Gonates," IX. 29. 5; of "Ptolemy, the son of Lagus," V. 67. 10, II. 41. 1; of "Philip, the son of Demetrius," XXXIX, 8; of "Antiochus, the son of Seleucus," XXX. 31; of "Demetrius, the son of Seleucus," XXXI. 2.

Josephus uses it, in the *Antiquities*, of "Cambyses, son of Cyrus," XI. 21; "Darius, son of Hystaspes," XI. 31; "Ptolemy, son of Lagus," XII. 2; in *contra* Apion, of "Ramesses, the son of Amenophis," § 300, and of "Ptolemy, the son of Lagus," 183, 185, 210.

Finally, Alexander, *Polyhistor*, employs it of "Cyrus, the son of Cambyses." Cory, Fragments 63.

10. The name of the father followed by the name of the son.

So Xenophon, in *Cyrop.*, I. 4. 25, speaks of "Cambyses, the father of Cyrus"; Diodorus Siculus speaks of "Darius, the father of Xerxes," I. 95. 4 (compare "the father, Darius," XI. 2. 2). So Strabo, "Darius, the father of Xerxes," 591.

11. Polybius speaks of "Attalus, the father of Eumenes, the king," XXII. 20.

12. The name of the father preceded by the word son, or its representative, the article.

So Herodotus, "son of Cambyses," I. 124; "son of Cyrus," III. 14.

13. Herodotus speaks of "Cleombrotus, the father of Pausanias, and son of Anaxandrides," IX. 10.

14. Xenophon speaks of "Artaxerxes, who was the father of Darius," *Hellenica*, II. I.

15. The name of the king followed by the name of the people or peoples ruled.

So Herodotus, "King of the Medes," IX. 7, VIII. 114, VII. 136, I. 56; 205 (of Cyrus), IV. 7; "king of the Ethiopians," III. 21; "the king of the Persians," III. 21 *bis*.

Xenophon, in the *Cyropædia*, "the king of the Assyrians," I. 5. 2; "the [king of] the Cappadocians," I. 5. 2, IV. 2. 29; "the king of the Phrygians," VII. 4. 10; "the king of the Indians," III. 2. 25, II. 4. 7 *bis*; "the king of the Bactrians," V. 1. 3; "the king of the Arabians," I. 5. 2; "the king of the Persians," VII. 1. 4, VIII. 2. 8, 9.

In the *Anabasis*, "king of the Persians," III. 4. 8, 12.

In the *Hellenica*, "the king of the Persians," III. 4. 25, VII. 1. 33; likewise, in the *Æconomici*, IV. 4, 5; and in Agesilaus, I. 6. "The king of the Egyptians," Agesilaus, II. 28.

So Ctesias, "the king of the Egyptians," *Persica*, IV-VI. 9; "the king of the Indians," *Assyriaca*, XIX. 7, 10.

So Polybius, "the king of the Persians," I. 6. 2; "the king of the Macedonians" (of Persius), XXIX. 18.

So Diodorus Siculus, "the king of the Egyptians," XV. 18. 1, 90. 3; "the king of the Persians," XV. 8. 2, 3, 8. 1, 93. 1; "the king of the Indians," II. 19. 7, 10; "the king of the Assyrians," II. 20. 3, 22. 2, 23. 1, 26. 4.

So Strabo, "the king of the Egyptians," 638; "the king of the Lydians," 667.

So Josephus, *contra Apion*, "the king of the Ethiopians," 246. In the *Antiquities*, "the king of the Lacedæmonians," XII. 228; "the king of the Persians," XI. 102; "the king of the Assyrians," IX. 275, 283, X. 17; "the king of the Babylonians," X. 96, 99, 101.

16. Herodotus speaks of "Proteus, the Egyptian king," II. 118.

17. Josephus, in *contra* Apion, speaks twice of the "king of Babylon," 143, 144.

18. Josephus speaks of "Nabopolassar, the king of Babylon and of the Chaldeans," *contra* Apion, 131.

19. The name followed by the title followed by the name of the people or peoples ruled.

So Herodotus, "Psammenitus, king of the Egyptians," III. 14. Astyages, "king of the Medes," I. 91, 162; "Sanacharib, king of Arabians and Assyrians," II. 141; "Elearchus, king of the Ammonians," II. 31; "Sabacus, king of the Ethiopians," II. 137.

So Thucydides, "Agis, king of the Lacedæmonians," VIII. 70; "Leotychides, king of the Lacedæmonians," I. 89; "Inarus, the king of the Libyans," I. 110.

So Xenophon, in *Cyropædia*, "Abradates, king of the Susians," VI. 3. 35; "Croesus, king of the Lydians," I. 5. 3, IV. 2. 29; "Ariabæus, king of the Cappadocians," II. 1. 5; "Cyaxares, king of the Medes," IV. 5. 8. In the *Anabasis*, "Syennesis, king of the Cilicians," I. 2. 12. In the *Hellenica*, "Amyntas, king of the Macedonians," V. 2. 12; "Darius, the king of the Persians," I. 2. 19.

So Ctesias, "Amyrtæus, king of the Egyptians," *Persica*, IV-VI. 9; "Anaxagoras, the king of the Cyprians," *id.*; "Amasis, king of the Egyptians," see Athenæus, citing from Ctesias, in *Cory's Fragments*, XIII; "Scytharbes, the king of the Scythians," *Persica*, IV-VI. 17; "Stabrobates, the king of the Indians," *Assyriaca*, XIX. 1.

So Polybius, "Agron, the king of the Illyrians," II. 2. 4; "Kotus, king of the Odrysians," XXX. 17; "Aminandrus, king of the Athamanians," XXI. 25; "Ariarathus, king of the Cappadocians," XXI. 41, XXXI. 7; "Philip, king of the Macedonians," XXIII. 40; "Genthius, king of the Illyrians," XXIX. 13, XXX. 22; "Bardullas, king of the Illyrians," XXXVIII. 6; "Orophernes, king of the Cappadocians," XXXII. 11; "Masanasses, king of the Nomads in Lybia," XXXVI. 16; "Galosses, king of the Nomads," XXXVIII. 7; "Kersobleptes, [king] of the Thracians," XXXVIII. 6.

So Diodorus Siculus, "Akoris, the king of the Egyptians," XV. 29. 1; "Tachos, the king of the Egyptians," XV. 90. 2; "Ninus, the king of the Assyrians," II. 1. 4; "Stabrobates, the king of the Indians," II. 19. 1; "Astyages, the king of the Medes," IX. 22. 23; "Astibara, the king of the Medes," IX. 20; "Psammetichus, the king of the Egyptians," XIV. 35. 4; "Cyrus, the king of the Per-

sians," II. 44. 2, IX. 31.3, X. 13; "Cambyses, the king of the Persians," X. 15; "Artaxerxes, the king of the Persians," XI. 71. 1, 74. 1, XII. 64. 1, XV. 2. 1; "Xerxes, king of the Persians," XII. 1. 2; "Cræsus, the king of the Lydians," IX. 32; "Archelaus, the king of the Macedonians," XIII. 49. 1; "Agis, king of the Lacedæmonians," XIII. 72.

So Strabo, "Gyges, king of the Lydians," 15, 590; "Ekatomnos, the king of the Carians," 656; "Codrus, the king of the Athenians," 632.

So Josephus, *contra* Apion, "Hiram, the king of the Tyrians," 109; "Amenophis, the king of the Egyptians," 243; "Cyrus, king of the Persians," 132; "Semiramis, the [queen] of Assyria," 142; "Xerxes, the king of the Persians," 172.

So, also, in the *Antiquities*, "Salmanasses, the king of the Assyrians," XI. 19, 85, IX. 257, 277; "Nebuchadnezzar, the king of the Babylonians and Chaldeans," XI. 91; "Philip, king of the Macedonians," XI. 304; "Alexander, the king of the Macedonians," XII. 1; "Areios, the king of the Lacedæmonians," XII. 225, 226 (letter); "Sennacherib, the king of the Assyrians," X. 114; *id.*, "of the Babylonians," X. 1; "Hezekiah, king of the two tribes," X. 1; "Hosea, king of the Israelites," IX. 277; so, "king of the Egyptians," IX. 277.

20. The name followed by the title followed by the country or city.

So Herodotus, "Psammitichus, king of Egypt," I. 105; "Sardanapal, king of Nineveh," II. 150.

So Thucydides, "Amyrtæus, the king in the Marshes," I. 110, 112.

So Ctesias, "Evagoras, the king of Salamis," *Persica*, IV-VI. 63.

So Polybius, "Ptolemy, the king of Syria," XXXIX. 7.

So Diodorus Siculus, "Ariæus, the king of Arabia," II. 1. 5; "Evagoras, the king of Cyprus," XV. 2. 1; "Leonidas, the king of Sparta," XI. 11 (in citation of Simonides' poem on Thermopylæ).

So Josephus, in *Antiquities*, "Ptolemy, the king of Egypt," XII. 287.

21. The title followed by the nation ruled followed by the name of the king.

"The king of Egypt, Sesostris," II. 106.

Herodotus, *e.g.*, "the king of the Persians, Cambyses," III. 21.

So Diodorus Siculus, "the king of the Egyptians, Nektanebis," XX. 42. 1; "the king of the Assyrians, Ninus," II. 1. 7; "the king of the Indians, Stabrobates," II. 17. 4.

So Josephus, *contra* Apion, "the king of Egypt, Amenophis," 263;

and in the *Antiquities*, "the king of the Babylonians, Baladan," X. 30.

22. The same as the last, except the name of the country instead of the name of the people, *e.g.*, "the king of Egypt, Sesostriis," Herodotus, II. 106.

23. The name followed respectively by father, title, and country (or people).

So Herodotus, "Midas, son of Gordias, king of Phrygia," I. 14.

So Thucydides, "Perdiccas, son of Alexander, king of the Macedonians," I. 57, II. 29; "Pleistonax, son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedæmonians," I. 114, II. 21; "Archidamus, son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians," II. 19, 47. So of "Agis, son of Archidamus," III. 89, IV. 2, V. 57; "Sitalces, son of Teres, king of the Thracians," II. 29; "Orestes, the son of Echekratides, king of the Thessalians," I. 111; "Arrhibæus, the son of Bromeus, king of the Lynceæstean Macedonians," IV. 83.

24. Josephus has a slight modification of number 22, to wit: "The son of Philip and king of the Macedonians, Alexander," *Antiq.*, XII. 354.

25. Herodotus reverses number 22, *e.g.*, "the king of the Lydians, Cræsus, the son of Alyattes," I. 47.

26. Thucydides varies number 22 as follows: "Perdiccas, the son of Alexander, king of Macedonia, and of the Thracian Chalcidians," II. 95.

27. Thucydides further modifies as follows: "Sitalces, the son of Teres, the Odrysian, king of the Thracians," II. 95.

28. Thucydides, again, has "Pausanias, the son of Cleombrotus, the Lacedæmonian," II. 71.

29. Thucydides, again, has, "Agis, the son of Archidamus, (the) king," V. 54. So Diodorus Siculus, "Cyrus, the son of Darius, the king," IX. 22, XIII. 104. 3.

30. Polybius has "Agron, the king of the Illyrians [was] the son of Pleuratus," II. 2.

31. Thucydides has, also, "Inarus, the son of Psammetichus, the Libyan, king of the Libyans, bordering on Egypt," I. 104.

32. Thucydides, again, has "Cyrus, the first king of the Persians, and Cambyses his son," I. 13.

33. Thucydides has, also, "Darius, who was king of the Persians after Cambyses," I. 14.

34. Thucydides, again, has "Cyrus and the Persian power" (ἐξουσία), I. 16.

35. Thucydides uses the following phrase also: "King Artaxerxes," I. 104.

xerxes, the son of Xerxes," I. 137, IV. 50; "King Darius, son of Artaxerxes," VIII. 5.

36. Herodotus speaks of Cræsus as "Lydian born, king of many, foolish Cræsus," I. 85.

37. Herodotus speaks of "Trasybulus, then tyrant of Miletus," I. 20.

38. Herodotus speaks of "Cyaxares, descendant of Deioces," I. 16.

39. Herodotus speaks of the nephew of Lycurgus as "Leobotes, his nephew, king of (lit. 'ruling one') the Spartans," I. 65.

40. Herodotus speaks of "Cyaxares, the son of Phraortes, the son of Deioces," I. 73.

41. Herodotus speaks of "Pausanias, the son of Cleombrotus, the Lacedæmonian," V. 32; and of "Inarus, the son of Psammitichus, a Libyan," VII. 7.

42. Herodotus speaks of "Agron, the son of Ninus, the son of Belus, the son of Alcæus, first of the Heracleidæ, king of the Sardi-ans," I. 7.

43. Herodotus gives the genealogy of Leonidas, as follows: "Leonidas, the son of Anaxandrides, the son of Leo, the son of Eurycratides, the son of Anaxandrus, the son of Euryeratides, the son of Polydorus, the son of Alcamenes, the son of Telecles, the son of Archelaus, the son of Egesileus, the son of Doryssus, the son of Leobotes, the son of Echesratus, the son of Egius, the son of Eurysthenes, the son of Aristodemus, the son of Aristomachus, the son of Cleodæus, the son of Hyllus, the son of Heracles," VII. 204.

44. Herodotus speaks of "Astyages, the son of Cyaxares, who was brother-in-law of Cræsus and king of the Medes," I. 73.

45. Herodotus speaks of "Cleombrotus, the son of Anaxandrides, and brother of Leonidas," VIII. 71.

46. Xenophon, in the *Cyropædia*, mentions "the ruler (*ἄρων*) of Babylon," VI. 2; "of Armenia," II. 4; "of Hyrcania," IV. 5; "of India," III. 2.

47. Xenophon, in the *Cyropædia*, represents different persons as calling Cyrus "lord" (despot), *e.g.*, IV. 6. 2, 3, II. 2, V. 4, VII. 3.

So Josephus, in *Antiq.*, XI. 22, in letter to Cambyes; XI. 240, in Esther's speech to Artaxerxes (Xerxes); XI. 162, Nehemiah in speech to Xerxes (Artaxerxes!).

48. Xenophon speaks of "Astyages, king of the Medes, his (*i.e.*, Cyrus') grandfather by Mandane," *Cyropædia*, I. 2.

49. Polybius speaks of "Ptolemy, who was called Philopator," XXXIX. 8, and Josephus of "Antiochus, who was called Epiphanes," *Ant.*, XII. 234, and of "Ptolemy, called (different verb) Epiphanes," XII. 130.

50. Polybius speaks, also, of the "second king of Egypt, who is called Philadelphus," Fragment 73, from Athenagoras, 2. p. 452.

51. Polybius speaks, also, of "Antiochus Epiphanes, named Epimanes," XXVI. 1.

52. Polybius mentions "Attalus, brother of King Eumenes," XXX. 1.

53. Ctesias speaks of "Arsaces, the son of the king, who also is called Artaxerxes," *Persica*, IV-VI. 53, 57.

54. Diodorus Siculus speaks of "King Cræsus, the Lydian," IX. 29.

55. Diodorus speaks of "Cyrus, the son of Cambyses and of Mandane, the daughter of Astyages, the king of the Medes," IX. 22.

56. Diodorus speaks, also, of "Cyrus, the son of Darius the king," IX. 22, XII. 104. 3.

57. Diodorus speaks, also, of "Darius, the king of Asia," XIII. 108. 1; and of "Artaxerxes, the king of Asia," XIV. 35. 2.

58. Diodorus speaks of "Ochus, surnamed Artaxerxes," XV. 93. 1; and of Artaxerxes who was called Ochus, XVI. 40 (different word in Greek).

59. Strabo speaks of "Σωτήρ Ἀντίοχος," 516.

60. Strabo speaks of "Darius, who was against Alexander," 544.

61. Strabo speaks of "Cæsar, the God," 616, and of

62. "The God, Cæsar," 657.

63. Strabo speaks of "Augustus Cæsar," 595, 637, and of

64. "Cæsar, the August," 840.

65. Josephus speaks of "Ptolemy, king of Egypt, even he that was called Epiphanes," XII. 235.

66. Josephus speaks of "Cyrus, whom the Greeks call Artaxerxes," XI. 184.

67. *Id.* of "King Antiochus, the God, Epiphanes," XII. 258.

68. *Id.* of "the great Antiochus," XII. 414.

69. *Id.* of "Antiochus, the great, the one ruling Asia," XI. 120.

70. *Id.* "Ptolemy Lagus Soter," XII. 3.

71. *Id.* of "Antiochus Epiphanes," *c. Ap.*, 234; *Antiq.*, XII. 393; "Ptolemy Soter," *Antiq.*, XII. 11; "Ptolemy Philadelphus," XII. 118; "Armesses Miamoun," *c. Ap.*, 97.

72. *Id.* of "Philopator Ptolemy," *Antiq.*, XII. 130; "Philometor Ptolemy," XII. 240.

73. *Id.* of "Philadelphus" *Antiq.*, XII. 11; "Philopator," XII. 131; "Philometor," XII. 235.

74. *Id.* of "Seleucus, called Soter, son of Antiochus, the Great," *Antiq.*, XII. 223.

75. *Id.* of "Antiochus, the son of Seleucus, who was called by the Greeks, Theos," *Antiq.*, XII. 125.

76. *Id.*, "Artaxerxes, the king of Persia after Xerxes," *c. Ap.*, 40.

77. *Id.*, "The most admirable king Agrippa," *c. Ap.*, 52.

78. *Id.*, Nabopolassar, king of Babylon and of the Chaldeans," *c. Ap.*, 131.

79. *Id.*, "Cyrus from Persis," *c. Ap.*, 150.

80. *Id.*, "Demetrius, son of Antigonus, who was called Poliorcetes," *c. Ap.*, 185.

81. *Id.*, "Cyrus, who after him (*i.e.*, Nebuchadnezzar) was king of Babylonia and Persia," XI. 92.

82. Polybius uses the phrase, "Antiochus, the Great," XX. 8. So Diodorus Siculus, 531, 594.

83. The title "the great king" is used as follows:

By Herodotus, VIII. 140 (of Xerxes in speech), I. 188, 192 (for the king of Persia in general). So he calls Gelo, of Syracuse, a "great tyrant," VII. 156.

By Xenophon, in the *Anabasis*, "μέγας βασιλεὺς," I. 2. 8, 7. 2, II. 3. 17; "βασιλεὺς μέγας," I. 7. 16. (All three of Artaxerxes.)

So Josephus, *Antiq.*, XII. 36, of Ptolemy Philadelphus.

84. "The great king Artaxerxes" (βασιλεὺς μέγας Ἀρταξέρξης), Josephus, *Antiq.*, XI. 216 (decree), 275 (decree). "The great king Senacherim," *id.*, X. 2.

85. "The king of kings Osymanduas," Diod. Sic., I. 47. 4; "the king of kings, Xerxes," Josephus, *Antiq.*, XI. 123 (in letter).

86. Further, Diodorus Siculus describes Philip as "Philip, the son of Amyntas and the father of Alexander, who conquered the Persians," XVI. 2.

III.—THE GREEK TITLES IN THE GREEK LETTERS.*

1. Name alone, *e.g.*, "Alexander," in the address of Alexander's letter to Aristotle, 98*a*; *id.*, to "Darius," 98*b* (address); "Ochus," in body of Alexander's letter to Darius, 98; "Arses," *id.*; "Bagoas," *id.*; "Amasis," in the address of Amasis' letter to Polycrates, 100*a*; "Alexander" (in address of Calanus' letter), 192; *id.* (in address of letter of Diogenes the Cynic to Alexander, 254); *id.*, 236. V (in letter of Diogenes to Perdicas); "Perdicas" (in address of last), 236; "Antipater" (in address of Diogenes' letter), 236. IV; "Artaxerxes" (in letter of Hippocrates), 291; "Darius," *id.*; "Xerxes," *id.*; in Isocrates' letter to Philip, 321. (7); "Cyrus," *id.*; "Alexander," in

* The references are to the pages of the *Epistolographoi Hellenikoi*, by Rudolf Hercher, Paris, 1873.

address of Isocrates' letter, 327; "Antipater," in address of letter from Isocrates, 325; "Philip," in address of letter from Isocrates, 324; *id.*, in address of letter from Menecrates, 399; "Xerxes," in address of letter from Pausanias, 407, and in letter of Themistocles to Polygnotus, 760; "Cræsus," in address of letter from Pittacus, 491; *id.*, in letter of Plato to Dionysius, 493; "Cyrus," in *id.*; "Philip," in address of letters from Socrates, 629 and 632; "Xerxes," in same letter, 630; "Alexander," *id.*, 630, 631; "Amyntas," *id.*, 631; "Agesilaus," *id.*, 632; "Perdiccas," *id.*, 632 *bis*; "Cræsus," in address of letters from Solon, 637; "Pausanias," in address of letters from Themistocles, 741 and 754; *id.*, in body of letter, 742 five times; *id.*, 754 *bis*; *id.*, in letter to Alcetas, 755 six times, 756 eight times; *id.*, in letter to Polygnotus, 759 four times; *id.*, in letter to Habronichus, 743 *ter*, 744; "Philip," in address of his letter to the Athenian Council, 461, in address of his letter to Aristotle, 466, and in body of letter, 467; "Agesilaus," in address of letter from Xenophon, 790; "Ptolemy," in address of letter from King Antiochus, 108.

2. The title "king" alone, *e.g.*, in address of letter from Amelius, 101; in letter of Heraclitus to Hermodorus, 286; in letters of Hippocrates, V. and VI. 290, and XXIV. 310; in letter of Socrates, 632; and in Themistocles' letters, 742, 755, 759, 761, and 762.

3. Title followed by name, *e.g.*, "King Alexander," in heading of his letter to the Greek exiles, 99; "King Antigonus," in heading of his letter to Zeno, 107; "King Antiochus," in heading of two of his letters, 108; "King Alexander," in address of letter from Aristotle, 174; "King Darius," in address of a letter from Darius to Heraclitus, and of one in reply, 280; "King Demetrius," in address of letter from Hippocrates, 310; "King Xerxes," in address of letter from Xerxes to Pausanias, 407; "King Ptolemy," in address of his letter to Eleazar, and in the address of the reply, 599; "King Antigonus," in address of letter from Zeno, 792.

4. The name followed by the title, *e.g.*, "Mithridates, the king," in the address of his letter to another Mithridates, 177; "Archelaus, the king," in address of letters to him, 275 and 276; "Chrisamus, the king," in letter to Artaxerxes, 289.

5. We find, also, title, people ruled, name of ruler, *e.g.*, "the king of the Egyptians, Amasis," in address of his letter to Bia, 100; "the king of the Macedonians, Philip," in the address of a letter from Philip to the Council of Athens, 461; in the address of three letters on page 465, and of one on page 466.

6. We find the title followed by the people ruled, *e.g.*, "king of

the Ethiopians," in letter of Amasis, 100; "king of the Lydians," in letter to Cræsus from Anarcharsis, 105; "king of the Medes," in letter from Anaximenes to Pythagoras, 106; "king of the Persians," in letter of Hippocrates to Demetrius, 290.

7. The following, also, are found, to wit: "king of Asia," in letter of Alexander to Darius, 98.

8. "Lord of all Asia," in same letter as the last, 98.

9. "The great king (*βασιλεὺς μέγας*) Artaxerxes," in the headings of two letters, or decrees, of Artaxerxes, 175.

10. "The great king" (*βασιλεὺς μέγας*), in the address of a letter to Ptolemy, king of Egypt, from Demetrius Phalereus, 218.

11. "Ptolemy, king of the Egyptians," in address of a letter from Demetrius Phalereus, 218.

12. "King Darius, the son of Hystaspis," in letter from Darius to Heraclitus, 280.

13. "Darius (the) king whose father was Hystaspis," in address of letter to Darius from Heraclitus, 280.

14. "The great king of kings, Artaxerxes" (*βασιλεὺς βασιλέων μέγας*), in address of letter from Artaxerxes to Pætus, 289, and in superscription of the reply, 289; also, in superscription of two letters from Artaxerxes on page 290.

15. "The king of kings, my great lord Artaxerxes," in letter to Artaxerxes from Hystanes, prefect of the Hellespont, 290.

16. "Pausanias the general (Hegemon) of Sparta," in beginning of his letter to Xerxes, 407.

16. "Son of Alyattes," in letter of Pittacus to Cræsus, 491.

17. "Pausanias, the Lacedæmonian," in letter of Plato to Dionysius, 493.

18. "The Persian," in letter of Socrates to Philip, 632.

19. "The great king," in letter of Themistocles to Aristides, 752 (*βασιλεὺς ὁ μέγας*).

20. "Alexander, prince (*ἄρχων*) of the Macedonians," in letter of Themistocles to Polygnotus, 759.

21. "Darius, the father of Xerxes," in letter of Themistocles to Temenidas, 762.

22. "O best Archelaus," in letters from Euripides to Archelaus (the) king, 276.

Princeton, N. J.

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V.

PROFESSOR ROYCE'S IDEALISM.

PROFESSOR ROYCE characterizes his theory of Being or Reality as "Synthetic" or "Constructive Idealism." While he acknowledges special indebtedness to the Critical Idealism of Kant and close sympathy with Hindoo Mysticism, his Philosophy is most immediately related to Fichte, Hegel and Schopenhauer. His Metaphysics is concerned with the problem of Reality and the problem of Knowledge. "Reality is not the world apart from the activity of knowing beings; it is the world of the fact and the knowledge in one organic whole." Moreover, as we shall see, these "facts" are "conscious facts," and these "conscious facts" mean "deeds" that "embody," "define" and express "purpose." And we shall find that "purpose" is the essential and final nature of Reality and that Knowledge is the final form of purpose. The problems, then, of Reality and Knowledge have, in this system, a very near relation, approximating to identity. Our author discusses Reality in what he considers its three characteristic and main forms. Says he: "My precise undertaking in the following lectures is to show what we mean by Being in general and by the special sorts of Reality that we attribute to God, the World and to the human individual." His philosophy deals with the problems of the God, the World, the human Individual and the Individual's relation to the World and to God.

The discussion "begins with the idea." "I am one of those who hold that when you ask the question, What is an idea? And how can ideas stand in any true relation to Reality? you attack the world-knot in the way that promises most for the untying of its meshes." And says he: "I shall assert that an idea appears in consciousness as having the significance of an act of will." "An idea is any state of mind that has a conscious meaning." "By the word 'Idea' I shall mean in the end any state of consciousness, whether simple or complex, which, when present, is then and there viewed as at least the partial expression or embodiment of a single conscious purpose." An "Idea" is thus of the nature of an ideal. And "the true self of any individual man is not a datum but an ideal."

And "any finite idea is insofar a Self." Philosophy then begins with the Idea, or, more comprehensively expressed, it begins with the Individual, for the idea, the ideal, the Self and the Individual are of the same nature, though the Individual is of more manifold composition and of more comprehensive extent. Professor Royce has been accused of pantheistic Metaphysics. If there is truth in this accusation, it is also true that from the literary point of view his philosophy is rather Individualism. The word "Individual" is throughout the altogether conspicuous word. God is Individual, the world is individual, man is individual, and everything is individual. "The Individual," however, referring to man, and as distinguished from the World and God, is a Will and a Self viewed in the forum of the Universe—a Self viewed in its highest potencies—a Self fully developed and educated. An Individual is by inheritance a "Son of God," but he may and should become also a Philosopher. He is not a subject exclusive of its object, nor an object exclusive of its subject. An Individual, in fullest sense, is a Subject or Self that has found its own true objective "counterpart," and therein its own ultimate, unique and identical place in the universal and absolute experience of the living God in whom we live, move and have our being. The Individual is thus an Idea or a system of ideas dominated by one supreme conception that has found its place in the divine system of universal truth, a moral ideal that has found its place in the universal moral order, and a religious personality that has found its peace in God. Our author's view of the Individual is thus not like a study in empirical Psychology or in empirical Ethics, but is a mystical and religious view.

HIS IDEA OF GOD.

Man's relation to God is mystically apprehended. It is not a causal relation, and so cannot be scientifically defined. And yet we have in the traditions of Religion and of philosophical thought certain forms of thought and expression that may serve in exposition of our author's view. God is the supreme Monad—not in the realistic and atomistic sense, but in a universally purposive, personal, intellectual and coöperative sense, God is the one supreme Thought in which all thoughts have their divine place and meaning. "All life is divine," God is the universal life in which all lives live. And more specifically: "All purpose is divine," and God is the universal purpose of the Universe; in Him all conscious purposes in man and in the world find their moral universe, their final meaning and their ultimate realization. God is the "Individual of Indi-

viduals"; and in Him all Individuals, of mankind and of the world, live, move and have their being. Man believes in God, not by reason of external and historical evidence, but because man needs God, wants God and means God. God as the "Individual of Individuals" is the supreme and ultimate centre and source of social interest; as the absolute and all-comprehending Thought He is the answer to all questions; as the absolute and supreme Will He is the counterpart of all finite wills, and in Him all the purposes and aspirations of all wills find their final goal, realization, rest and peace. And God is the world. The world is composed of conscious individuals. God is "the Individual of individuals." In the social organism of his life all individuals find their conscious meaning, their life and intercourse.

We may further observe that Prof. Royce has three somewhat different views of the nature of God. "The true God is, therefore, as Fichte holds, existent in our universe as the pulse of its moral order, as the life of lives, the eternal spiritual self-creator, whose work is never done, and who is no one individual being anywhere, but who is the life and organic unity of everything." This adaptation of the Fichtean idea of God approaches to Pantheism, though with realistic resistance, and this view of God our author accepted at the time when he wrote his *Religious Aspect of Philosophy*. In his book on *The Conception of God*, God is rather the scientific ideal of universal, rationally systematized knowledge deified in the Omniscient One. This view is after Hegel, and may be said to be based on epistemological ontology. In his volumes on *The World and the Individual* we find his third and final view of God. Reality is a social organism, and God is the "Individual of Individuals." The "Individual" in our author's system, though differing in its voluntaristic and social interpretation, corresponds to the "monad" in Leibnitz's system. And God, instead of supreme Monad, is the "Individual of Individuals" in whose all-comprehending experience all conscious experience of all individuals finds its place and meaning and realization. This view is an interpretation more harmonious with our author's voluntarism and is his most characteristic view of God. We may style it Pantheism, but it is a system of individualistic Pantheism. The question that arises is, whether or not the word "Individual" with a consciously personal meaning can be applied to everything in heaven and on earth?

HIS VIEW OF THE WORLD.

Our author's first work was on *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*. With Fichte and Hegel, he enters Philosophy from religious or theological premises to make a theological study of the world—viewing the world as a function of divinity. In this view and from his mystical premises, final knowledge of the world surpasses all human, terrestrial knowledge, individual and collective. It is only as a child of God and as part of the divine mind that man can know the real meaning of the world. Our author's view of the world is, first, then, for an attempt to study or formulate the world from the divine standpoint with the assumption that this is possible, and that this is the problem of Philosophy. From the divine standpoint the world is the "embodiment," the "realization" and "expression" of the divine purpose. The word "embodiment" suggests corporeality. But corporeality in the material sense of the word does not exist. The word "realization" suggests Realism. But our author is not a Realist. "Realization," with him, refers to the final form of conscious purpose, and the final form of conscious purpose, as we shall later see, is knowledge. The word "expression" is a social word. Our author employs its meaning in the sense that the Universe is absolutely and entirely a social organism. The word "expression" and the word "embodiment" are also used interchangeably, for the author reminds us in his book on *The Conception of God* of the view of Thomas Aquinas, that matter is itself merely an essential form of divine expression. Further, in *The World and the Individual* (Series I) our author says: "The world in its wholeness might indeed be regarded as, so to speak, an only begotten son of the central purpose—an unique expression—unique not merely by reason of its wealth, but of its exclusiveness. And thus the category of individuality would be fulfilled in the whole precisely in the sense in which our finite affection presupposes its fulfilment in individual cases." We notice in this passage: 1. A genetic relation between God and the world. This doctrine of emanation is pantheistic. But it carries with it a remnant of Realism—namely, the belief in the independent existence of the world as based on the testimony of the senses. And 2. The world is a "unique expression"; God does and realizes exactly and specifically what He means and purposes. And the unique and specific form of expression for God and man alike is the form of conscious "individuality." In other words, God specifically asserts His own conscious individuality in the world, and the true, real world is simply the definite, conscious form in which Divinity asserts and

expresses itself. Our author's view of the world, then, like his view of the Individual, is, first, a part of religious philosophy, not first a study of Physics, but primarily an adaptation of theological premises. The world seen *sub specie divinitatis* is the final view, and we shall return again to this view after passing through the discussions of terrestrial philosophy.

For the philosophy of ideas and of the mind Idealism would be no very difficult conclusion were it not for their external reference and the testimony they bear to an external world. It is Nature and the material Universe that to many minds renders Idealism unconvincing. And it is to our author's view of Nature that we now direct our attention. Realism with its doctrine of the Dualism of Mind and Matter was the current philosophy in America when Prof. Royce began his philosophical career. This is doubtless the historical occasion of his hostility to Realism. He takes an extreme view of Realism—argues that it owes its origin to social convenience, that it is the doctrine of the well-to-do, of the well-established part of society, of the class that is interested in “socially important objects” and in “property,” and that is therefore conservative and desirous of keeping important issues well established. He holds that “metaphysical Realism is the theory which, recognizing independent beings as real, lays special stress on their independence as the very essence of their reality.” From this he argues that Realism reduces itself unavoidably to atomism, and ultimately to zero. For if things are absolutely independent and in no relation to each other and to knowledge, then knowledge, which involves the relation of subject to object and the relationing processes of Reason, can have no relation to things, and thus we have universal atomism, and from the standpoint of knowledge universal skepticism.

We may notice here our author's theory as to Nature as the realm of mechanical laws. The laws of Nature are not invariable, but only “relatively invariable”; they are “cosmic weather habits,” and when finally appreciated they are only laws and rules of thought and human convenience. The origin of the laws of Nature is described as follows: “The endless novelties of social life can only be organized in definite ways, in case many people agree to coöperate by adopting the same plans. If they adopt these same plans, and persist in them, a basis of custom, of social habits is formed.” “Such definite social habits, or plans of action as can be communicated by one man to another, or passed down, like the industrial arts of earlier people, from generation to generation, depend upon discovering, fixing by our attention such uniformities of national law as

enable men to conceive, and to describe to one another, definite plans of action." "Hence in the history of mankind, the discovery of seemingly invariable laws of Nature has been the condition for the organization of definite customs. And just because Nature has thus come to be conceived as the socially significant tool, that aspect of Nature which suggests such unvarying laws has come to be looked upon as the most characteristic of the aspects of the objectively physical world." "Industrial art, commerce and social custom were the three early sources of interest in the uniformities of natural phenomena." "It is our interest in social organization that has given us both industrial art and empirical science." "Our science is a sort of theoretical extension of our industrial art." "A conception used by any empirical science is an ideal tool, or a sort of mechanical contrivance." "And not only are the conceptual constructions of science thus similar to the contrivances of an industrial art, but the processes involved in the one case are actually continuous with those which are used in the other." "My conclusion, then, is this: It is especially through the success of our scientific conceptions that we have been led to a mechanical view of Nature, and to the consequent doctrine that Mind and Matter are utterly contrasted entities." "And this concept of the unvarying laws of Nature, freed at length from its practical motives, became universal, and has inflicted itself as a dogma on more recent thought. Yet its origin was social." Our laws of Nature are thus of mechanical and social origin. Thus we do not get our mechanical laws from Nature nor adapt our social laws to the laws of Nature; on the contrary, we get natural laws from our mechanical ideas and from social adaptations.

Prof. Royce has two views of the World; the one he terms "the World of Description," the other "the World of Appreciation." In giving his view of the origin and nature of the mechanical world we have already anticipated his view of the "World of Description." The World of Description is not the external material world of common belief. This belief in a material world is a blind popular dogma to be set aside as antiquated. Nor is it the world of "brute facts" and of the "senseless accidents of sensation." It is, in short, the world of common intelligence and of scientific knowledge and theory. This world of descriptive knowledge does, however, have conscious external reference—at least "apparently external." But knowledge and the sciences are utilitarian, and this realm of descriptive knowledge is the arsenal of our intellectual "tools," and has thus the apparent externality of mechanical implements. And

this World of Description constitutes a universal human currency with humanity's standards of weights, measurements and values. Hence the definiteness of scientific knowledge is born of social convenience. The conceptions of substance and causality and the categories of knowledge and the laws of Nature are definite because it is socially convenient to have definite standards of estimates and of valuations and definite rules of action. Scientific knowledge is then definite for reasons of utility and for no other reason.

And Nature in this view is of social extraction. "Our belief in the Reality of Nature, when Nature is taken to mean the realm of physical phenomena known to common sense and to science, is inseparably bound up with our belief in the existence of our fellow-men. The one belief cannot be understood apart from the other. Whatever the deeper reality behind Nature may turn out to be, *our* Nature, the realm of Matter and of laws with which our science and our popular opinion have to do, is a realm which we conceive as known or as knowable to various men, in precisely the same general sense in which we regard it as known or as knowable to our private selves." "Take away the social factor in our present view of Nature and you would alter the most essential of its characteristics possessed for us." "Our belief in man is logically prior to our interpretation of Nature." "I see the sun shining. My fellow, as I learn, sees the sun shining also. This I learn as a part of my interpretation, not of external Nature, but of my fellow's inner life." "If we are to understand what we mean by material Nature, and why we believe it to be real, we must ask, What internal meaning of ours seeks and demands an embodiment such that, to our minds, only outer Nature can furnish this embodiment." "By my material world, I certainly mean a collection of actual and possible experiences of mine such that you, too, can agree with me about the presence and describable character of these experiences." The "World of Description," then, as the realm of mechanical laws that we call "Nature," is not the corporeal world of popular belief, but is rather a social product, a personal and social experience, and an educational system. It may serve for beginners as a partial description of the real world. "Realism is a good doctrine to begin with," and "that the world permits us, up to a certain point, to describe it does help to throw light on the true nature of things." The educational value, however, of the study of the world is not in the direction of what we understand by scientific knowledge. Our author is here also finally a mystic, and by scientific education he means personal discipline and edification. This may be seen in the follow-

ing passage. He says: "The only justification for the more abstractly theoretical conception of the World of Description is its value as a means of organizing our conduct and our conception of what the will seeks. On the other hand, without such a definite conception as the World of Description furnishes, the finite will is left to vague longings." Nature, then, as the World of Description, is not the real world; it is merely the realm of the rules and the intelligence of social convenience, of utility and education.

What, then, is the true view of Nature? The world as seen in its true reality our author terms the "World of Appreciation"; and Nature, in this view, is given a social and ethical interpretation. "For us to-day, the conceptions which, from our idealistic point of view, promise to admit of the most plastic adaptation to the varieties of empirical fact, and consequently to the most universal application to the interpretation of the inner life of Nature, are our social conceptions." "In the form of finite social intercourse, amongst human beings, we find exemplified a type of unity in variety and of variety recalling us always to the recognition of unity—a type, I say, which permits us, as I believe, to go further in our hypothesis for the interpretation of the vast realm called Nature than we can go by the use of any other types of conception." And our relation to Nature is also ethical and religious. "In the second series of these lectures I shall try to explain our relations to Nature as essentially social, and, therefore, in their deepest essence ethical relations." And "we are related to God through our consciousness of our fellows. And our fellows, in the end, prove to be far more various than mere men. And precisely in this sense of deeper companionship with Nature will lie the future reconciliation of Religion with Science." "Moreover, God is the Absolute Being. And God, when thus viewed, is indeed not other than His world, but is the very life of the world taken in its wholeness as a single conscious and self-possessed life." The world, then, in its real meaning, is to be viewed as a "social organism," and as a function or aspect of Divinity, and our relation to it is to be understood as social, ethical and religious.

"Our fellows are known to be real, and to have their own inner life, because they are for each of us the endless treasury of more ideas." "Our fellows furnish us the constantly needed supplement to our own fragmentary meanings. Hence, since Reality is through and through what completes our incompleteness, our fellows are indeed real." He speaks thus of our relation to our fellow-men in which we interpret their reality. And we know Nature in the same

way. He says: "If we are to know what we mean by Material Nature, and why we believe it to be real, we must ask, What internal meaning of ours seeks and demands an embodiment such that, to our minds, only outer Nature can furnish this embodiment?" The argument then is that Nature is a world of "socially related selves," because the demands of our natures seek and require such an interpretation. We do not know Nature's time-table and her language, and so we miss connections and misunderstand Nature. Hence we deem Nature dumb and dead. But "we have no right whatever to speak of really unconscious Nature, but only of uncommunicative Nature, or of Nature whose mental processes go on at such different time-rates from ours that we cannot adjust ourselves to a like appreciation of their inward fluency." "I suppose that when you deal with Nature, you deal with a vast realm of finite consciousness of which your own is at once a part and an example." "I suppose that this process goes on with vast slowness in inorganic Nature, as, for instance, in the nebula, but with great speed in you and me. But, meanwhile, I do not suppose that slowness means a lower type of consciousness." "Every natural process, if rightly viewed from within, would be the pursuit of an ideal." "There would be no dead Nature—nothing really inorganic or unconscious—only life, striving, outflow, ideality, significance, rationality." "Perhaps experiences of longer time-span are far higher in rational type than ours." The world, then, in its inner and real life, is composed of "socially related selves," and this social realm of the world is also divine. Our relationship to the world is not only intellectual, but in its deepest significance this relationship is social, ethical and religious. We have seen, then, something of our author's view of the "Individual's" relation to the World and to God. The more special consideration, however, of the Individual's relation to the World and to God involves the problem of knowledge and the discussion of epistemology. Prof. Royce holds, as we have seen, that Realism is untenable, especially because its doctrine of the Dualism of Mind and Matter renders a theory of knowledge impossible. In order that knowledge or a theory of knowledge may be possible, the realistic dogma of an independent external world must be abandoned. Our author, accordingly, teaches that the belief in a material world—in an independent corporeal world—is a "superstition," and he terms the belief in an independent external world a "realistic dogma" to be abandoned as antiquated. That anything should exist independent of the mind or external to the mind is, in our author's view, epistemologically impossible. Philosophy,

he holds, as we have seen, "must begin with the Idea." And since externality is impossible, the question then to be solved is, how to explain the "apparent externality" to which our ideas bear testimony. The belief in an external material world he explains, as we have said, as a "popular superstition" and as a "realistic dogma." "Apparent externality" is, however, in part an essential function of Reality—a real but a transient part of the conscious process. Prof. Royce's epistemology is voluntaristic. "An idea appears in consciousness as an act of will." An idea is thus of the nature of an ideal. Now it is of the nature of the will to project its ideals, at least in part, as something "beyond" and "other than" itself; then, in the process of realization, it seeks to identify itself with its ideals and its ideals with itself. There is then the "apparent externality" of ideals involved in the essential process of voluntary activity. "It is of the very essence of my will to demand its own other, to set its fulfilment beyond its present, and so define its own very life as now in some sense also not its own, or as in some wise foreign." This essential principle of voluntary activity is what our author terms the principle of "contrast-effect"—a principle fundamental and universal in the process both of Reality and of true Knowledge. For this prime function of the will offers also the principle of organization for the world of descriptive knowledge, insofar as the World of Description is not affected by the "realistic dogma" of independent externality. Of this we have the following explanation: The "World of Description" is a world of knowledge, and the realm of knowledge is organized on the principle of "resemblance and difference." Now "difference" is simply the "between"-ness which the will projects between its ideal and itself; and this "difference" or "between"-ness is what makes the object seem to be "other than" the subject, or merely to "resemble" the class with which it is to be identified. And the mind experiences "differences" and distinctions before it "identifies" in classification. All our real knowledge of the world then admits of interpretation and adaptation on this very principle of the objectivation of the will, in which it posits its object as "other than" itself before proceeding to identify its object with itself and itself with its object. The realm of personality and of our personal neighborhood admits also of the same construction. There is the same "between" in our relation to our fellow-men and to all our "fellows." And this "between" is here also a part of the projection—the first stage of volitional activity. It is volitional "other"-ness. And recognizing my neighbor's traits and personality means

"realization"—or identification. Moreover, the "apparently external" world, as a whole, is itself the "Between" of social life, of social convenience and utility. "It is a realm that appears *between* us; that is, it is such that our sharp distinction from one another depends upon our distinguishing it from every self." "This leads to the triad—my fellow and myself, with nature between us."

But there is an "apparent externality" that may be misleading. This would not be so misleading did it not so easily affiliate with the blind "superstition" of materiality and the "realistic dogma" of an external world. This "apparent externality," which is not an essential part of the real activity of the will and which is rather a temporary impression or conceit, attaches itself to what we term "the facts" of the world and to the conceptions of the World of Description which seem to refer to externality. "Facts" in themselves are interpreted voluntaristically. "The facts of life are the only facts; a 'fact' is a 'conscious fact.'" "A fact that is not satisfying is not a true fact." A "fact," in short, is an individual purpose "embodied" and "expressed" in a "deed." "The life of our consciousness is a life of watching our deeds, of estimating our deeds, of predicting our deeds, and of *interpreting* our *whole world* in terms of deeds." Genuine facts, then, as such, are conscious and purposive, and are like, and indeed are, the "deeds" in which our ideals are realized. But the "world of facts" does, nevertheless, bear the impression of "foreignness," as if it were "other than" ourselves. "It is perfectly true that we are not conscious of creating, *i.e.*, of finding our purpose expressed in more than a very subordinate aspect of the differences and correlative likeness that we at any moment observe in the world." This "foreignness", however, is not inherent in the facts as such; but this relatively foreign character is to be explained "in terms of the theoretical ought" which is a function of the intellectual system dominant in the World of Description. Facts are apprehended and grasped in the system of rules and universal concepts that constitutes the realm of the Intellect; and the Intellect's apparent reference to externality is thereby transferred to the facts; and facts, which in their essence are but the final realization in "deeds" of our inner purposes, come by affiliation with the Intellect to have the appearance of belonging to an external world. The importance of this "theoretical ought" in explanation of the "apparent externality" of the world entitles this function to fuller exposition. Since man is essentially and thoroughly volitional, it follows that the Intellect with its systematized knowledge is also

essentially practical. Thus "the theoretical ought of our judgment about facts, like the practical Ought of Ethics, is, after all, definable only in terms of what Kant called the Autonomy of the Will," and "Science is justified as a type of action." Now our author holds that "Knowledge begins with vague universals." These "vague universals" are at the same time vague purposes. And when these vague universal purposes find their individual place in the Catalogue and in the Library of Universal Knowledge they become what are popularly called "facts." Now this Catalogue or Library of our Universe of Knowledge constitutes the "theoretical Ought." "The only justification for our more abstractly theoretical conception of the World of Description is its value as a means of organizing our conduct and our conception of what the will seeks. On the other hand, without such a definite conception as the World of Description furnishes, the finite will is left only to vague longings." It is then, otherwise expressed, the world of descriptive knowledge that constitutes the "theoretical Ought." Oughtness is the obligation that the Individual is under to his ideals and to the socially acknowledged and accepted laws of conduct. The World of Description is composed of the acknowledged and accepted laws of action. These laws and the knowledge that compose the world of descriptive knowledge are generally misunderstood, and are thought to pertain to an external world. This, however, as our author holds, is epistemologically impossible. They are not the laws of an independent nature; they are rules of human and social conduct and convenience. And it is these rules of the world of descriptive knowledge that constitute the "theoretical Ought." And "this theoretical Ought"—voicing our world of knowledge and thought—"controls all our thinking." And this "theoretical Ought" carries with it the "apparently external" reference of the Intellect and of our common intelligence and of Science as combined in our World of Description, and thus brings the world of apprehended "facts" under the same impression of "apparent externality." This accounts, then, for the "apparently external" or "foreign" aspect of "the world of facts." "I immediately recognize the embodiment of this Ought in the world of my completed will as a fact." "The facts as real are embodiments of my purpose, yet not as it just now transiently seems, but as it ought to be viewed." In other words, the knowledge, more or less systematized, that we have or acknowledge is that by which we systematize the new event. The new event is a conscious purpose. "I ought to do that which I, even now, by implication mean to do."

And when this new event finds its place in the system of my knowledge it is a "fact." "Facts," then, have no reference to the Realist's external world. They are merely conscious purposes that get classified and systematized, first, in our world of descriptive knowledge, and through that course of thought and education pass into the system of our purposes. The apparent externality of the "theoretical Ought" and the World of Description has no reference to the "realistic dogma" of an external world. The Intellect has no independent status and function. It is merely the servant of the will, and "a scientific generalization is an intellectual tool." Thus the Intellect itself, and more particularly the general knowledge that it has, bears the impression of the apparent externality of tools and mechanical instruments. The "apparently external" reference, then, of the Intellect and of our descriptive knowledge, as if referring to an external world, is finally only the impression of "other"-ness and difference and apparent externality that intellectual tools and implements have in the employment of the will. Otherwise, the real world, the world of our essential meanings, is not external; it is an "inner" world. "The external meaning is only apparent and not real." "The external meaning is only apparently external, and, in very truth, is but an aspect of the completely developed internal meaning." "We shall assert in the end that the final meaning of every complete idea, when fully developed, must be viewed as wholly an internal meaning, and that apparently external meanings become consistent with internal meanings only by virtue of thus coming to be viewed as aspects of the true internal meaning." A world, then, external and independent of the observer, does not exist. External independent Reality is a notion to be abandoned. Our author's philosophy here goes evidently in the direction of Pan-egoism. "The real world is just our whole will embodied." What then is Knowledge?

Prof. Royce "begins with the Idea," but maintains that an idea is an act of will and of the nature of a purpose, a meaning, or an ideal. "An idea is any state of mind that has a conscious meaning. Thus, according to my present usage of the word 'idea,' a color, when merely seen, is insofar for consciousness no idea; a brute noise merely heard is no idea. But a melody when sung, a picture when in its wholeness actively appreciated, or the inner memory of your friend now in your mind, is an idea." The "idea," then, is not a witness to be interrogated; and so sense perception, and therewith the testimony of the senses to the existence and nature of the external world, is excluded, and the discussion is confined to ideal-

istic material, to ideas that the mind has reconstructed in adaptation to personal interests. The material world is thus left out. In its place, however, is retained a shadow and a reminiscence, as we may say, of equal dimensions. "Realism is a good doctrine to begin with." And this objective though shadowy basis of his philosophy is retained from Realism. On this basis he builds a structure of a different kind composed of Mysticism and Critical Rationalism. "The world is just our whole will embodied." This is voluntaristic, but means the same as "The Self is the Universe," borrowed from the ancient mystic. But our author objects to mysticism that it has no place for a world of objective knowledge that admits of definite formulation and that is characterized by "eternal validity." Knowledge is a convincing thing, and room must be made for it in any system that would appeal to the modern mind. So the objective system of Critical Rationalism, from Kant through Hegel, is taken to provide an objective world of valid knowledge. In introducing Critical Rationalism, and in showing how the mind may construct its own objective world, our author leans especially on mathematics. He employs the material of the human personality and human history, and often takes his crucial and leading argument from music and the poetry of love, for in these departments of human experience and in mathematics the mind constructs for itself its own world. And this realm of experience constructed and projected by the mind passes in certain phases out of the control of the mind that projected it. And especially in mathematics and in morals, their newly projected world surprises at times the mind of its maker with unexpected developments (such as may unexpectedly confront us in the natural world), and which may be entirely beyond his control, and which may subject the mind that invented its premises to truths of "eternal validity," and may bind the imagination that constructed it with objective laws, standards and responsibilities which it cannot dispute. Our author finds here, then, how the mind is capable of constructing for itself a world of objectively valid truth and reality, and entirely free from dependence on the "brute facts" of sense perception or the blind "superstition" of a material world. And if the mind can thus construct such an important part of its objective world, is not all Reality constructed in the same way by the mind of the knower and the doer? This is, of course, the more or less latent empirical argument underlying our author's philosophy.

If we should halt here to criticise, we might observe that Prof. Royce's philosophy, especially as seen from this point of view, is

"Hegel worked over" by Schopenhauer and adapted by our author to present-day psychology and present-day thought. Mr. Spencer has called music "the ideal expression of the feelings"; that is, music is personal and ideal, and the same is true of poetry. And history is personal. And mathematics is pure theory. We maintain that mathematics bears testimony to an external world. But the material of human personality does evidently admit of the *homo mensura omnium* construction, and pure thought construction may at least be reconstructed about the centres of personal interest. But if we read the six best historians of philosophy, we find that, even if the authors are sympathetic with Hegel, they nevertheless all assert that Hegel did not succeed when he attempted Natural Philosophy. He and our author shut out the testimony of the senses by definition. The beautiful landscape that dawns suddenly and unexpectedly upon the vision is no reality; it is but a "meaningless accident of sensation." These philosophers are thus by their definition not students of the world of reality at first hand, but only students of reflective thought and of human history and culture. Moreover, it is to be observed, also, that they are by the same definition excluded from historical reality. For history was not made by monks and mystics, but by men who used their senses. And history cannot be studied either in books or through our fellow-men without the "sights and sounds" of immediate sense-perception. And what would our author's poetry of love and music mean without the testimony of the senses?

"The Being to which any idea refers is simply the will of the idea more determinately and also more completely expressed." This is Voluntarism. But the following sentence contains Rationalism: "And there is indeed a sense in which, according to our view, any rational idea in the whole universe seeks, and in its complete development finds, as the expression of its ultimate meaning the whole of the universe." Tennyson's "Little flower in the crannied wall" lives in the material world, and so does not suit as an illustration of our author's meaning. His "rational ideas" belong to the realm of the universal concepts of Critical Rationalism, and thus to the "World of Description." The question then arises as to whether a philosophy constructed of mystical Voluntarism and Critical Rationalism is a legitimate composition. In our view it is not a legitimate or convincing adaptation. The Categories of Knowledge upon which Rationalism is based are from Aristotle's Logic. And these Categories are of popular, realistic and scientific origin, and such is their ordinary usage. When these Categories of Knowledge

are by skepticism and formalism cut off from their realistic and scientific function and usage, they then become in Rationalism the machinery of knowledge running empty. And this, we think, is the function of a formal Rationalism when it combines with a mystical Voluntarism. It is shut off from its source and emptied of its content. We find in our author's system a historical inconsistency. His "World" as inherited from Hegel is a world of scientific universals. It is this that he has in mind when he makes the uncertain and transitional remark that "the world of validity is, indeed, in its ultimate constitution the eternal world." This world is the realm of Science, of Mathematics and of Critical Rationalism discussed under his "Third Concept of Being." It is the world, not of concrete reality, but of the systematized universal concepts of knowledge. This realm of knowledge is of realistic extraction and of realistic significance. It is realistic knowledge of the world, but it is not the Realist's world; it is his knowledge of the world. But with Prof. Royce, as we shall see, knowledge is not of "universals," it is of "Individuals"; and these individuals are conscious individuals—namely, the individual purposes of the will in self-assertion and in self-expression and in self-realization. And in this sense we have his theory that knowledge is Reality in its final form. But knowledge, in this sense, is not scientific knowledge; it is something else. This inconsistency is evidently due to our author's adopting a realistic remnant of the traditions of scientific knowledge as an integral part of his psychological Voluntarism.

Our author, as we have seen, "begins with the Idea." Ideas are, however, not witnesses to be put on the witness stand and have their testimony taken. Ideas, on the contrary, are acts of will. And the process of knowledge and the process of Being are the same. The process of knowledge is the process of conscious purpose, of purpose that is conscious of its own unity in the unity of self-consciousness; it is the process of personality realizing and identifying itself with its ideals and purposes. This is Voluntarism. But our author's philosophy is, as we have seen, encumbered by the traditions of Science and Religion, and the process of knowledge from this broader point of view is, in first instance, the process of freeing the mind from the realistic presuppositions involved in our world of descriptive knowledge—his "World of Description." The process, as a whole, might be likened to our author's experience in the study of philosophy. His world is Philosophy. The process, we may say, then, would be as follows: Prof. Royce's philosophy has ceased to be an external or "apparently external" study, and

has become the conscious definition of his dominant aims, and, in short, the garment and expression of his inner life and personality. It was first projected as a medium of comparison for the study of the ideals and purposes of his type of personality, and as a medium of social convenience. This was the "apparently external" or realistic stage. But when this external and realistic reference has served its purpose and the mind has come thereby to understand itself thoroughly, our "apparently external" philosophy forgets its external reference and becomes simply and entirely the inner philosophy of our type of personality. And this inner philosophy of our personality is knowledge in its "real" and final form. And this is what our author calls the "World of Appreciation"—the world in which our "apparently external" meanings "have lost their "foreign" or external reference and have become entirely "internal" as the "embodiment," the definition and expression of the ideals and purposes of our own personality.

Reality means simply conscious purpose in the processes and forms of its definition and expression. To be, to will and to know are all volitional and knowledge is but the final form of purpose. The Universe is a Person—it is God. "In the One Thought of God" is comprehended all the conscious thoughts that constitute the Universe. And this "One Thought of God" is itself a conscious purpose that seeks its own fulfilment, and therein seeks the realization and expression of all the conscious purposes that make up the universe. And "Reality" is found just here in these conscious purposes, and in their fulfilment in knowledge and expression. "Reality is not found in universals, but in individuals." What we call scientific knowledge, or what our author terms the "World of Description," is common property; it is of social origin and composition and it constitutes the common currency of human convenience and utility. This realm of scientific knowledge is a realm of "universals." "Universals" are but the rules of convenience and utility. But this is not the realm of Reality. Final Reality consists exclusively in conscious purposes and in their realization in the "conscious facts" of knowledge and in the "deeds" of conduct. That is, all Reality is consciously personal. "The essence of the real is to be individual, or to permit of no other of its kind, and this character it possesses only as the unique fulfilment of purpose." Conscious purposes alone and their realization in knowledge and conduct are, *in se*, unique and not interchangeable. And these, in our author's system, take the place exclusively of what in common estimation are termed the individual things of

concrete reality. Now "Individuality is essentially an Ethical Category, and a new person exists whenever, within a given time-span, intercommunication with the rest of Nature results in the appearance of processes significant enough to express themselves in new ideals, and in a new unification of experience in terms of these ideals." And the human Individual has as his life-task to find his place and limitations in the divine system of the universe. And each purpose attains its realization as it finds its own specific and unique place in the realm of divine knowledge. The process of finding its place in the divine knowledge, we may say, is the process of Being, and this specific and unique place and limitations when found is knowledge and final realization.

But our author's division of all Reality into the Individual, the world of "socially related selves" and God, and his identification of God with the world, is based, as we have observed, on a remnant of Realism—namely, on the belief in the existence of an objective and external world. When, however, this shadow of the old "realistic dogma" is dispensed with, our philosophy falls back again into Pan-egoism, and "the Self is" again "the Universe," as with the ancient mystic. And knowledge for Pan-egoism consists in educating, defining and in finding the final form of the conscious purposes of the personality. We may follow in this a few passages from our author. The Individual starts out vaguely—with "vague universals." And "increase of knowledge, therefore, would really involve increase of determination of your present meaning." "The universe you have always with you as your true internal meaning." And "the thinking process itself is a process whereby at once meanings tend to become more determinate, and external objects tend to become internal meanings. Let my process of determining my own internal meaning simply proceed to its own *limit*, and then I shall face Being. I shall not only imitate my object as another and correspond to it from without, I shall become one with it and so internally possess it." (The idea that in knowledge the subject "possesses" the object, and that the possessive pronoun is an extension of the personal pronoun, is familiar to the reader of Hegel. And the doctrine that the subject in true knowledge becomes "one with" the object is a mystical doctrine that we shall notice again later on.) Our author continues: "To pass to your real and completed meaning, to the meaning implied in this very moment's vagueness, would be a passage to absolute determinateness. So to pass would therefore be to know with full determination truths of an often-desired type, truths such as: What you yourself are; and,

Who you are, as this individual; What this individual fact now before you is. Yes, it would be to know what the whole individual being called the World is, and who the Individual of Individuals, namely, the Absolute, or God Himself, is. Just such final *determinateness, finality of meaning*, constitutes that *limit* of your own internal meaning which our theory will hereafter seek to characterize." Our author's pan-egoistic epistemology, though somewhat shrouded in Mysticism, is still clearly seen in these passages. Knowledge owes nothing to "impressions" from or of an external world. For, in volitional knowledge we are not seeking the external world,* nor are we seeking abstract scientific principles; we are seeking, on the contrary, the unique conscious purposes of personal life. And this definiteness toward which our purposes strive and these "limits" that they seek are not imposed *ab extra*; they are merely the final form and "unity" to which the inherent tendencies of conscious purposes and meanings strive in their realization. When conscious purposes find their own definite limits they have therein found their own final form and are therein realized, and this final form in which purposes are realized is Reality itself in its final form. It is also knowledge. And knowledge is thus merely the final form of Reality. All Reality is personal; all Reality is composed of conscious purposes; and the final form of conscious purposes is knowledge.

The mental function employed in the use of universal concepts and in scientific knowledge is the function of Judgment. And "Judgment," it is ordinarily understood, is the special function of knowledge. And our author at first seems to be himself of this opinion. "Judgments are devices whereby we weave already present ideas into more manifold structures, thereby enriching our meanings." "The intended subject of every judgment is Reality itself." "You can never judge without some sort of conscious intention to be in significant relation to the Real." These passages sound like Realism. But he does not intend to stop here. "To judge is to consider internal meanings with reference to external meanings"—with the purpose, of course, of getting rid of the realistic associations of "apparent externality." Does, then, "Judgment,"

* World and Individual. Series I, p. 333, "Experience is the determiner of the will." 332, "The idea is a will seeking its own determination. It is nothing else." 333, "The object is nothing but the will of the idea itself in some determinate expression." 327, "What the idea always aims to find in its object is nothing whatever but the idea's own conscious purpose or will, embodied in some more determined form." "And the world of my idea is simply my own will itself determinately embodied."

this apparently specific function of Knowledge, with its intended reference to Reality, give us real truth and final apprehension of Reality? Our author finds that it does not. We have (1) "hypothetical" and "universal" judgments. And though with hypothetical and universal judgments the mind is led, with mystical imperiousness, through the "destruction of abstract possibilities" into the realm where the concrete realization of its external meanings is to be found, yet the concrete and living embodiment of the inside meaning of Reality is not specifically identified through universal or hypothetical judgments, for ultimate Reality is not found in "universals," but in "individuals." (2) We have, further, "particular affirmative judgments—those of external experience viewed as external—and these," says our author, "are especially instructive as to the nature that our ordinary thinking attributes to Being, and as to what we demand of our Other." And yet these "particular affirmative judgments" view "external meanings as external" and "foreign." Hence they are not final—they do not embody our "external meanings" as part of and as the completion of our "internal meanings." In these judgments knowledge or experience does not get rid of external reference with its dogmas and superstitions, and hence does not attain to the finality of "Individuality." And this is true likewise of hypothetical and universal judgments and of judgment in general. It is not the final form of the apprehension of Reality, for it deals with universals and the facts of the World of Description, and these all have external reference and are thereby misleading; for external reference leads to Realism, and Realism, our author maintains, as we have seen, is epistemologically impossible. Judgment, then, is not final, and the true knowledge of our "internal meanings," as completed by the internalizing of our "apparently external meanings," must involve another, a deeper and a more final function.

This deeper function our author finds suggested in the time-honored definition of Truth as "the correspondence between an idea and its object." In accepting this definition, our author indicates that by "correspondence" we do not mean that the subject necessarily has in mind a picture of the object. The items in a ledger may be true without being at all like the business transactions referred to. And "a true idea of a dog need not bark in order to be true." Thus resemblance is not the exclusive or final meaning of "correspondence." Correspondence of the idea with its object, in our apprehension of Reality, means the correspondence of purpose with its proper realization. "For the sort of correspondence to

be demanded of the idea is determined by itself, and this correspondence cannot be judged merely from without." "The idea is selective. It seeks its own. It attends as itself has chosen." "The idea chooses for itself its object." And "the correspondence of the subject with the object" in which Truth consists is thus a correspondence of purpose and meaning, so that the subject finds in the object "its own counterpart"—the completion of its own design, and the final identification of itself. What, then, is the process of knowledge by which our internal meanings find their apparently external meanings, and therein find their own completion and full determination? This final knowledge is not a process. It is an act of realization. The identification of the subject with its object as its own "counterpart" and completion is an act of volitional "immediacy"—the immediacy of the attainment of desire and the realization of purpose. But this volitional immediacy is also, in our author's view, an act of immediate "insight"—the immediate insight of self-consciousness in which the completed purpose is conscious of its own "unity." But if the object becomes consciously identified with the subject it thereby loses its objectivity. What, then, becomes of knowledge? And has not our author reached the same conclusion that he condemned in the Ancient Mystic—namely, that he pushes knowledge out of his system?

Our author's first book bore the title of *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*. In literary style the book was promising, but disappointing in contents. The title of the book, however, has proven to be the title of his life-work as a philosophical thinker. His philosophy is an attempt to explain the world and all Reality from the divine standpoint—from the standpoint of the Omniscient Creator. We may admit that the world from that point of view might, if we were capable of it, make a very different impression. But as terrestrial students of terrestrial philosophy, we find seemingly fundamental difficulties in Prof. Royce's view.

1. He entertains the view, as we have seen, that Realism is the doctrine of social expediency, the doctrine of the well-to-do class that employs dogmatism to secure social conservatism. It occurs to us to observe here that the Romans were Realists, and that they conquered the world and developed a system of jurisprudence that is still important. Does their world-conquest invalidate their Realism, or does their Realism invalidate their world-conquest, or may it be possible that their clear discernment and sound judgment were responsible both for their Realism and their world-conquest?

The fact that a philosophy is contrary to common-sense and reason, and that a man could not succeed in life on such principles, does not prove that its author sees things from the divine standpoint. Realism is very evidently not born of "social convenience." On the contrary, it is the belief of those who use their senses and their understanding; it is the doctrine of the more independent type of character—the type that has deeper discernment as to matters of fact and as to the permanent conditions of existence, and that has more intellectual and ethical views of religion.

Our author holds, evidently, an extreme view of Realism. He maintains, as we have observed, that "Metaphysical Realism is the theory which, recognizing independent beings as real, lays special stress on their independence as the very essence of their reality." From this premise he argues that Realism reduces itself unavoidably to atomism, and ultimately to zero. For, if things are absolutely independent of each other and of knowledge, then knowledge can have no relation to things, and thus we have a universal atomism, and from the standpoint of knowledge universal skepticism. But suppose the Realist disputes the fairness of the premise, and asserts that things are not real because they are independent, but that they are independent because they are real? This would put a different face on the matter, and this is certainly the basis on which Science and human intelligence proceed. The captious critic might assert that our author, in seeking to discredit Realism, proceeds somewhat as an intellectual intrigant to stir up strife and get Realism divided against itself. But, on the other hand, we may assume that, as master of the history of philosophy, he has also in mind the more antiquated and unscientific forms of Realism. In his view Realism would maintain that the objects of knowledge are absolutely and entirely independent of the knowing subject. But does a scientific Realism—and it would not be consistent to saddle this scientific age with a Realism cited from unscientific and mystical ages that are past—does scientific Realism assert the absolute and exclusive independence of all objects of knowledge from the knowing subject? It asserts what it finds to be true; it asserts what by thousandfold observation, experiment and ratiocinative process is known to be true—that the earth, the sun, moon and stars have an existence independent of all human observation. But scientific Realism also finds that the knowing subject and the objects known have a coöperative existence. The process of knowledge is only partially understood. This fact, together with the realistic implications of the concepts of knowledge, are the reasons that have

made epistemology an inviting basis for "frenzied" Metaphysics. Thus epistemology, as a semi-chaos, has become the mother of most astonishing worlds. And these unrestrained metaphysical enterprises are attractive because of their magnitude, and to some even because they are venturesome and conspicuous. In our author's view Realism would maintain not only the object's absolute and exclusive independence of the subject, but also that each and every object, that each and every thing, is in its separate existence absolutely and exclusively independent of each and every other object, and of each and every other thing. But what scientific Realist holds this view? For, in fact, scientific Realism finds that the whole world and universe, as far as known, maintains a coöperative existence. According to Prof. Royce, there is a mortal conflict on in Realism between the one and the many, and that in this conflict Realism must unavoidably destroy itself. But this apparent inconsistency in Realism, on which our author delights to dwell, is due to the fact that Realism has, historically speaking, been mixed with Idealism. Prof. Royce calls Plato a Realist, but he was also an Idealist. Spinoza was a Realist, but he was also a Mystic. And Mysticism is the original fountain of Idealism. And this conflict that our author urges is brought on by the aggressiveness of mystical Idealism. Prof. Royce insists on the Realist's inability to give a simple definition of all Reality. But to this Realism replies that it does not profess omniscience, nor claim the ability to solve the whole Universe at one sitting and in one sentence. Realism is scientific, and human intelligence and the sciences constitute its definition of Reality, as far as it knows Reality.

2. Our author declines the testimony of the senses. "Sights and sounds," etc., are but "brute facts" and the "meaningless accidents of sensation." This is the skepticism of Hume incorporated in Critical Rationalism by Kant, and passed on into Speculative Idealism by Fichte. And Speculative Idealism, thus isolated from the concrete world, has followed ancient Mysticism in its main motives and lines of thought. The Mystic neither attempts Science nor the moral government of the world; he seeks monastic seclusion and neglects posterity. Evidently the interests of the race had better seek other guidance. And Mysticism is not convincing. It is related of a lawsuit, in a case concerning the infringement of patent rights on car wheels, that Mr. Choate, in defense of the accused, argued in his concluding speech in an exceedingly refined theory of "mathematical points" to prove that the patent had not been infringed upon; and that Mr. Webster, in reply, simply rose

and said: "Gentlemen of the jury, there are the wheels, look at them." The patent had been infringed upon, and the testimony of the senses was sufficient evidence and was accepted as incontestable evidence. Our author's theory, that we get the external world or "Nature" ready-made from our fellow-men, leaves out the testimony of the senses. If we did get Nature from our fellow-men—if Nature, then, were of "social extraction"—we would get it, as Prof. Royce gets it, by the dialectical method, and through the social organ of language, namely, the ear. And if Nature were composed of "socially related selves," we might expect to become acquainted with it through the ear, which is more personal, emotional and social in its receptivity. But even language itself is realistic, and the eye, the most intellectual of the senses, and the sense of touch are realistic in their testimony, as our author acknowledges. And yet it is through the eye and through the sense of touch that we get our primary and also our final knowledge of Nature in observation and experiment. It is evident, of course, that we do get our standards of weights, measurements and estimates and our education from our fellow-men. But public opinion and social estimates cannot control the price of beef when the corn crop fails.

3. Our author, in seeking a deeper view than Science offers, is led to dispute the categories of the understanding. Substantiality and causality are not essential or necessary characteristics of Reality. They are, indeed, the basis of our scientific "book-keeping," for the present, in dealing with Nature. But our author holds that a change of conditions and of sentiment on this matter may occur, so that in future ages scientists may do their book-keeping on a different method. Moreover, "quantity," he maintains, is not a fundamental conception in our apprehension of Nature. "Not quantity, but order is the fundamental category of exact thought about facts." The fundamental conception of Science is that of "serial order." This "serial order" means the "time-series." And "our experience of time is for us essentially an experience of longing, of pursuit, of restlessness." That is, "Time is the form of the will." This reduces Science also to a voluntaristic basis. Now whatever the right and the wrong may be, or the true and the false, it seems pretty clear that the philosophy that declines the testimony of the senses and disputes the categories of the understanding cannot be made convincing.

4. Our author's style seems at first to be plain and simple. It is, however, very compromised—distinguished for complication and

evasiveness. His philosophy is, as we have seen, composed of two constantly conflicting currents; and if not in every sentence, certainly in almost every paragraph he makes concessions to the realistic sentiments of the reader. And in his resolution of Realism into Idealism he seldom, if ever, makes a plain statement. He says: "There is an ancient doctrine that whatever is, is ultimately individual. Realism early came to that view." He is here introducing his own view under the auspices of the Realism that he has been criticising as epistemologically impossible and as ontologically equal to zero. He must here, of course, be employing the word "Realism" in another sense. And this converted, disembodied Realism he employs, not simply for superficial forensic reasons, but primarily because all men are realists, and he himself wants to believe in his own ideal world as "real" and wants all men to agree with him in that belief. Our author is very clever, and when he doesn't want to be detected he accuses some one else—probably Realism—of doing just what he is about to do. On p. 65 of the *World and the Individual* (First Series) he concludes: "In brief, then, the present ontological definition is a synthesis of the three popular conceptions, with stress laid upon the second, that is, upon the idea that the real as such is behind or beyond the merely immediate of our experience." Now "this present ontological definition" of which he is speaking is none other than Realism. And Realism is also the first of these "three popular conceptions" of which he speaks. Realism is thus composed, observe, of Realism and the two other popular conceptions, namely, Mysticism and Critical Rationalism, in the order mentioned. And Realism would be thus more closely affiliated with Mysticism than with Realism itself. Now this is, of course, not true of Realism. But it is true of Prof. Royce's own theory. This is, then, another illustration of the cleverness with which he attempts, while keeping Realism under a constant fire of hostile criticism, to retain the Realism of the popular mind in support of his own system.

To venture the assertion that Sophists are still extant, and that the dialectical and rhetorical ability to make the worse appear the better reason still brings a reputation and an income; to accuse an honest man of Sophistry or of a forensic conscience, or to charge a dominant system of thought with perversion and over-subtlety would seem absurd to the uninitiated, and to many at least of the initiated it would be unwelcome and therefore absurd. But the Realist cannot read our author's writings without being convinced that the argument is too clever and too evasive, too complicated

and too plainly against the plain testimony of the senses and the categories of the understanding. And, in fact, the effort, in itself, to prove scientifically that Science is not scientific, and to make intelligent demonstrations that knowledge is not intelligent and that reason is not reasonable is an enterprise that may require sophistry in order to succeed. And we are herewith not surprised to find one of the newer shining lights of this same type (Schiller, of Oxford) defending openly the ancient Sophists at the expense of Plato and Aristotle. And if what we have referred to unsuitably is not Sophistry, then our author has rather literary designs and is employing the race's profoundest and best traditions of Ontology, Epistemology, Psychology and Ethics rather for literary effect and for philosophical diversion. We do not dispute at all the propriety and the importance of literary effect and of philosophical diversion, nor do we dispute the educational value and work of many of the ancient Sophists. We, however, prefer the plain dealing and the great and lasting content offered us in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle.

5. Our author has told us that the thinking of the Ancient Mystic was negative, and that he employed his keen intellect critically to make naught of other men's systems. No better illustration of this description can be found than Prof. Royce's own book on *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*. Leibnitz found good in all that he read; but our author finds no light whatever as to ultimate moral theory in any and all of the moralists. He rejects Christian Theology as the basis of Ethics, and says we must start with Morality, or, more specifically, with the moral ideal, and let Theology come afterward, if it can. But the moral nature and conscience give no indications whatever as to the ultimate basis of right and wrong. All moral theories are in such conflict and hostility that our author is driven to skepticism. But his skepticism is not the skepticism of indifference, he maintains: it is rather the skepticism of universal generosity—his benevolence wishes to contribute to the realization of all the desires and aspirations and ideals of all life. And in the universal benevolence of this universal skepticism he finds suggested the ultimate ideal of Morality. Though the moral nature and conscience do not teach it, he finds in Schopenhauer's treatment of "Pity" a suggestive element of deeper "insight"—namely, that "in deeper truth you and I are one. Being, namely, *the one great Being, the absolute Will, which works in us both.*" "Pity is a revelation in concrete form of a great fundamental truth, the great fact of the ultimate and metaphysical oneness of all sentient be-

ings." This, then, is his ultimate basis of the "law of love" and of Kant's universal Imperative and the ultimate moral ideal. "Insight" into this great truth is itself a tendency to its realization. And on this final "moral insight" of the identity of all sentient beings our author bases an exhortation to universal harmony, to the law of love and universal benevolence. This exhortation is of most noble content and of most far-reaching significance—that is, within the limits of our human kind. But is there in this universal metaphysical oneness of all sentient beings a basis for moral distinctions? If all life is one and all divine, then all is right as it is. His observation that we must realize that other life is "real" like our own is a most essential initiative to sympathy and philanthropy. But to realize this is not to become absolutely one and identical with that life. A family of pigs sleeping together in a pile might dream that they were all one inseparable and identical pig, and as big as a hog. This is our author's ultimate moral ideal and ultimate reason of right and wrong. But if the swimmer, in his most noble action of rescuing a drowning man, fails to insist on the distinction between himself and the unfortunate man whom he would save and lets the drowning man get his arms around him, they will both go down together. In order to rescue the perishing he must insist on the difference and distinction between his life and the life of the drowning man. And so with all life-saving. Mr. Moody and General Booth and the most effective rescuers of the perishing are those who insist most strenuously on the difference and distinction between the life they are seeking to live and the degraded lives they are striving to rescue. There is no need of reminding ourselves that this principle is conspicuously acknowledged in the Decalogue and throughout the Old Testament. It is acknowledged no less distinctly in the writings of Paul and in the preaching of all the great Reformers. This is, in fact, the principle of moral distinctions, the principle of moral self-defense, the principle of moral individuality and of holiness. In the first part of *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy* our author says: "In treating ethical doctrine it is common to avoid by all sorts of devices the main and most difficult problem of all." And, "having occupied so many pages in entertaining digressions, when they come, if they ever do come, to the central problem, namely, the nature of moral distinctions considered purely as such, such writers have no time to do more than to appeal to the common sense of readers, and then to pass on to consequences." Well, certainly our author does not "appeal to the common sense of readers," nor does he "pass on to consequences." But it is

interesting to observe that, although the ultimate basis of moral distinctions was his prime issue at the start, yet when he reaches his final "insight" and his "identity of the life of all sentient beings" as his ultimate moral basis, the subject has changed, or has vanished, and he has nothing whatever to say about the distinctions of right and wrong. Our author would seem to have departed from the Bible at the start, because of the supernatural element and because of the Biblical doctrine of inspiration. But in his conclusion all true Being is supernatural and every article of it verbally inspired. One of his arguments for the existence of God is the existence of human error. Error is only possible when there is a system of absolute Truth to which it is an exception. But then "in the One Thought of God" all Reality is comprised, and hence in Reality human error is really no inconsistency. This means simply that moral evil belongs to the realm of conscience—the moral nature—and empirical morality, and that human error belongs to the world of objective and external reference. Thus both moral evil and human error belong to the World of Description. But this World of Description, with its apparent reference to externality, is, after all, a fiction, and, though it serves a useful purpose, it is not the world of Reality. But when this World of Description has been assimilated to satisfy the wants of the inner man, to complete his "inner meanings," by this life-time process, objective reference and externality may have been forgotten, and therewith the evils and errors of former days and of the social consciousness may have been "purged" away and forgotten. Our author's solution, then, of the problems of evil and of error is twofold: psychologically and practically evil vanishes by being forgotten; theoretically there is no place in Pantheism for evil and error. Prof. Royce's religious philosophy, as has been indicated, is based upon a realistic remnant—namely, the belief in an objective, external realm of Reality called the World and God. The idea of the World is realistic both in its origin and in its ordinary acceptance. And the idea of God, when not from Revelation, is developed to account for the world and the mind and history and destiny of man. Our author cites with consent Anselm's idea of God as "*ens realissimum*." This is evidently of realistic extraction and of realistic significance. Without this remnant of Realism as basis his philosophy falls back into Pan-egoism. And Pan-egoism has no religion. Otherwise Prof. Royce's religious philosophy is pantheistic. And of Pantheism it must at least be said, that the theory that identifies God with the world in which we plow and sow and tunnel and blast is not

conducive to worship. And as a historical fact, Pantheism has never been distinguished for the spirit of holiness, but rather by the spirit of laxity. The Hebrews, as a race, have never been equaled in their acquaintance with human nature. This has always been with them a special distinction, and they have always shown an unequaled genius in this way. To them was revealed—we say “revealed,” for true piety is based on revelation and not on speculation: the preacher who uses Speculative Idealism as his Theology insofar invariably turns reverential and filial piety into curiosity and intellectual interest—to the Hebrews was revealed a religion in which a “strict account is kept”—a religion in which man’s relation to God and to his fellow-men is apprehended and estimated in terms of justice. The distinctive feature of the Christian religion is that it is based on justice in God and man. And justice is scientific. God’s love is in His justice meted out in His wisdom with the exactness of thorough intelligence. All men respect what is called “Hebrew piety,” and certainly we are not prepared to dispute the tacit agreement of the authors of the Bible that piety must be based on justice, in order that man may not be presumptuous nor Divinity despotic—in short, that holiness in heaven and on earth may be superior to all accusation. But this Pauline method and evangelical spirit does not appeal to the Mystic, nor does it find acceptance with the Voluntarist. They have no basis in their philosophy for the positive structure of Christian doctrine.

Speculative Idealism is the transition from Science and revealed Religion to Voluntarism. And Voluntarism is really the dominant initiative and motive in the transition. Voluntarism is occidental, secular Mysticism. The Mystic is a monk. And men in solitude have the habit of soliloquy. Moreover, their minds are busied only with themselves. Thus, in solitude, with nothing but himself on his mind, to the Mystic everything becomes a mirror. Wherever he looks he sees himself and recognizes nothing else. And thus, looking out upon the world, he says: “That art Thou”—and this is his Metaphysics. Speculative Idealism is the German type breaking away from the restraints of Science and of Christian doctrine and civilization to assert again the mystic and monarchic type of their original forest life. Fortunately for Germany, the sciences and the scientific spirit have not only held this reckless retrogression in check, but have pushed Speculative Idealism as a system of philosophy out of the public mind. But unfortunately for the Germans, their native mystic tendency and fondness for theorizing have given this philosophy too large a place in their Theology.

Mysticism is pass-time. The Mystic does not have religious convictions: he has religious ideals and religious dreams and vagaries. If he had religious convictions he would undertake the evangelization and moral government of the world. In spite of his imperial designs he is sedentary and solitary. And his unbridled imperialism is the result of his unreceptive, uncommunicative and non-moral sedentariness. Speculative Idealism is spectacular, over-aggressive and full of exaggeration. But it requires a great effort, and in that it requires a great effort it often wins the confidence of a great virtue; but it is too highly artificial to be adaptable to the world or to man in the duties of practicality. It is Nature supernaturalized in the house; and the demonstration is as artificial as the task itself. A sound Metaphysics is the highest training-school of the mind, and is essential to the highest intellectual culture. But voluntaristic Metaphysics neglects the sciences and knowledge, and proceeds along the line of floating tradition, personal preference and forensic invitation. And this is not the way of scientific integrity and responsibility. And it is not the line of safe procedure. For often, very often, it is not the line of profundity, and this is not only true in the sciences and in the affairs of daily life, but it is true also in Morality and Religion.

If we cannot accept our author's philosophy, how then account for its popularity and influence? 1. Prof. Royce is, with Plato, Malebranche and Schopenhauer, one of the greatest and most gifted litterateurs in all the history of metaphysical thought. He was thus endowed by nature for leadership. And, especially in matters not fully understood, men follow the greater leader. And, 2. Speculative Idealism is not an American type of thought: it is German. And the Germans, by their natural endowments for theory and by their life-long patient and systematic endeavor, have in the realm of scholarship and thought overwhelmingly outworked other nations, so that their systems of philosophy are far greater and bear a far greater burden of scholarship and of systematic thought. And in matters not fully understood men admire the greatest achievement and follow the greatest movement. 3. Men who are interested in religion and attached to its traditions follow Prof. Royce as a counter to Spencer. Naturalism had received in Evolution the strongest presentation it had ever had. But this Naturalism, in its greatest philosopher, Mr. Spencer, was overweighted with a Materialism that threatened to blight the higher interests of personality and of religion. Spencer maintained that man is sprung from Nature. But Nature, as far as it came within the category of "the Knowable,"

was materialistic. Man was thus left under the shadow of Materialism. Prof. Royce was thus confronted with the same problem that confronted Plato and Leibnitz—namely, to rescue the higher interests of personality and religion. In his philosophy man does not spring from Spencer's material Nature, but Nature, as far as its appearance of materiality and corporeality is concerned, springs from man, and is a human product. Otherwise, in its essential reality, the world is a function and an expression of the divine personality. And in this defense Prof. Royce, employing the best philosophical resources of the traditions of personality, has done great service in removing the centre of philosophical interest away from the materialistic tendencies of naturalistic evolution. And on this issue he became a welcome leader of thought. 4. Prof. Royce is rather the popularizer than the founder of the system that he represents. Speculative Idealism originated with Fichte, and attained to its greatest eminence and respectability in Hegel. And Prof. Royce, though nearer to Schopenhauer, has still maintained the honors of Hegelianism. The Cologne Cathedral, seen at night, is a dream and a hymn of praise. In daylight it is an ideal of architecture. Hegel's philosophy is a German prophecy and full of intellectual exhortation. It is also full of history and replete with variations of scientific conviction. But it is not scientific philosophy, nor is it scientific history. It is an architectonic ideal—an attempt to interpret the world and history from the divine standpoint, and a reconstruction of Reality with the idea that the world as a whole must be grasped as within the reach of human attainment and achievement. We ourselves prefer a sort of physiological division of labor, leaving creation to the Creator and omniscience to the Omniscient One. And yet we are forced to recognize that, as an ideal of greatness and as an intellectual exhortation to achievement and attainments, Hegel's philosophy is truly great, imposing and inspiring. And to Prof. Royce we are indebted as a defender of the faith, as a brilliant author, and as a great intellectual quickener and educator. This confession is unavoidable even by those who do not agree with his Natural Philosophy or with his mystical tendencies in Ethics and Metaphysics.

Princeton, N. J.

E. D. MILLER.

VI.

CRITICAL NOTE.

AN UNDESIGNED COINCIDENCE.

No ONE doubts that our books of Samuel and Kings were the main source for the author of Chronicles. It is not unusual for critics to compare these existing sources with those parts of Chronicles evidently derived from them, to the disparagement of the latter; and then, arguing from the known to the unknown, to infer, with respect to the parts of Chronicles for which we have no sources preserved, either that they have no source save the author's imagination, or that, even if some vague documentary or oral tradition must be allowed, the author has no claim to credence because he does not accurately reproduce but disfigures and overlays his sources.

If, however, within the limits of the material peculiar to the Chronicler there are found presupposed the same conditions or situations as are vouched for by Samuel or Kings; if especially such presuppositions are found in connection with material which by its nature (persons, places, dates and the like) suggests a written source, then obviously a strong presumption is raised, first, that in these places the Chronicler did use a reliable written source, and second, that he used it honestly. Such points of contact belong to the class of "undesigned coincidences," of which we find so many examples in a comparison of the Acts and the Epistles. And it is manifest that the law in their case is; the closer the correspondence, and the less obvious the correspondence, the stronger the confirmatory force. In the case of the Book of Chronicles in particular, the theory of artificially developed correspondences, designed coincidences meant to look like undesigned coincidences, is especially untenable. The radical critic should be the last man to deny this, for according to his hypothesis, in the words of Graf,* "the Chronicler knows no distinction of times, but always and everywhere has his own contemporaries, for whose instruction and edification he wrote, before his eyes." Indeed, such critics as Thenius and Graf develop this characteristic of the Chronicler most insistently in immediate connection with that particular episode to which the reader's attention is now directed.

In Kings† we are told very briefly of a reform in worship that took

[* *Die geschichtlichen Bücher*, p. 170.

† II Kings xviii. 3-6, esp. ver. 4.

place in the reign of Hezekiah, king of Judah. As it is the first thing told of Hezekiah, the narrative of whose reign occupies three chapters,* the natural presumption is that this reform took place in the beginning of the reign. In Chronicles, while a space of four chapters† is allotted to Hezekiah, three of them are occupied with affairs of worship, while into the fourth are crowded all the personal and political affairs that bulk so largely in Kings. The three chapters dealing with Hezekiah's relation to ritual, temple and priesthood are divided between an account of the purification of the polluted temple in the first month of the first year of the new reign; the celebration of a great Passover in the second month; and the royal provision for the maintenance of the cult thus reinaugurated.

Hezekiah, according to II Kings xviii. 1, succeeded his father Ahaz in the third year of Hoshea, that last monarch of the Northern Kingdom, whose nine years' reign ended with the fall of Samaria in the winter of 722-721. A few verses later we are informed that the siege of Samaria began in the fourth year and terminated in the sixth year of Hezekiah, king of Judah. By these data the accession of Hezekiah is fixed in the year 728 or 727, and the reformation of Hezekiah should apparently be dated in the spring of 727.

The blow that fell upon Samaria in 724, and that eventuated in the final overthrow of the Northern Kingdom, was not the only blow dealt it by the Assyrians. Rather it was the last of a series, and it fell upon what was but a remnant of the really mighty kingdom over which, only a few years before, Jeroboam II had ruled.‡ The fall of the nation was swift, yet it was accomplished by stages. Shalmaneser, the conqueror of Hoshea, was but finishing the work begun by his predecessor, Tiglath-pileser. As we are informed by the brief statement, II Kings xv. 29, it was in the days of Pekah, predecessor of Hoshea, that considerable portions of the kingdom were overrun by the Assyrians under Tiglath-pileser, who carried the population captive to Assyria. With this record of Kings agrees perfectly the information obtained through the decipherment of Tiglath-pileser's annals, and by their means we are enabled to date this great Syro-Palestinian campaign positively in the years 734-732.

The following geographical terms are used in II Kings xv. 29, in describing the parts of the kingdom then conquered and deported: "Ijon, and Abel-beth-maacah, and Janoah, and Kedesh, and Hazor, and Gilead, and Galilee, all the land of Naphtali." The first two names are mentioned in I Kings xv. 20, in connection with "Dan, Chinneroth, and all the land of Naphtali." Janoah may well be the modern Januh, about fifteen miles (as the crow flies) directly west of Abel-beth-maacah. Kedesh is the Kedesh-Naphtali of Judges, the home of

* Chs. xviii-xx.

† Chs. xxix-xxxii.

‡ II Kings xiv. 25-28

Barak, while Hazor is the neighboring capital of Barak's enemy Jabin. Thus far all are names of cities. The three remaining terms are of wider application. Gilead is frequently applied (*e.g.*, II Sam. ii. 9) to all the country east of the Jordan; as its limitation, when it is limited, is rather on the north than on the south, and as Tiglath-pileser's operations were pressed from north to south, it can hardly be maintained that in this case it should be limited to any particular portion of trans-Jordanic Israel.* Galilee is a name which we are wont to associate with all Palestine north of the plain of Esdraelon and west of the Jordan valley, because that was its extent in the time of Christ. But at first it designated a limited district lying wholly or partly within the territory of Naphtali. In Joshua xx. 7, Kedesh is described as "in Galilee, in the mount of Naphtali." By the time Samaria fell, that extension of application may already have commenced which ultimately embraced in Galilee all the northern hill-country.† But however this may be, the historian of Kings upon mentioning Galilee at once adds "all the land of Naphtali." The question whether this is meant as an equivalent or a supplement has, therefore, no practical bearing upon the geographical question.

With this severe blow to the nation, there is associated, by both the author of Kings and the Assyrian annalist, a change of rulers. Hoshea obtained by conspiracy and murder a throne which he was permitted by the Assyrian to retain only on condition of vassalage and tribute. For seven years (730-724) he was the ruler of the remnant of Israel. In subjection to the foreign power which had carried off their brethren, this kinglet and his decimated nation awaited the final blow.

It is within these seven years that the Biblical records place the accession and reformation of Hezekiah of Judah. In Kings no event of Hezekiah's reign is associated in any manner with the Northern Kingdom. We feel no surprise at this, since the reformation, the only event professing to date from the beginning of that reign, is confined to a single verse, from which all geographical reference is absent.‡ But in Chronicles, where the same event is so much expanded, there are repeated references to the Northern tribes. Hezekiah not only summons his own subjects to the great Passover of chapter xxx, but also invites by letter the people of the neighboring and kindred nation, "Ephraim and Manasseh" (ver. 1). All Israel is to be bidden to the festival, in the ancient phrase, "from Beersheba even to Dan" (ver. 5). The posts "pass through the land of Ephraim and Manasseh, and as far as Zebulun" (ver. 10). The result is that although "they derided them and mocked them, nevertheless some from Asher and Manasseh and from Zebulun humbled themselves, and came to Jerusalem" (ver.

* I Chron. v. 26 informs us expressly that all trans-Jordanic Israel was included in this earlier deportation.

† Isaiah ix. 1 probably favors this supposition.

‡ II Kings xviii. 4.

11). Among those who came were "a multitude from Ephraim and Manasseh, Issachar and Zebulun," who were not ceremonially clean, and were therefore unfitted to eat the Passover lawfully. For these Hezekiah interceded with that notable prayer, "The good Jehovah pardon every one that setteth his heart to seek God, Jehovah, the God of his fathers, though not according to the purification of the sanctuary" (vers. 18, 19). Finally, after the Passover, the iconoclastic zeal that brought destruction to the altars and images of Judah and Benjamin extended itself to the altars and images of Ephraim and Manasseh (xxxix. 1).

These allusions, when put together, yield the following result. The tribes of the Northern Kingdom to which Hezekiah's messengers came, or which were represented at the Passover, were Ephraim, Manasseh, Zebulun, Issachar and Asher. The tribes left unmentioned are Dan,* Naphtali and the trans-Jordanic tribes. There is just one time in the history of Israel when Ephraim, Manasseh, Zebulun, Issachar and Asher constituted the Northern Kingdom: the years between 734, when Tiglath-pileser carried off "Gilead, and Galilee, all the land of Naphtali," and 721, when Sargon deported what remained.

Precisely into these few years this narrative of Hezekiah's reformation is fitted by the bungling Chronicler, who, as we have seen, according to Graf, "knows no distinction of times."† Thenius‡ is so confident of the Chronicler's ignorance of chronology or indifference to it that he even writes: "It is beyond question that the Chronicler, *in order to set Hezekiah's great zeal for Jehovah's worship in the brightest light*,§ has represented this Passover as occurring in the *first year* of Hezekiah. . . . But in his zeal he has assigned the misery that has come upon Israel through the captivity as a peculiar motive for this festival (II Chron. xxx. 5ff.); and in so doing he *has failed to notice, or perhaps hasn't wanted to notice*, that this captivity—mark well, *he assigns to it no date*—had not, in the *first year* of Hezekiah, as yet occurred."

By such opinions as these, which might be multiplied, two things become plain: first, destructive critics cannot deny that if there be a coincidence here it is an "undesigned coincidence," for the Chronicler would not be their Chronicler if he had so mastered the chronology and geography of the period of Hoshea as to conform his narrative of the relations between the two kingdoms in that period to these nice demands of time and place, and then, having so mastered these details, had scattered them about in two or three parts of his narrative as we have found them; and second, such critics are blind to the fact that we have here any coincidence whatever, whether designed or undesigned.

* Dan of the South disappeared early; Dan of the North (comp. Judg. xviii) lay within the bounds of Naphtali.

† As above, p. 299.

‡ *Könige*, p. 379.

§ The italics throughout the quotation are as in Thenius.

Not so the impartial student of Scripture, who, with a map of Palestine before him as divided among the tribes, observes the accuracy with which the author of Chronicles, or rather his lost source, draws the boundary of Northern Israel precisely as it should be drawn for the years 734-722, and only then in all the course of Israel's history.

It was either chance, or careful research, or a reliable source, which guided the Chronicler's pen when he penned these names. The first choice is a resource of despair, and is contradicted by the appropriate manner in which the names are used in their various connections.* The second may be the choice of some students; it requires a strain of the imagination to picture the author hunting out of Kings, his only source, the scattered data from which to construct his geography of Samaria in its decline, and then making such an unimpressive use of his investigations that few† have noticed, even in this day of minute Biblical research, the Chronicler's faithful correspondence with Kings. Is it not most reasonable to select the third of the three choices, namely, the existence of a reliable source, correctly used, and wholly outside of our book of Kings? If such be the choice adopted, then we have here another item to add to the growing list of historical statements in Chronicles, unparalleled in the other Biblical books, which appear to demand reliable sources of information for the Chronicler, outside of the historical sources now in existence.

But may not this undesigned coincidence, which has been shown to exist between the data of Kings and of Chronicles on the hypothesis that the general chronological scheme of Kings is correct, serve as an additional argument in favor of the correctness of that chronological scheme? In the source upon which the author of Chronicles depended for his narrative of Hezekiah's reformation, just as in our book of Kings, the accession of Hezekiah fell, not in or near 714,‡ but between the years 732 and 724. To argue thus is by no means to argue in a vicious circle: to prove Chronicles by Kings, and then to prove Kings by Chronicles. For an undesigned coincidence confirms both documents involved in the comparison. If, then, we have here a genuine coincidence, and if this coincidence is undesigned, it not only confirms the historical character of Chronicles, but adds a new prop to the general chronological scheme of Kings.

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* Comp. Zöckler on II Chron. xxx. 18 (in Lange's *Bibelwerk*).

† Among them Oettli and Meinhold, Zöckler and C. J. Ball, in their commentaries.

‡ So most modern historians, following Wellhausen in *Jahrbuch für deutsche Theologie*, 1875, pp. 637ff. On this whole problem of comparative chronology, see critical note by Prof. Davis in *Presb. and Ref. Review*, January, 1890.

VII.

REVIEWS OF RECENT LITERATURE.

I.—PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE.

KANT AND SPENCER: A Study of the Fallacies of Agnosticism. By PAUL CARUS.
Second Edition. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1904.
8vo, paper, pp. 104.

This little book is No. 40 in "The Religion of Science Library," and contains four chapters which have been printed before as articles in either *The Monist* or *The Open Court*. In these papers Dr. Carus has addressed himself to the not very difficult and, we imagine, not very distasteful task of exposing the weaknesses and inconsistencies of Mr. Spencer's philosophy. For this philosophy he has scant respect. He regards its author as a reactionary spirit in philosophy, and says, "As a philosopher he is a dilettante." In *The Popular Science Monthly* for August, 1888, Mr. Spencer published an essay on "The Ethics of Kant," in which he took the liberty of criticising Kant severely, at the same time patronizingly excusing him on the ground that if the Sage of Königsburg had only known more he would probably have thought differently. Kant's famous saying, that the starry heavens above him and the moral sense within him excited his supreme admiration, was unsatisfactory to Mr. Spencer, because he inferred from this dictum that Kant recognized the supernatural in conscience. This, of course, Spencer could not tolerate. If Kant had only known better, that admiration would have wilted. Dr. Carus argues vigorously, however, that Kant did not hold to any supernatural origin or aspect of conscience, and that if Spencer had known Kant better he would never have made the mistake of supposing that he did. Carus points out that Kant was an evolutionist; and while it would require an expert to decide upon the correctness of Dr. Carus' position in these claims, we are disposed to believe that, as between him and Spencer, he is the nearer right: however, Dr. Carus hardly convinces us that Kant wholly dismissed from his thought faith in the Supernatural.

Dr. Carus wants it understood that he is neither a disciple nor a defender of Kant; he only objects to Mr. Spencer's unfair treatment of him. He likes this in Kant, namely, that he was monistic, not dualistic. He insists that notwithstanding Mr. Spencer's almost contemptuous references to Kant in his writings, he is yet directly indebted to Kant for the groundwork of what little philosophy he had. And in this we believe Dr. Carus to be exactly right. "What is Mr. Spencer's agnosticism but a popularization of Kant's view that things in themselves are unknowable?" (p. 34). The two offshoots of Kant in England are Green's Oxford Transcendentalism and Spencer's Agnosticism, and for Mr. Spencer to treat Kant with contempt is simply for him to betray his ignorance of the origin

of his own ideas. We question Dr. Carus' judgment that Spencer got his ideas directly from Kant: he got them rather from Mansel, whose very words he quoted and incorporated by pages into his *First Principles*; but they were Kant's ideas, just the same. Mr. Spencer never cared to conceal his impatience with Kant—or, indeed, with any other writer whom he did not happen to like. Any one who has read his voluminous autobiography has observed with what self-sufficient complacency he was wont to throw aside any book which did not chance to fit itself at once into his own moods and molds of thought. At the age of twenty-four, when a guest in his friend Wilson's house, he picked up a loose copy of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, and this is what he says about it: "This I commenced reading, but did not go far. The doctrine that Time and Space are 'nothing but' subjective forms,—pertain exclusively to consciousness and have nothing beyond consciousness answering to them,—I rejected at once and absolutely; and having done so, went no further. Being then, as always, an impatient reader, even of things which in large measure interest me and meet with a general acceptance, it has always been out of the question for me to go on reading a book the fundamental principles of which I entirely dissent from. Tacitly giving the author credit for consistency, I, without thinking much about the matter, take it for granted that if the fundamental principles are wrong the rest cannot be right; and thereupon cease reading—being, I suspect, rather glad of an excuse for doing so." "It remains only to say that whenever, in later years, I have taken up Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* I have similarly stopped short after rejecting its primary proposition" (Spencer's *Autobiography*, Vol. I, pp. 289, 301). What wonder that Mr. Spencer should condemn Kant without even dreaming that he was calumniating the most illustrious of his philosophic forbears! We are inclined to agree with Dr. Carus in his opinion that the Spencerian influence is on the wane. Certainly it is high time. His description of Agnosticism is good enough to quote: "Agnosticism is like a shallow mud-puddle in which short-sized men can wade without fear of ever going beyond their depth. When the waters are disturbed one cannot see the bottom, and the pool gains the appearance of unfathomable profundity. . . . When all issues are mixed up in inextricable confusion, he (*i.e.*, Mr. Spencer) exults with joy and concludes that everything is absolutely unknowable" (p. 30).

Trenton.

HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

BALANCE, THE FUNDAMENTAL VERITY. By ORLANDO J. SMITH. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Company; The Riverside Press, Cambridge, 1904. 8vo; pp. xi, 286. \$1.25 net

This is another attempt to reduce Science and Religion to the common terms of one broad generalization. The author sets out with the general maxim in the physical world that to every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. This principle he gathers up into his own dictum that Balance rules the world. This "world" is the material, the economical, the social, the moral or the religious world. This means justice supreme in the realm of ethics. This great truth has worked itself out in the mind of man into these three beliefs which are fundamental to religion, namely, that the soul is accountable for its action, that it survives the death of the body, and that there is a supreme power that rights things.

In an appendix are found the solicited criticisms of a score or more well-known writers, some of them very searching and just, together with the author's reply to them.

The book is very well written. It might be taken as an enlarged and revised edition of Emerson's essay on "Compensation." We are disposed to think that the author overestimates the value of his idea. Balance is a passive state, not

a ruling power. The author's view-point is distinctly naturalistic; the religion thus identified with science, if all its essential elements are here comprehended and designated, is Deism at the best; indeed, many being judges, the third fundamental belief does not necessarily demand a personal supreme power. Natural theology stops this side of Supernatural Religion, and Christianity is a Supernatural Religion.

Trenton.

HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

PRINCETON CONTRIBUTIONS TO PSYCHOLOGY. Princeton, N. J.: The University Press. Paper, pp. 35-79.

We have here two reprints from *The Psychological Review*, bearing upon cognate subjects. The first is from Vol. X, No. 4, July, 1903, and is a Discussion upon the subject "Imitation and Selective Thinking." The parties to the Discussion are Prof. B. Bosanquet and Dr. J. Mark Baldwin. These papers are severely technical, and give us only the conclusions of an argument which had been prosecuted in preceding numbers of the *Review*. The second paper is from the *Review*, Vol. XI, No. 1, January, 1904. It is by Prof. Baldwin, and was read before the joint seminars, Department of Philosophy, Princeton University, December 1, 1903. It is on "The Limits of Pragmatism," and is a searching and exhaustive critique of this philosophy which was first well launched by Prof. Pierce, which is championed by the "Chicago School," and which has had such a popular and plausible presentation in the brilliant teachings and writings of Prof. William James.

Trenton.

HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

II.—APOLOGETICAL LITERATURE.

EDUCATION IN RELIGION AND MORALS. By GEORGE ALBERT COE, Ph.D., John Evans Professor of Moral and Intellectual Philosophy in Northwestern University. Author of *The Spiritual Life* and *The Religion of a Mature Mind*. Chicago, New York, Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Company, MCMIV. Svo, pp. 434.

The author of this new volume is now well known as one of the most vigorous and popular champions of the new religious education. His former books have been widely read and have created a distinct impression upon the public mind. Of the two, the evangelical reader would probably judge *The Spiritual Life* much higher and healthier in tone; for while *The Religion of a Mature Mind* is fresh and suggestive, it is also bold in its ambiguous presuppositions, and it is not too careful to avoid or to conceal its negative tendencies. This book is a sort of handbook on Education—of the religious type. Indeed, it is cut up into short sections in order to adapt it to the use of classes for teacher training. Its character is more educational than religious. It is pedagogy viewed from the standpoint of religious development. The author regards education as in a way belonging to the larger category of religion. He tells us that "religious education is *simply education in the complete sense of the term*" (p. 29), and that the "*modern educational movement as a whole has consisted in the working out of certain pedagogical aspects of Christian belief*" (p. 95).*

The book falls into four parts, namely, The Theory, The Child, Institutions, and The Perspective. In the first part, the general postulates and principles of the modern conception of education are set forth. The three factors in education are an immature human being, a destiny or goal of life, and a guide who has been

* Italics are the author's.

matured by an experience of his own. Thus it appears that education in general is the effort to assist the development of an immature mind toward the proper goal of life. In his discussion of *The Child* the author's psychological principles appear. Not unfrequently these clash with traditional beliefs, but this seems to occasion the writer little concern. Indeed, he seems so careless about this as to imagine sometimes that his views are at variance with long-accepted doctrines when they are not. We are much mistaken if he is correct in the evident implications of this remark: "The denial of a positively religious nature to man through the doctrine of total depravity tended to paralyze religious education" (p. 60). The doctrine of total depravity, rightly understood, never denied to man a positively religious nature. The man who is dead in his sin still has a positively religious nature. He has not the new spiritual life, the pneumatic nature, which is the gift of the Holy Spirit. We understand a religious nature to be such as is possessed by a being endowed with a capacity for religion. Brutes lack a religious nature. Men do not. An actual sinner is a possible saint. A depraved man is capable of being a child of God—not by merely normal development; but the capacity, given proper conditions, is there. The mistake in the quoted remark is that of employing the general term "religious" instead of the specific term "spiritual," the term so frequently used by the Apostle Paul. And this probably not accidental choice of terms is indicative of a very large presupposition, favoring naturalistic interpretations of spiritual experiences, which underlies this whole view of Christian education.

The author's conception of Authority is suggestive of Sabatier. It must always be consistent with the educational idea of freedom in self-expression. It may work within the individual "as an impulse, not without him as compulsion." This subjective authority may objectify itself in the customs and canons of civilization, but, in the last analysis, it exists "as authority for us only when it actually becomes the self-expression of our higher nature" (p. 79).

This book is full of material which is valuable and helpful to all who are charged with the responsibility of training the young. That the new psychology, with its many pedagogical corollaries, contributes richly to the principles and practices of Christian education goes without the saying. But the adjustment of the new to the old is not yet complete. Indeed, the new pedagogy has as yet hardly found itself with sufficient clearness to make its adjustments final or complete. Granting that there are disagreements, in both principle and method, between the new and the old, the adjustment must come in one or some or all of three ways, namely: The new finds, after making much noise, may recede into the populous limbo of exploded ideas, or the old ideas may sink lower and lower until they shall at last sink forever out of sight, or each, being better understood and more perfectly developed, may with modifications find itself essentially and easily adaptable to the other. For example, note the author's rash relegation of the doctrine of human depravity to the rear on account of its alleged incompatibility with the principles of the true education. Let him rightly state the doctrine, let him clearly state and apply his pedagogic principle, and what becomes of the incompatibility?

But the new psychology, christened by Coe and his kind, must be careful of its adjustments. For it has for its chief boast that it is empirical, its methods are inductive, its results are garnered from the gleanings of the laboratory. But some of the most important elements in Christian education do not disclose themselves to the microscope. Prof. James and Prof. Starbuck may tabulate phenomena and tell us upon data (partial, and therefore necessarily of questionable value) just when and where and under what circumstances conversions occur; but all this is in the region of phenomena. This is well, very interesting and very instructing. But Dr. Martineau has somewhere said that men are always

tempted, as soon as they learn how a thing happens, to forget that it is God who causes it to happen. Now we have no quarrel with a phenomenal psychology of religious experience, young or old; we are cordially ready to acknowledge its value in Christian thought and Christian work; only it must not become so enamored of its discoveries as to forget that there is a vast deal which it never can discover. We join the author in emphasizing the importance of education. We believe that Horace Bushnell's *Christian Nurture*, notwithstanding its two or three unguarded flaws, was a contribution to the Church which ought to have marked an epoch and which never has been estimated at its real worth. We are eager to grant that the true educational method should be employed in Christian education—in the home, in the college and in the Sunday-school. But we must not be blind to the fact that there are perils along that way. We want to register a *caveat* when it is said that education, including, of course, religious and therefore Christian education, "is an effort to assist the development of an immature mind toward the proper goal of life" (pp. 19, 120): not because this, when most broadly interpreted, is not fairly true, but because there are so many who will not interpret these words as Dr. Coe might and as we must. If it be said that this is over-cautious and that the criticism is an over-refinement, we need only reply that there are not a few, and they among the leading educators, who *do* interpret them differently. That is to say, not a few tell us that all education is simply development, whereas Christian education is not "simply development." The psychology of the spiritual life is the psychology of the Holy Spirit's work in the heart of a man, and this cannot be reduced to the scientist's rules and statistics. Some one has argued that meteorologists now can tell whence the wind comes and whither it goes—that our Lord's words to Nicodemus are no longer true. This is so absurd as to provoke only a smile. Neither can men inspect all the secret and subtle workings of the Spirit, even in the quiet processes of Christian education. There is a supernatural element in it, and the naturalizing of the supernatural is the besetting sin of the new psychological pedagogy, in common with many other disciplines and tendencies of the time.

Nor is the strictly pedagogical side of this book without occasion for remark. Catechisms are uncompromisingly ruled out. The new pedagogies nails its theses upon the door of the intellect and challenges the Churches of Christendom in their use of the Catechisms of their faiths. Formulated questions and answers kill the vital processes of assimilation. Conversation must take the place of the Catechism, and in the new order the child must ask the questions, while the teacher or parent must answer them—if he can. This is somewhat revolutionary, but what of that? It is the ukase of the new pedagogy. Neither is the Sunday-school without a revolutionary reconstruction, at least in the conception of it. It is a school for "the normal development of the spiritual life of its pupils" (p. 286). This is excellent, although Robert Raikes organized the modern Sunday-school rather as an evangelistic than as an educational agency, and we are strongly inclined to believe that undue emphasis is just now being put upon the educational side of Sunday-school work. But we are surprised to find among the very next words these: the Sunday-school is "not a Bible school, but a school of religion." This is a sharp and suggestive contrast. If it be meant in the only sense in which it is true, it is pretty sure that that meaning will be missed by many who read the words. Chillingworth's remark that the Bible is the religion of Protestants is open to criticism, but its most hostile critics have always been among those who reject the very large truth which it conveys rather than those who except to the small error which it may fairly be construed as setting forth. If the contrast implied in Dr. Coe's remark is warranted, then it is just because too much emphasis is being placed upon the educational or intellectual side, the *book* side of Sunday-school work. Does not Christendom regard Christianity as religion *par excellence*, and is not the Bible the handbook of Christianity? Is

not the Bible being not taught, but mistaught if religion is not taught in the teaching of it? If the conception, *Religion*, is to be widened out and thinned down, in contradistinction to the Bible, which is God's Word, the text-book on Christian faith and practice, then just exactly what is it that is to be studied in the Sunday-school? In the progressive movement of the new education, are we first to drop the Catechism in the interest of the study of the Bible, and having adjusted ourselves to this order, are we then to be told that we must drop the Bible in the interest of *Religion*? Indeed, we are warned to be very careful about having children memorize Scripture (pp. 160-2). It is at serious pedagogic peril. We had supposed this time-honored and heaven-blessed custom innocent enough, but, alas! it must go. While an unfriendly criticism would fain cut away our Bible, is a friendly pedagogy to warn us not to have our children store their memories with what little Bible the critics are constrained to leave us? The cases cited by Dr. Coe to show the mistake of putting the symbol before the reality as illustrated in memorizing Scripture are too frivolous for serious consideration. The little child who made a mistake in hearing and so said in the first petition of the Lord's Prayer, "Harold be Thy name"; and that other little child who, hearing amiss, quoted the text, "Children, bathe your parents in the Lord for this is right," soon outgrew their innocent little mistakes, but never outgrew their invaluable possession of the memory. Thus it is that we find much in this book that is wise and some that is otherwise. One could wish that it brought out more clearly the author's conception of the supernatural side of Christian education. To be sure, it may be urged that, while holding firmly to this, it was neither necessary nor relevant for him to introduce it into this essay. But we are often forced to consider that some things are so important that the omission of reference to them may lay us open to the charge of being indifferent to them. The tendency just now is very strong in the direction of the designed omission of everything in a theory of education which will not subordinate itself manifestly under the general category of *Evolution*—"normal development" is the word in this volume. The author's former book, *The Religion of the Mature Mind*, is not wholly innocent of certain teachings which render a statement of faith on this point in this book neither redundant nor incongruous.

We believe in the larger conception of education. We believe that this means far more than mere instruction. We may concede that there is in certain quarters not a little occasion for the call to make "instruction less formal, less *memoriter*, more free and self-expressive, more appreciative of freedom of thought and modern learning" (p. 368). But we also believe that a true Christian education, while employing the methods enjoined by a rational pedagogy, presupposes elements actually lacking in that sort of education which is not hard to find and which is better characterized as non-Christian than as "secular," and that these elements are such as to differentiate it in some very important particulars from all education which can be accurately styled "normal development." There is a vast deal of modern education in all the schools, claiming the virtues of the new pedagogical *regime*, which is neither specifically Christian nor generically religious. We believe that the Catechism is an invaluable part of the vastly important and too much neglected educational work of the Christian Church in caring for and in holding to herself her own sons and daughters; and we believe that infinitely more good than harm is done in having our children, not under compulsion but under wise and loving guidance, store their minds and memories with the very words of Holy Scripture, assured that, as their minds develop, the meaning of the familiar words will become apparent to them and, as the need arises, the Spirit whose sword it is will train the mind and teach the heart to use it.

Trenton.

HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

THE CHRISTIAN'S RELATION TO EVOLUTION: A QUESTION OF GAIN OR LOSS. By FRANKLIN JOHNSON, D.D., LL.D., Professor in the University of Chicago. Chicago, New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. 8vo, pp. 171.

This little book purports to be not so much an estimate of Evolution as of the influence or effect which that doctrine should have upon the Christian's view of things. The author begins by saying that in this book he "neither opposes nor advocates the doctrine of evolution." Properly enough, he first explains what the doctrine is; and it would seem that the limits which he set for himself were too narrow for the very satisfactory accomplishment of this no small task. He classifies all doctrines of evolution as untheistic and theistic; and it is interesting to note that he regards the late Prof. Le Conte's definition, namely, "A continuous, progressive change, according to certain laws and by means of resident forces," as untheistic, although he concedes that the professor himself was a Christian evolutionist. We believe that this judgment is just and fair. Dr. Johnson shows at some length that the vaunted claim is wholly unwarranted; that the much utilized doctrine of the *Immanence* of God, so inwrought into modern evolutionary theories, is a recent find: rather, he argues, whatever is true in this idea was always held under the old name of the Immensity or Omnipresence of God, while, on the other hand, the modern statement of it is not sufficiently safeguarded against some very damaging errors. A chapter is devoted to the easy task of showing that the phrase "Creation by Evolution" means just nothing at all. The general position of the author is a cautious and conservative one. He has little use for what he calls the current "apologetic apologetics." "This literature holds its hat in its hand, and forever bows to objectors of all kinds, and forever thanks them for claiming so much, and forever grants them all that they claim, and forever begs them to claim more. Our world is abundantly supplied with it, and our younger ministers feed upon it. I counsel them to become acquainted with it. But I also counsel them to abandon it. The first requisite to their success is the strong assertion of the divine in the world and over the world. The Church and the human race have suffered long enough from the lamblike instruction of this literature" (p. 121, footnote). He justly complains that many theologians are disposed to yield so much to evolution as the reconstructive principle of their thinking, while, on the other hand, such philosophers as Royce and Howison, and such men of science as the late Prof. Romanes and now, by his own confession, Prof. Shaler, and also such writers as the late John Fiske, and even Mr. Spencer himself by his latest apparent concessions to the theists, are very slow in going so far. "If it shall proceed much further, it will be found that the men of science will stand nearer to our beliefs than the theologians to whom I refer. We shall soon hear the men of science lamenting our retreat and summoning us to stand fast. The two hosts, instead of joining their forces to defend the central fortresses of our faith, will pass each other and wander away" (p. 165).

Trenton.

HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

FETICHISM IN WEST AFRICA. Forty Years' Observations of Native Customs and Superstitions. By the Rev. ROBERT HAMILL NASSAU, M.D., S.T.D., for forty years a missionary in the Gabun District of Kongo-Française, author of *Crowned in Palm Land, Mawedo*. With twelve illustrations. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1904. 8vo; pp. xvii, 389.

From the first foreign missionaries have been conspicuous for their contributions to science. The proof of this statement is the well-known and splendid Ely volume. It is doubtful, however, whether any more signal and valuable contribution to the science of religion has been made than the book which is the

subject of this notice. In several respects the author is peculiarly qualified for his important work. For over forty years west Africa has been his home, and the tribes of that vast region his friends. By nature he has an inquiring mind, and his powers of observation have been exercised and trained throughout a long lifetime. He has read widely and carefully as well as observed constantly. To a degree rarely equaled and probably never surpassed, he has succeeded in coming into sympathy with, and so in gaining the confidence of, the secretive because distrustful savage. Thus he has amassed a great store of rich and accurate information. This his Missionary Board most wisely gave him the leisure to put into literary form; and this he has done with a clearness of analysis, a freedom from bias, and a lucidity, vigor and elegance of style, which would make his work remarkable as an English classic, if it were not yet more notable as probably the last word descriptive of west African fetichism. It remains only for the student of the philosophy of religion to interpret the vast mass of material which Dr. Nassau has so admirably laid before him.

The book opens with a succinct but clear and full description of the "Constitution of African Society." It then presents the "Idea of God" dominant in African religion. This is followed by a discussion of "Polytheism and Idolatry." Then come two very illuminating chapters on "Spiritual Beings in African Religion"; then "Origin," "Number," "Locality," "Characteristics," "Classes and Functions." Thus is introduced a chapter on "Fetichism and its Philosophy"; and the subject is further developed by considering "The Fetich" as "a Worship," as "Sorcery," as "Demonology," as a "Government," in relation to "the Family," in relation to "Daily Work and Occupation and to the Needs of Life," as a "Superstition in Custom," in relation to "the Future Life," in its "Practical Effects," with regard to the "Tales" that it has inspired, and in "Folk-Lore." The work closes with an excellent glossary.

Our limits, of course, forbid even a bare enumeration of the conclusions suggested by the facts presented. The following, however, are among the more obvious and important:

1. African society is far from undeveloped; it is exceedingly complex.
2. The belief in God is universal as elsewhere.
3. The conception of God is deistic; He has abdicated in favor of the spirits.
4. The real world is the spirit-world.
5. The influence of this world on human beings is in some cases such as would seem to imply demoniacal possession.
6. The moral sense of these fetich-worshippers is very low; it is the continuation rather than the retribution theory of the future life that is held, and their tales and folk-lore are characteristically without a moral.
7. The terrors of death are enormously aggravated; our friends it commonly converts into our enemies.
8. Fetichism is not merely a superstition; it is a system of worship, and an almost inconceivably complicated one.
9. It is not the first step of the savage toward God; it is his last step away from Him. This is Dr. Nassau's own philosophy of it, and it would seem to be correct. Could so complex and fully developed a system be a *first* step in either direction?

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

THE BIBLE IN MODERN LIGHT. A Course of Lectures before the Bible Department of the Woman's Club, Omaha. By JOHN WESLEY, D.D. Philadelphia: The Griffith and Rowland Press, 1904. 8vo, pp. 238.

These lectures, as their title indicates, were intended to serve a most important purpose; and they must have served it admirably. Their style is terse, clear, chaste, strong. Their spirit is preëminently fair, judicious, philosophic. They are literally packed with matter as interesting as it is important. Their tone is confident, optimistic, inspiring. The tactful firmness with which truths that

would naturally evoke controversy and opposition are usually stated is most praiseworthy. Some of the chapters, notably that on "Ethics and the Bible," that on "The Bible and the School," and that on "The Bible and Christ," are beyond all criticism. We regret, therefore, to have to dissent from Dr. Conley in the following respects: 1. His attitude toward evolution and toward modern science in general is too concessive. There is not yet the harmony between scientific theories and revelation in which he rejoices. Doubtless, there is much that is hopeful in the present relations between the two; but it is scarcely the fact that, as a rule, "the younger scientists are saying" of Spencer's "infinite and eternal energy from which all things proceed," "This is God, and He is over all things and in all things"; or if they are saying this, it is hardly true that they mean by God what Dr. Conley means. The time has not come when we need no longer to be on our guard against "oppositions of science falsely so called."

2. While Dr. Conley does not overestimate at all the emphasis which the Bible puts on the equality of man and woman, is he correct in holding that "the supposed teaching of the subordination of woman is simply a concession for the time to customs which could not be broken with immediately without misunderstanding and harm?" If this subordination were merely a temporary concession, why should the apostle base it on reasons (1 Tim. ii. 14) which must always be as much in force as they were at first?

3. It is not enough to say that "a miracle may simply be the manifestation of a higher law." "There are miracles," like the raising of the dead, "which transcend not only all known, but all possible laws of nature." "The Scriptures not only are silent about any higher law as the cause of miraculous events, but they always refer them to the *immediate* power of God." If miracles could be explained "simply as manifestations of higher law," it would mean that there were no *miracles*. The essence of the miracle is not in its exceptional character, as Dr. Conley would seem to think; it is in the power by which it is wrought. It is not the intimation of a higher law of nature toward which nature is working; it is the sign in nature of the very hand of the living God.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MUSLIM THEOLOGY, JURISPRUDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY. By DUNCAN B. MACDONALD, M.A., B.D., Professor of Semitic Languages in Hartford Theological Seminary. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1903.

This volume is one of a series called "Handbooks in Semitics." It is a fruit of the new Semitic scholarship, the advance of which is noticeable in American theological seminaries and other institutions of learning. We can confidently expect from the same movement additional valuable literature. Great industry has been displayed in the preparation of this text-book, for "all the results given have been reached or verified from the Arabic sources."

The work first, and wisely, takes up the constitutional development, following the succession of dynasties and the evolution of Muslim sects with their diverse claims to supremacy. Then follows briefly, in two chapters, the development of jurisprudence—the foundations and sources of law, the systems of the great founders of the schools and a comparison of their codes.

The main part of the volume treats of the development of Muslim Theology, its principles, its controversies and conflicts, the rise of Mohammedan scholasticism, and some account of the great theologians and their philosophic systems; and ends with such modern movements as the Wahhabite attempt to return to primitive Islam.

Valuable appendices, constituting one-fourth of the volume, give translations of the creeds of Al-Ashari, Al-Ghazzali, An-Nasafi and Al-Fudali. There is added

a selected Bibliography and chronological data concerning the theologians and the doctrinal history of Islam.

Doubt may be expressed as to whether the contents may be classed as "popular," as is indicated by the prospectus of the series. The subject-matter requires fixed attention and constant thought to grasp it.

There is need of an index of subjects or an enlargement of the present "Index of Names and Arabic Words," to make the volume more valuable to the general reader. For the latter such terms in the index as "Attributes," with cross reference to "sifat"; "mysticism," referring to "Sufis"; "sects," "women saints," etc., would be advantageous.

Prof. Macdonald deserves great credit for erudite investigation in a field hitherto untouched by any American scholar. Research in the Mohammedan field will also be required in the preparation of two other volumes promised in this series.

Tabriz, Persia.

SAMUEL GRAHAM WILSON.

III.—EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY.

THE STUDENT'S OLD TESTAMENT. Narratives of the Beginnings of Hebrew History from the Creation to the Establishment of the Hebrew Kingdom. By CHARLES FOSTER KENT, Ph.D., Woolsey Professor of Biblical Literature in Yale University. With Maps and Chronological Chart. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1904. Pp. xxxv, 382. \$2.75 net.

For the study of the literary analysis of the Old Testament, or for a means of ready reference to the hypothetical documents underlying the present narrative, or for the purpose of reading each of these originals consecutively, Prof. Kent's work is a convenient handbook. Not only are the disentangled documents placed side by side for comparison; but their origin and dates are indicated by headlines, and the reasons for the partition are stated in footnotes. The whole material is thus ever before the eye and constantly at hand.

The lengthy introduction is important. From it Prof. Kent's view regarding the historical value of the Old Testament writings is found to be quite that of Prof. H. P. Smith. The minor differences between them are insignificant. In fact, they represent, as they claim to, the consensus of opinion among the adherents of the Graf-Wellhausen school. The exegesis adopted by this school and its textual criticism, as well as its explanation of historical movements, have become traditional. The exegesis is dogmatic also, and ignores all other interpretations.

We hope that such students as are impressed by the general arguments for the existence of underlying documents beneath the present Hebrew narrative will diligently and thoughtfully read the arguments for the minute analysis that are presented in the footnotes. Even though great lines of cleavage may be thought to be discernible, indicating a compilation, the task the analysts have set themselves is hopeless; for it is impossible to prove, as the analyzing critics are compelled to prove, that the original documents are thoroughly and pervasively contradictory or minutely to analyze the individual narrative and assign the parts to different authors and editors, on grounds that are substantial. The weakness of the argument, the inconclusiveness of the evidence, the legitimacy of a different interpretation are at once obvious to the thoughtful reader. The attempt at a minute analysis and to establish pervading inconsistencies is to the last degree precarious.

The translation paraphrases the Scripture narrative slightly. Prof. Kent has

promoted clearness by substituting the proper name or the common noun in those places where the pronoun is ambiguous in its reference. Occasionally his interpolations are dogmatic interpretations; and sometimes they distort the record. It may be instructive to compare the paraphrase by Prof. Kent in the first column with the translation of the Hebrew in the words of the American Revision.

Gen. ii. 8:

Jehovah planted a garden in Eden far in the East.

Jehovah God planted a garden eastward, in Eden.

Gen. ii. 18, 19:

Then said Jehovah, It is not good for the man to be alone; I will make a help suited to him. Therefore out of the ground Jehovah formed all the beasts of the field, etc.

And Jehovah God said, It is not good that the man should be alone; I will make him a help meet for him. And out of the ground Jehovah God formed every beast of the field, etc.

Gen. iii. 8:

They heard the sound of the footsteps of Jehovah, as he was walking in the garden.

They heard the voice [or sound] of Jehovah God walking in the garden.

Gen. ix. 20:

Now Noah, the farmer, was the first to plant a vineyard.

And Noah began to be a husbandman, and planted a vineyard.

Gen. iv. 1 is given twice; once in the connection in which it is found in the Hebrew narrative (p. 61), and again as the continuation of chap. iv. 26. The latter passage is made to read thus:

iv. 26: To Seth also was born a son, and he called his name Enosh. He was the first to call on the name of Jehovah. ¹Then the man [Enosh?] knew . . . * his wife; and she conceived, and bore Cain, and said, I have got a male child with the help of Jehovah. ^{2b}And Cain was a tiller of the soil ^{16b}and dwelt east of Eden.

Or take Ex. xxxiii. 6:

So the Israelites despoiled themselves of their ornaments from Mount Horeb onward, *and with these Moses made a tent.*

And the children of Israel stripped themselves of their ornaments from Mount Horeb onward.

The new sentence is not derived from the Septuagint or other ancient version, nor is it required by any exigency of the Hebrew narrative. Its insertion is due solely to the demands of the theory which Prof. Kent is advocating. It shows how an ancient document can be induced to make any statement that a modern critic thinks proper.

A translation frequently occurs in these pages that is peculiarly interesting to believers in the entire consistency of the first and second chapters of Genesis. It has been pointed out that the first chapter describes the creation of the universe, culminating in the creation of man, and that the second chapter takes up the formation of man and woman as its chief topic and narrates it in detail. To make these two chapters contradict each other it is necessary to prove that whereas in the first chapter vegetation and the lower animals appeared before man, yet in the second chapter God did not make trees to spring from the ground nor give being to beasts and birds until man had been formed. To establish this

* Eve in the Hebrew text is an editorial addition.

point it is asserted that grammar forbids *waw* consecutive with the Imperfect to be rendered into English by the Pluperfect or by the participle which is indefinite as to time; in other words, that ii. 19, for example, a verse already quoted from Prof. Kent, cannot be understood to mean "Now the Lord God had formed every beast . . . and he brought them to the man," or, with the use of the participle, "Now the Lord God, having formed every beast, brought them unto the man." Defenders of the consistency of the two narratives have cited the same construction elsewhere, in passages where beyond question or cavil the thought is correctly represented in English by the Pluperfect. And now Prof. Kent frequently renders this Hebrew construction by the Pluperfect; for example, in Gen. xxv. 1 and 5, "Now Abraham had taken another wife," and "Now Abraham had given all that he had to Isaac."

In conclusion it may be said that the form of criticism represented by Prof. Kent's work is losing its interest. The Christian public has not been guided by it; and its importance is rapidly dwindling in the estimation of Biblical critics, whether they accept or reject the authenticity of the early narratives in the Old Testament. Prof. Gunkel has sounded the note in Germany. Moreover, nothing is gained by the analysis unless the documents discovered by it are inconsistent; for, if they are authentic, it is indifferent whether they are read separately or combined as one. As Dr. Woosung Wade sees, "the analysis of so many of the Old Testament histories into their component parts does not exhaust the inquiry; it remains to determine upon what sources of information the latter were dependent." The supreme question concerns the authenticity of these early narratives, and the debate is being made to rest more and more upon broader considerations than the analysis.

Princeton.

JOHN D. DAVIS.

INTERNATIONAL THEOLOGICAL LIBRARY. Old Testament History. By HENRY PRESERVED SMITH, D.D., Professor of Biblical History and Interpretation in Anherst College. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1903. Pp. xxv, 512. \$2.50 net.

In the judgment of Professor Smith few facts are ascertainable from the Scriptures regarding the Israelites before their settlement in Canaan, while much may be learned of them from the same source after the time of Nehemiah. It is not without significance that in a book bearing the title *Old Testament History* the last eighty-six pages of the text, forming five and three-quarters of the whole, are devoted to the period after 333 B.C., a period of which the Old Testament does not ostensibly treat at all.

The work is avowedly a presentation of the history of Israel as reconstructed according to the theory of Graf-Wellhausen. Happily the reasoning upon which the conclusions rest is constantly laid before the reader. In fact the book is not so much a narrative of events as it is an argument; and it is in this aspect that the work deserves and will repay earnest consideration by thoughtful people. In the interest of truth we hope that the men and women who know their Bible and who have learned to weigh evidence will carefully ponder the premises which are set forth in this volume. Certain questions belong to a critical study of this sort: have the words of Scripture been properly interpreted; is another meaning than that adopted by Professor Smith equally probable; has the biblical portrayal of the events been reproduced without distortion and caricature; is it the author's theory of the history, or the force of other considerations, which has led him to the acceptance of verses and clauses as genuine or to the rejection of them as spurious? A surprise awaits the reader who conducts the investigation.

Princeton.

JOHN D. DAVIS.

NOTES ON THE HEBREW TEXT OF THE BOOKS OF KINGS. With an Introduction and Appendix. By the Rev. C. F. BURNEY, M.A., Fellow and Lecturer in Hebrew of S. John Baptist's College, Oxford. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1903. Pp. xlviii, 384. 14s. net (\$4.75).

A worthy companion to Driver's *Notes on the Hebrew Text of the Books of Samuel*, conceived in the same spirit and executed on the same plan. Differences of opinion between author and reader are bound to arise in connection with a work of textual criticism, under the present limitations of the science. The volume before us belongs, in its main features, to this class; and one often feels constrained to dispute the author's conclusions, and one may also believe that the attempt to ascertain the documentary sources even of the Books of Kings is in itself a precarious undertaking beyond certain very narrow limits, and at best is of doubtful value as a framework for objective textual criticism. No one who is competent to use such a book as this will go to it for final results. One resorts to it for the raw material in the first stages of preparation. And for such resort there is no disappointment.

The author has tabulated the synchronisms as found in the present Hebrew text, in the Septuagint, and in Lucian; and remarks that "examination of the three columns makes the fact plain that Lucian exhibits a different scheme of synchronism to MT. from Omri of Israel (I. xvi. 23) down to Jehoram of Israel (II. i. 17). This scheme conflicts with the synchronisms which go before and follow after, and which belong to the system of MT.; but, so far as it goes, is self-consistent." The present reviewer thinks that the author errs in the sentence last quoted. The synchronisms are, indeed, different at this point in Lucian and the Hebrew; but instead of conflicting, as Mr. Burney imagines, they are harmonious. The chronologist can use either set, and obtain the same result; or he can use both the Hebrew synchronisms and those of Lucian, and the combination clinches the correctness of each.

Princeton.

JOHN D. DAVIS.

THE INTERNATIONAL CRITICAL COMMENTARY. A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Numbers. By GEORGE BUCHANAN GRAY, M.A., D.D., Professor of Hebrew and Old Testament Exegesis in Mansfield College, Oxford. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1903. Pp. lii, 489.

This volume is the first critical commentary on the Book of Numbers to be written from the standpoint of the Graf-Wellhausen school. It is conceived wholly in this spirit. Professor Gray is an advocate, and he engages in special pleading from first to last. He cites no contending interpretations, only rarely does he allude to their existence; and he makes no attempt to sift and weigh evidence.

The commentary has, of course, its own place in Biblical criticism and exegesis quite distinct from that of the monograph and the general work; and so far as critical commentaries on the Book of Numbers are concerned, Keil, though written a generation ago, is the best conservative exposition, Dillmann is the superb product of the school of Ewald, and Gray presents the accepted interpretation of the school of Wellhausen.

Princeton.

JOHN D. DAVIS.

A SYLLABUS FOR OLD TESTAMENT STUDY. By JOHN R. SAMPEY, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Old Testament Interpretation in the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary. Louisville, Ky.: Charles T. Dearing, 1903. Pp. 105.

Most teachers of the Old Testament have doubtless felt the need of some compact, low-priced compendium of the elementary facts with which his classes have

to be made acquainted. Such an "irreducible minimum" in a comprehensive course on Introduction is furnished in this Syllabus by Prof. Sampey. The bulk of the volume is, of course, occupied by the analysis of the separate books, with brief, and in the main apt, characterizations of their contents. But in addition there are two features that contribute much to the usefulness of the Syllabus. One of these is a synchronous chart of Old Testament history, giving in parallel columns dates, events in Judah, prophets in Judah, prophets in Israel, events in Israel, and contemporaneous events. And the other feature is a most satisfactory list of those books on the Old Testament to which the student may with the greatest profit direct his attention. Unlike many similar lists, this is confined almost exclusively to books in English, and a practical teacher will recognize from his own experience the wisdom of this limitation; for few, even in these days, are the pupils who are able to make use of works in other tongues than their own. To each book of the long list Dr. Sampey has added a word or two, generally well chosen, to help the beginner in his estimate of these authorities. The volume, as a whole, is cordially recommended to students and teachers of the Old Testament as a thoroughly practical aid.

J. OSCAR BOYD.

DIE BEGRIFFE GEIST UND LEBEN BEI PAULUS IN IHREN BEZIEHUNGEN ZU EIN-ANDER. Eine exegetisch-religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchung von EMIL SOKOLOWSKI, Magister der Theologie. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1903. 8vo, pp. xii, 284.

After all that has been written on the Pauline pneumatology of late, it still remains true that an inquiry into the relations between the Spirit and life in Paul's teaching is by no means a work of supererogation. Considerable unclearness and difference of opinion still exist among students of Paulinism on this fundamental subject. The author conducts his investigation in five steps: first, he discusses the conception of life; next the relation of the Spirit to life; thirdly, the method according to which the Spirit operates in this relation; fourthly, the anthropological presuppositions; and finally, the source of the Pauline conceptions. The inquiry is based on the four great Epistles, 1 and 2 Thessalonians, Philippians, Colossians and Philemon. Through a curious oversight in the preface, where these are enumerated, Philippians is not mentioned. A large part of the book, especially in the earlier chapters, is exegetical in its character, and these exegetical discussions constitute, in our view, its chief merit, being marked throughout by great penetration and lucidity. In the first part the eschatological aspect of Paul's conception of life and its aspect as a present life are separately dealt with, and then the unity in principle of these two aspects is shown. Valuable, in view of the extreme physical eschatologism of Kabisch and others, is the demonstration that Paul knows of a life consisting in moral and religious processes. When the two sides of this present life are distinguished as ethical righteousness and justification (the status of sonship), this, while substantially correct, is liable to create a misconception, as if life were identical with the act of justification—a misconception which the author more or less invites by saying that "the imputed righteousness is an element of the present life." It would be better to say that the state of sonship, insofar as it involves communion with God, forms to Paul the religious aspect of life, and that justification lies at the basis of this sonship-life. The inseparable connection between the forensic righteousness and the ethical renewal is admirably brought out, and the logical precedence of the former carefully guarded. We are not so sure that we can follow the author where he thinks to have discovered the principle of this inseparable connection in the Pauline idea of faith. According to him, faith as an affirmation and appropriation of the meaning of Christ's death, both as a passive experience

and as an act of obedience, necessarily produces in this its twofold character, a twofold effect in the relation of the believer toward sin: on the one hand, the removal of the guilt of sin; on the other hand, the determination to put away sin in practice. We do not mean to dispute that faith, according to Paul, actually performs both functions; but it is a totally different thing to affirm that, as performing both, it furnishes the ultimate explanation of the vital nexus of the two sides of the effect of the death of Christ, the forensic and the ethical. Faith in reference to justification is so much the opposite of every positive, active attitude, so much the negative of works, that it becomes exceedingly difficult to explain its unity with faith in reference to the ethical sphere as a principle of sanctification. The two appear to have no more in common than the general form of faith. All that we can say is that, according to Paul, they coexist and are inseparably connected, and both have to do with the death of Christ. What the author takes to be an explanation of the two-sidedness of Paul's soteriology appears to us to be simply one of the phenomena in what this two-sidedness reveals itself. In this twofold significance of faith we have the subjective reflex of the twofold strain which runs through the apostle's interpretation of the death of Christ everywhere. In our opinion the true reason why justification entails sanctification must not be sought on the subjective side, in faith, but on the objective side, in the *modus operandi* of the atonement. Because Paul views the ethical bondage of man under sin as a result of his condemnation by the law, therefore the removal of this condemnation, the canceling of the guilt, *ipso facto*, also sets him ethically free; more strictly speaking, enables God forensically to free him in the ethical sphere. That this is subjectively mediated or applied by faith, so far as the conscious life of man is concerned, remains more or less true, and we are just as much indebted to the author for having so convincingly shown this. Another point in regard to which we are not quite prepared to accept the author's conclusions is the exegesis of such passages as 2 Cor. iii. 18, iv. 10, 11, xiii. 4, when he makes these prove that Paul assumed a life-giving influence of the Spirit upon the body of believers in this present life.

In the second part, dealing with the relations between the Spirit and life, the former is shown to be the author and the guarantee of the latter. We here find an illuminating exegesis of such difficult passages as Rom. i. 3, 4; viii. 1-4. The most interesting section, however, here is that on the relation between justification and the Spirit. Against Weiss and Pfeiderer, and many others, the thesis is upheld that justifying faith is a product and gift of the Spirit, not an act of the natural man, as Schmiedel would have it, nor an operation of God in a general sense merely (apart from the Spirit), as Gunkel believes. 2 Cor. iv. 13, iii. 3; Rom. xii. 3; Phil. i. 29; 1 Cor. ii. 5; indirectly also Gal. iv. 23, 28, are quoted as decisive indications of the true Pauline position in this question. Equally instructive are the remarks on p. 77 on the twofold aspect of the apostle's conception of freedom, the ethical and the religious.

The third part, in which the word and baptism are found to be the media in connection with which the Spirit operates in the first production of life, calls for little comment. We doubt whether the statement that the Spirit within the Christian state is as entirely independent of outward means in working life as he is in his charismatic operations is capable of proof. 2 Cor. iii. 18, where, according to the author's own exegesis, "the mirror" is the Gospel, would seem to disprove this. In vain the author seeks to interpret the passage 1 Cor. x. 3-4 in such a way as to exclude the implication that in the Lord's Supper the Spirit operates as well as in baptism. Granted that *πνευματικός*, joined to meat, drink, rock, does not mean "pneuma-conveying," but simply "of heavenly origin," the former is surely given with the latter. When something of heavenly origin becomes a meat and a drink, this can have no other purpose and effect than to communicate the peculiar power with which in virtue of its heavenly origin it

is endued. And if the Spirit in the Lord's Supper acts upon the life of believers, this is a direct proof that within the Christian state as well as at its beginning the Spirit operates mediately.

In part four, under the head of the anthropological suppositions, the author seeks to determine how Paul conceives of the Spirit in his relation to the elements of man's natural being. Σάρξ, νοῦς, συνείδησις, καρδία, πνεῦμα, ἔσω ἄνθρωπος are successively discussed. The main conclusion drawn from this discussion is that the Spirit of God possesses objective reality outside of the subjectivity of man, that he operates as such upon the inner man and causes the latter to react upon his influence, so that from the coöperation of these two elements those new activities result which are called life. The new product is not the Spirit of God itself, which in that case would come to supply the place of a deficiency in natural man. Nor does Paul so subjectivize the Spirit as to identify him with man's own spiritual disposition. The author vigorously disputes the widely spread opinion that πνεῦμα frequently means with Paul the new, specifically Christian subject. His position in this respect is, in our opinion, bound to find general acceptance in the end. Between the anthropological πνεῦμα, as a part of man's nature, and the objective divine πνεῦμα, there is neither place nor necessity for any other. Everything Paul predicates of the πνεῦμα anywhere can, we believe, without difficulty be distributed between these two. By far the most space in this section is occupied by the discussion of the Pauline notion of σάρξ. On the one hand the author points out that the σάρξ as the material element in man is not sinful in itself. On the other hand he shows that in its ethical and religious contrast with the πνεῦμα it assumes positively sinful character. By insisting upon it that in the latter connection also it retains its concrete, physical meaning of the substance of the body he involves the apostle in a contradiction, in order to explain which he later on has to resort to the theory that these two divergent views arose from the conflict of Judaism and Hellenism in the mind of Paul. We are willing to acknowledge that the notion of σάρξ in its ethical significance involves a problem which no one so far has been able satisfactorily to solve. The difficulty lies in this, that in some of the apostle's statements the sinful character of the σάρξ is distinctly brought into connection with its bodily associations. But it should be clearly recognized and as freely acknowledged that the characterization of the σάρξ as sinful is by no means coextensive in Paul with such statements. It covers a wider range. There are instances in which the σάρξ is ethically and religiously condemned and yet the body cannot be thought of. Purely spiritual sins are attributed to it. This the author has neglected to take into account. So far as it is the case the Hellenistic theory fails to explain the facts.

The last section of the book, in which the sources of the various views and conceptions discussed are traced, is not the least instructive and interesting part of the whole. From the nature of the case there is here more room for dissent than when the author moves on purely inductive exegetical ground. We may mark the following as his main conclusions: Paul is original, in comparison with primitive Palestinian Christianity, in ascribing to the Spirit operations in the ethical and religious sphere. He is not original, however, in this respect as compared with the Old Testament and Judaism, for here the Spirit is distinctly conceived of as the source of ethical and religious dispositions, although he is not represented as the author of life in doing this, nor even as the author of the physical resurrection-life. With the latter position we can heartily agree, and believe the author has done a good work in emphasizing this point over against recent denials (Gunkel, Pfleiderer, and others). Only a more careful distinction might have been drawn between the operation of the Spirit in ethically and religiously qualifying the office-bearers of the theocracy and his operation in working obedience to the law in general. More hesitant we feel ourselves as to following the conclusions

reached in regard to the apostle's relations to Jesus and primitive Christianity on this point. The author himself acknowledges that they are in a certain sense provisional insofar as they are based on mere silence, and "it is a difficult, perhaps hopeless, undertaking to seek to obtain a reliable picture of Palestinian-Ur-Christian relations and conceptions from the scant statements of the Synoptists and Acts." In the teaching of Jesus certainly the two principles from whose combination a doctrine of the life-giving work of the Spirit in the moral sphere would almost inevitably spring were given, viz., strong emphasis on the ethical and great prominence of the Spirit as the chief gift of the Messianic age. And the author here simply discounts the important testimony of the Fourth Gospel, no doubt because he is convinced of its unhistorical character.

From the source of Hellenism are derived: the conception of *σάρξ* as an inherently sinful principle, above referred to; the conceptions of *νόυς* and *συνείδησις* and the modification of the Jewish conceptions of *καρδιά* and *πνεῦμα* as belonging to the *ἰσω ἀνθρώπου*, in analogy with *νόυς* and *συνείδησις*, side by side with which modification they, however, retain their original Old Testament meaning; the development of the material conception of the *πνεῦμα* into that of a local sphere or element inside of which certain processes take place; the idea of a gradual development in the life of the body already in the present state; finally, the expectation of a perfect, embodied life with God immediately after death, to which Paul is believed to give expression in 2 Cor. v and Phil. i. In connection with the last-mentioned point we miss what forms the most conspicuous merit of the earlier part of the book, viz., a painstaking exegetical ascertainment of the facts. Especially the passage in 2 Cor. v is so difficult, and subject to such widely divergent interpretations, that any conclusions based on an exegesis of it which is simply taken for granted and not justified in detail, must for that reason alone lack all force. We believe Titius has clearly shown that the *ἐπενδύσασθαι* of which Paul here speaks excludes the *ἐκδύσασθαι*; where the one takes place the other does not; the former, therefore, cannot be referred to the moment of death, but must have reference to the moment of the Parousia. The author does not hesitate to represent Paul as involving himself by this new phase of his doctrine of the future life in an open contradiction. He repudiates all the feeble attempts at explanation or reconciliation that have been proposed. Paul did not cherish this Hellenic hope as something applying to himself alone by way of exception, and, on the other hand, he did not, in formulating it, mean to give up the older Jewish view of a resurrection at the end, to whose continued existence several passages later than 2 Cor. v bear the clearest witness.

Alongside of the Jewish and Hellenic elements other elements are recognized as original in the sense that they were derived from Paul's personal experience. To this category belong the following ideas: first of all, the thought that the Spirit is the source of a present (ethical and religious) life. In the next place, the conception of the human *πνεῦμα* as an organ which mediates between the Spirit of God and the human individual. Further, the manner in which Paul has modified the dualistic contrast between flesh and spirit. Not the material nature of his *σάρξ* makes man sinful in the last analysis, but personal self-determination against God. The profound ethicism of Paul's Jewish past alone does not, in the author's opinion, sufficiently explain this, because he goes so far as to place a positive ethical and religious valuation on the *σῶμα*. Paul's deepened moral consciousness, it is believed, furnishes the only satisfactory explanation of his peculiar mixed anthropology, and this deepened moral consciousness itself can only in part be traced back to contact with primitive Christianity and the teaching of Jesus. And to the expression of this very personal element in the apostle's consciousness even the adoption of the Hellenic idea of the *σάρξ* had to become subservient, for in the last analysis this also tends not to depreciate human responsibility, but simply to bring out the terrible proportions of man's

natural corruption and the absolute indispensableness of redemption. Still further, the author derives from Paul's personal experience at his conversion the close identification between Christ and the Spirit. The effect of the appearance of the exalted Christ upon Paul had been preëminently an effect of power, which as such had to be interpreted in terms of the Spirit. Here the author follows closely in the footsteps of Gunkel. It is worth while to take note of this, in view of the recent attempt of Brückner to derive the pneumatic character of the Pauline Christ from the apostle's erstwhile Jewish Christological belief. Interesting is the thought developed on p. 234, that Paul's conception of the Spirit as working in contact with the word, viz., in its first creative stage, is in strict analogy with the apostle's experience at his own conversion, where not only a seeing but likewise a hearing had taken place.

We take leave of the book with the grateful acknowledgment that in many points, even in such with reference to which we found it necessary to take issue with the author's conclusions, it has enlarged and clarified our knowledge of a most fundamental portion of the great apostle's teaching.

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DIE OFFENBARUNG DES JOHANNES. Ein Beitrag zur Literatur- und Religionsgeschichte von JOHANNES WEISS. Göttingen: Vanderhoeck und Ruprecht, 1904. 8vo, pp. 164. ("Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments," herausgegeben von Bousset und Gunkel, 3 Heft.)

In a treatise on the Apocalypse, issued as the third instalment of the new Bousset-Gunkel series, one might naturally expect that great emphasis would be thrown on the derivation of the contents of the book from Babylonian or other Oriental sources, chiefly through oral tradition, over against the almost exclusively literary method of explaining its make-up which until recently prevailed. Bousset and Gunkel are the most prominent representatives of this new school of apocalyptic exposition. In the first instalment of the new series Gunkel has, in his well-known bold and dazzling manner, blazed the path for the application of the new method to New Testament study. The treatise before us, while not in any way criticising or discountenancing Gunkel's theory, purposely adheres to the old line of literary analysis. Weiss reminds us that, whatever the ultimate sources of the apocalyptic ideas, the book, in its entirety as a literary composition, demands explanation, and challenges us to loose its seals. He complains that it has become almost a vogue among recent writers on the Apocalypse to profess eagerly that nothing can be known regarding the literary sources of the book and the process of its construction. This wave of critical agnosticism, he is afraid, has been helpful to no one except to those who, on account of dogmatic prejudice, desire to uphold the unity of the Apocalypse. To make up for the neglect he offers a new divisive hypothesis, resembling in certain respects its predecessors, yet possessing certain new features. The oldest element is a Johannine Apocalypse, written by the so-called presbyter John before the year 70. This contained chaps. i. 4-6, 9-19; ii-vii; ix; xii. 7-12; xiii. 11-18; xiv. 14-20; xxi. 1-4; xxii. 3-5 and parts of vers. 22 *seq.* With the exception of its prophecy of a millennium, this Johannine Apocalypse moved within the lines of the ordinary primitive Christian eschatology. In fact, the author makes agreement with the eschatological teaching of Jesus and Paul one of the canons for his reconstruction of this work. From the later component parts of our present Apocalypse it is distinguished by not attaching itself to definite contemporary events. It was not called forth by any universal persecution, and does not regard the Roman imperial power the great anti-Christian enemy of the Church. The latter is expected, as with Jesus and in 2 Thess., from among Judaism. The author was not, as the old Tübingen school used to represent the writer of the Apocalypse,

a particularistic, narrow-minded, anti-Pauline Jewish Christian, but rather a Paulinist of the second generation. Chap. ii. 14, 25, prove nothing against this, for the Book of Acts shows that in this later period the decree of the Apostolic Council was observed even in Pauline churches. "The teaching of Balaam" designates gnostic antinomianism, such as is condemned also in 1 John and 1 Peter. This gnosticism shielded itself behind misinterpreted Pauline formulas, but what John attacks is only the misinterpretation, not the Paulinism as such. Weiss takes occasion to dispute very energetically the thesis of Weizsäcker, as if Paul's work in Asia Minor had been entirely destroyed and a new structure of a totally different character, represented by the Johannine literature, raised on its ruins. This Johannine type of Christianity, he maintains, is simply Paulinism, toned down, to be sure, in accordance with the needs of a later generation, but nevertheless perfectly continuous with the work of Paul. Weiss further takes issue with the old Tübingen dogma, still embraced by many, that the author of the Apocalypse and the author of the Fourth Gospel cannot be identical. He believes with Bousset that the Apocalypse, both in its linguistic character and in the details of its subject-matter, shows numerous resemblances to the other Johannine writings. Nor does he attribute much weight to the argument that the attitude of the two writings toward the eschatological aspect of primitive Christianity is too radically different to admit of unity of authorship. Already in the Epistles John, while yet speaking of the Antichrist, appears to have in principle surmounted the eschatological standpoint of primitive Christianity. In his reminiscences of the Lord, which, according to Weiss, form the basis of the present Fourth Gospel, his religious outlook has been entirely changed from the future to the present. Here the Messianic age is represented as having arrived, the earthly life of the Lord is viewed as the fulfilment of the long-expected theophany. But not only does the author affirm the identity of authorship of the original Apocalypse, the Epistles and the original Gospel, he also maintains that there is a certain historical connection between the enlarged, reëdited Apocalypse of the time of Domitian (95 A.D.) and the enlarged, reëdited Gospel of from ten to twenty years later; the final redaction of the Gospel must be understood as an effort to transmute the eschatological piety of the Apocalypse, whose predictions of the immediate end had been falsified by the course of events, into a type of religion finding its satisfaction in the present. Thus the progress from the John of the original Apocalypse to the John of the original Gospel ("the reminiscences of the Lord") was repeated in the relation between the final editions of these two documents. Nor was this relation in the latter case one of pure contrast. In the final Apocalypse he already discovers a slight tendency to anticipate in spirit the outcome of the eschatological crisis, to view the developments as in principle accomplished, and thus to pass over into that timeless mode of contemplating religious experiences which is so characteristic of the Gospel. Unconsciously the Apocalyptic editor has thrown a delicate veil of allegory over the entire composition.

It will be seen from the above that Weiss attributes to John considerable more of the contents of the present Apocalypse than some of his predecessors, *e.g.*, Spitta, whose conclusions he not seldom quotes with approval. For the two Jewish Apocalypses of Spitta one Jewish source is substituted. ' It contained chaps. x; xi. 1-13; xii. 1-6, 14-17; xv-xix; xxi. 4-27. It dated from the year 70, and in the Jewish war and the siege of Jerusalem the author recognized the beginning of the end. In it were incorporated older materials, in regard to the origin of which Weiss does not feel himself able to determine anything. We learn, however, that one component part, the Babylon-vision (in chap. xvii), existed separately, and was composed during the reign of the sixth emperor (p. 10). The editor of the Jewish Apocalypse of the year 70, while incorporating this older document, combined with it the prediction of the beast, which he interpreted as

destined to find its fulfilment in the appearance of *Nero redivivus*, who would come from the east with the kings as his allies and destroy Rome. Parts of this Jewish Apocalypse were, further, the account of the two witnesses, the story of the birth of the Messiah and of the persecution of the woman by the dragon, the Messiah's battle, the Jerusalem-vision. The editor's main contribution consisted in the vision of the bowls, which he composed in order to bind together the Babylon-vision and the Jerusalem-vision. We do not believe that the author has succeeded in making the unity of this complex of diverse materials, as he himself characterizes it, appear very plausible. Nor can we allow that the Jewish character of the pieces assigned to it has been demonstrated, either by him or by his predecessors, in any conclusive manner. The prediction that in the New Jerusalem there will be no temple is most easily understood as a Christian idea. The birth of the Messiah in heaven in chap. xii ought not to have been counted by the author among the proofs of the Jewish origin of this representation on page 82, since on page 135 it is intimated that the location of the event in heaven is due to the final (Christian) redactor. In order to uphold the Jewish provenience, it is necessary to ascribe the explicit statement of xi. 8^b, "where also their Lord was crucified," to the same redactor. Neither the author of this piece nor the assumed editor of the Jewish Apocalypse cherished favorable expectations for Jerusalem, as Weiss himself acknowledges on p. 127. As to the meaning of the temple and the altar, the author endeavors, on p. 153, to show how the final Christian editor could retain this representation and attach a suitable meaning to it, although the temple at that time lay in ruins. If he could do this, there is no necessity to assume that the words were ever meant in any other than a Christian sense. That the Jerusalem-vision is too general in its conception and the account of the Messiah's battle too vindictive in its spirit to be attributed to a Christian author, more particularly to the John of the original Apocalypse, these are highly subjective opinions, to which various persons will attach a varying degree of convincing force.

The main point to which Weiss directs his efforts is the elucidation of the historical situation and literary character of the final redactor of the book, who combined the Johannine Apocalypse with the Jewish collection of the year 70. This redactor is characterized as an interpreter of ancient prophecy, which he beheld fulfilled or fulfilling itself in his own time. His time was the time of Domitian, and the occasion for his work the collision between Christianity and the cult of the Caesars. He believed the end of all things to be immediately at hand. The apparently threatening demand that all Christians should worship the emperor and stigmatize themselves in acknowledgment of their religious allegiance to him, created in him the acute eschatological conviction that now the hour of the consummation had actually come. Weiss does not assume that a universal compulsion to this effect had been exercised, or was at the time likely to be exercised, by the supreme imperial power. But certain circles of imperialistic zealots in Asia Minor had imposed these idolatrous practices on themselves, and this led the redactor to fear that they would soon be imposed on all. Weiss believes that to the mind of the redactor the second beast of chap. xiii designates the provincial representatives of the imperial power, either the political authorities or the priests who had the cult of the emperor in charge, although originally, in the Johannine Apocalypse, the description had reference to the prophetic Antichrist from among the Jews as usually conceived in early Christian eschatology. Under the eighth king the editor understood Domitian, whom he regarded as *Nero redivivus*. He invited his readers to recognize Nero's name, on the principle of "*isopsephia*," in the numerical value of the characters of the name of the beast handed down by tradition. In making his combined sources bear this new interpretation the redactor used great freedom. We have not sufficient space even to enumerate all the passages

where Weiss discovers his hand. He prefixed to the salutation of the Johannine Apocalypse the introductory verses i. 1-3. In the Epistles to the seven churches he added the closing refrains. In this connection Weiss falls into a curious inconsistency. He thinks the words "what the Spirit says" cannot be of John, because to the one who wrote them the Spirit was too much an objective principle; they do not fit in the mouth of one accustomed himself to be in the Spirit (p. 37). And yet the liberties which the redactor took with the work of John is excused on p. 39, on the ground that as a member of the Christian Church he knew himself to participate in the Spirit. In chapter vii the redactor changed the entire meaning of the sealing of the 144,000, and of the vision of the great multitude in heaven. In the Johannine Apocalypse the former designated the remnant of the Jews which were to be saved, the latter the totality of the Christian Church (without regard to martyrdom). Out of this the redactor made that a select number of Christian ascetes (cf. xiv. 4) will be saved from martyrdom, but that the majority of Christians will, in the final persecution, have to lay down their lives. John took the names of the tribes literally; to the redactor they represent the spiritual Israel, the Church. The redactor further added to the three woes, which followed the seven seals in the Johannine Apocalypse, the contents of viii, 6-12, and then made out of the whole the vision of the seven trumpets as a pendant to the seven seals and the seven bowls. Chap. x. 6, 7, is believed to be a seam in which the joining of the Johannine Apocalypse and the first great piece of the Jewish Apocalypse is clearly perceptible. The eating of the little book in vers. 10 signifies that the redactor is here aware of incorporating another document. The words "thou must prophesy *again*," in ver. 11, also betray that these things have been prophesied before. In chap. xii the story of the Messiah's birth and of the dragon's expulsion from heaven, the former Jewish, the latter Johannine, were brought into connection, by means of vers. 6 and 13. How in chap. xiii the tradition of the beast and the Johannine account of the prophetic Antichrist from among the Jews were welded together, so as to make of them two beasts, the imperial power and its provincial representatives, has been indicated above. The duplicating of the beast is a sign of compilation. In chap. xiv. 1-5 the redactor again changed the meaning of the 144,000 in the same sense as above. To John here also they meant simply the élite of Israel to be saved. Vers. 14-20, which in the Johannine Apocalypse described the climax of the advent of the Son of Man, he moved backward to this insignificant, obscure position, because of its sobriety and because he had in reserve, from the Jewish source, a picture of the end of a much more inspiring style. As the first half of the Jewish Apocalypse was inserted between chap. ix. 21 and chap. xii. 7-12, so the second half was inserted between chap. xiv. 20 and chap. xx. 1-10.

It lies beyond our power to enter upon a detailed criticism of this analysis. The author himself observes, and from his standpoint perhaps justly, that a reconstruction like this, based on what he calls "*Nachempfindung*" of the contents, cannot be refuted by isolated objections, but only by substituting for it an equally comprehensive interpretation of the book, which shall be superior by reason of a more complete entering into its spirit and by better taste. It goes without saying that we are not prepared to furnish such a refutation, even if we could place the same implicit confidence as the author does in his principle of "*Nachempfindung*" as an instrument for critical analysis. We must content ourselves with a few desultory remarks. In the first place, it seems to us that Weiss has not succeeded in making the freedom with which the redactor is assumed to have dealt with the Johannine material psychologically conceivable. How a writer, who so repeatedly had to change former (partially unfulfilled) predictions into something quite different from their original meaning, could retain any confidence in his own, we do not understand. It is especially difficult to believe that he could have written the solemn injunction of chap. xxii. 18, 19 ("I testify unto every man that

heareth the words of the prophecy of this book, If any man shall add unto them, God shall add unto him the plagues which are written in this book: and if any man shall take away from the words of the book of this prophecy, God shall take away his part from the tree of life and out of the holy city"), after having both in spirit and letter in numerous instances committed the sin here denounced. What Weiss offers in explanation of this, viz., that the redactor firmly believed his work to be the absolutely final Apocalypse, so that what applied to it did not apply to former issues, does not help much, because the very point difficult to believe is how the redactor, in view of the disappointment of former expectations which throughout his work of editing must have strongly impressed him, could still cherish this naïve confidence in his own finality. In the second place, in our opinion, Bernhard Weiss and Zahn have convincingly shown that the whole conception of a *Nero redivivus* was of comparatively late non-Christian origin, that it arose only after the lapse of time had rendered belief in the return of the living fugitive Nero impossible, that consequently there is no ground to assume its existence at the time of the writing of the Apocalypse. The author has done nothing to meet this serious objection, although it bears equally much against his form of the Nero-hypothesis as against its earlier formulations. Thirdly, the author's hypothesis does not succeed in making the whole an intelligible composition. Granting him all freedom in dealing with the distribution of the material at will, he still frequently professes himself unable to tell us how the redactor conceived of the movement of events. This applies even to the fundamental question of what was to the redactor past, present and future (cf. pp. 150-154). The great problem of the sequence of the scenes of the Apocalypse is even here far from solved, notwithstanding the ingenuity expended upon it. Side by side with this result, which the author seeks in no wise to disguise, we may place the favorable judgment pronounced by him on the work of the editor as it lies before us in the present book: "The editor has created a work which in its richness and the variety of its scenes, in dramatic tension and progress of action, seeks its equal. He has succeeded, above all, to pervade the whole with a uniform sentiment and a fervor of spirit by which even at the present day every susceptible reader feels himself carried away." Will it not require more than the arguments hitherto adduced to convince us that a book so confessedly homogeneous in its parts and so artistic in its structure is not also a unit in its origin? Finally, a peculiar difficulty arises for the author from the statement of Irenæus, that John continued to live until the reign of Trajan. This involves nothing less than that the editor ventured to take the work of John, while the latter was still living, and by combining it with the Jewish Apocalypse and otherwise manipulating it, to make out of it a totally new composition. That this could be done under the eyes of the venerable disciple and in a circle where his writings possessed the highest authority seems to us utterly incredible. Weiss himself is fully aware of this difficulty. With commendable candor he suggests that he could easily have avoided it by calling in question the correctness of the Irenæus tradition, but did not feel at liberty to resort to such a violent measure.

It is a merit of all attempts to analyze a text into its alleged component parts that it compels both the analyst and his readers to inspect the contents more minutely and painstakingly than is otherwise apt to be the case. In this respect the modern critical treatment of the Biblical writings has yielded a rich harvest, quite irrespective of the soundness or unsoundness of its main contentions. And in this respect we believe that the treatise before us has a value which will remain, even if all its critical positions should be overthrown. The study of it gives one a better acquaintance with and a warmer love for the Apocalypse.

Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

DER BEGRIFF DER GNADE IM NEUEN TESTAMENT. Eine biblisch-theologisch Untersuchung, von R. VÖMEL, Pfarrer in Gmiten (Rheinland).—TERTULLIAN'S DOGMATISCHE UND ETHISCHE GRUNDANSCHAUUNGEN. Von Dr. theol. WILHELM VOLLERT, Gymnasial-Oberlehrer in Gera. Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1903. Svo, pp. 83.

These two essays form the fifth part of the seventh annual volume of the well-known *Beiträge zur Forderung christlicher Theologie*, published under the editorship of Drs. A. Schlatter and H. Cremer. The first of them follows the usage of the word "grace" through the New Testament—in Luke, Paul, Hebrews, Peter, John and the Apocalypse, James and Jude—with a view to discovering the exact sense in which the term is used and the exact significance it has therefore in the religion of the New Testament. Although this investigation was already complete when Dieckmann's comprehensive work on *Die christliche Lehre von der Gnade* was published (1901), yet it may be taken as a reply to that author's contention that the term "grace" is employed in two senses in the New Testament—a wider and a narrower. Pastor Vömel, on the contrary, thinks that throughout the New Testament "grace" bears the single sense of God's saving activity, which has reached its goal only when all who are made partakers of grace are perfected in the Father's house. In Paul, he thinks, nevertheless, the significance of "grace" is most richly developed. The investigation is carried through in some detail and is interesting.

The second paper in the pamphlet attempts to bring together Tertullian's fundamental dogmatic and ethical ideas in a consecutive statement—much as Tertullian would have himself set them forth if he had been led to write a brief outline of his belief. Naturally this gives us a very readable summary, free from the dryness of most compendious summaries. Perhaps in some points, as in Tertullian's Logos doctrine and his attempt at the construction of a doctrine of the Trinity, something in the way both of fullness and of appreciation is left to be desired. At the end a brief criticism is passed on Tertullian's views.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

THE JOHANNEAN PROBLEM. A Résumé for English Readers. By Rev. GEORGE W. GILMORE, A.M., Professor of English Biblical Exegesis and Criticism in Bangor Theological Seminary. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication and Sabbath-school Work, 1895. Pp. 124. Price, \$1.00.

The reissue of this little handbook should prove helpful to those who are studying and teaching the Gospel of John in the Sabbath-schools. It gives a concise and clear review of two fundamental questions in which every student of the Gospel of John will be interested, the antiquity and the authorship of the Gospel. After discussing briefly the criticism of the Gospel, the evidence for its early origin and use is set forth. Beginning with Irenæus at the close of the second century, the Gospel is traced back through the Apologists and early Gnostics to the close of the first century and to Asia Minor, where tradition tells us the apostle John spent the closing years of his life. The external evidence for the Ephesian residence of the apostle and his authorship of the Gospel is given, and this is found to be supported by internal indications which prove that the author must have been a Palestinian Jew who knew well the geographical, political, social and religious conditions of Palestine before the year 70. The Gospel does not name its author, but by a process of exclusion the internal indications of authorship are shown to point to the apostle John.

On p. 15, l. 4, "second half of the second century" should be read for "second half of the first century"; on p. 49, l. 4, "from" for "fre"; on p. 65, the citation from Ignatius, Ephesians, chap. xi, weakens the argument, because taken from the longer and undoubtedly interpolated Greek recension. The statement of the external evidence is, however, as in the case of Dr. Drummond's recent book on

the Fourth Gospel, the strongest feature of the book. It is, perhaps, a little too much to expect a more satisfactory discussion of the internal evidence in so small a handbook, and yet this is the most vital aspect of the Johannean problem to-day.

Princeton.

WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.

THE OLD TESTAMENT STORY (four volumes). Vol. 1: THE PATRIARCHAL AGE—GENESIS. By MARY W. BROWNSON, A.B., Professor of English Bible, Pennsylvania College for Women. W. A. Wilde Co. 75 cts.

Good text-books for teaching the various contents of the Bible are extremely rare. It seems easy to present matters so simple and so familiar, but practically it proves one of the most difficult tasks. Either the bare historic facts are given, with the ethical and religious teaching eliminated or obscured, or, on the other hand, we have a volume of religious essays or pious exhortations. When these errors have been happily avoided, we have, too frequently, a book intended for all classes—suited to none.

Miss Brownson has aimed at a definite age. She has written for the Preparatory Students in Pennsylvania College for Women, girls from fifteen to seventeen years of age; and in writing for her own classes she has written for the High School age everywhere. She has brought to the work a very complete equipment—fine scholarship, the result of extensive travel and twelve years' experience in presenting this very matter to her large classes; enriched them by copious illustration; and perfected the style by repeatedly rewriting before publication. As a result she gives these volumes, which, if not the best possible text-book, is certainly the best yet offered students of the High School and Freshmen Classes. They do not preach, and they do not sentimentalize, but they do present the facts with the devout and spiritual flavor marvelously well preserved. They are scholarly but simple; accurate but interesting; up-to-date yet conservative. The publishers have done their work well. The volumes are well printed, convenient in form and size, and tastefully bound. The illustrations are well selected and fairly well printed. The one serious defect in the make-up of the book is the lack of maps. A text-book on historic subjects without maps is a tool without a handle. We hope the publishers will supply this lack in later editions.

Pittsburg.

S. A. MARTIN.

IV.—HISTORICAL THEOLOGY.

A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN EPISCOPAL METHODISM. By JOHN J. TIGERT, D.D., LL.D. Second Edition, Revised and Enlarged. Nashville, Tenn., and Dallas, Tex.: Publishing House of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, 1904. 8vo, pp. 12, 626.

The well-known author of this portly volume has rendered not only his denomination but also the cause of American historical scholarship in general a really eminent service by this republication in enlarged and revised form of his monumental work of the same title issued in 1893. Two new chapters on hotly contested questions—the General Conferences of 1840 and 1844, resulting in the organization of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South—and the important series of appendices on legal, constitutional and historical matters are the chief additions to the size and value of the original edition. But the whole text has been overhauled, the literature is brought up to date, and the results of the most recent investigations are carefully weighed. The author has likewise reaffirmed the chief conclusions of his own parallel work, published in 1898, on *The Making of Methodism: Studies in the Genesis of Institutions*. The volume before us will

take high rank as a piece of solid historical work that has long needed to be done. We surmise, however, that the author's brethren in the North will not be inclined to regard his account of the disruption of 1845 as the last word that is to be said on that mournful topic. We cannot presume, indeed, to pass upon the merits of the points in controversy, but there can be no doubt that the historian's purpose to present an unbiased narrative, free from the controversial spirit, has not been so successfully carried out in the latter as in the former portion of his work. It must be acknowledged, however, that the author presents a strong case in behalf of the constitutionality of the organization of the Southern Branch of the Methodist Episcopal Church.

The style is clear and vigorous, but unnecessarily monotonous and devoid of the graces of historiography. Every student of American Methodism will have to reckon with this instructive and authoritative work; but few, we fear, will not have occasion to regret that the learned author did not make his pages more delightful reading.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

MEN OF THE COVENANT. The Story of the Scottish Church in the Years of the Persecution. By ALEXANDER SMELLIE, M.A., author of *In the Hour of Silence*. With Thirty-seven Illustrations. Second Edition. Fleming H. Revell Company, 1904. 8vo; pp. viii, 426.

It is a most admirable series of character-sketches that make up this handsome volume. Without aiming to write a scientific history of those stirring years in the Scotch Church that followed the Restoration of Charles II in 1660, and addressing himself to the general reader rather than to the informed scholar, Mr. Smellie has signally succeeded in his modest purpose of summoning "from the shadows which begin to gather about them some stalwart and noble figures in whose fellowship it is good to linger." For surely even the most partisan defender of the Stuarts and their ecclesiastical policy in Scotland cannot make the acquaintance of such men as Samuel Rutherford, Archibald Campbell, James Guthrie and Archibald Johnston without being forced to admire with fresh enthusiasm those sterling qualities that have made the members of the Scottish Kirk an object of pride to all their Presbyterian brethren. The style is racy, popular, full of romantic interest, yet breathing a deeply religious spirit, and adorned not seldom with a quaintness of phraseology that is in most admirable keeping with the knightly theme. The tone is, on the whole, one of moderation and frankness, in spite of the author's avowal of strong Whigism. The illustrations, executed as a labor of love by an artistic namesake of the writer's, are admirable reproductions of original portraits and drawings. Notwithstanding its uncritical nature, the book deserves a wide popularity for its felicitous treatment of those Scotch worthies who so nobly fought the fight of faith in the stormy period after the Restoration.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

INAUGURATION OF THE REV. HENRY E. DOSKER, D.D., AS PROFESSOR IN THE SCHOOL OF ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY IN THE PRESBYTERIAN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY OF KENTUCKY, AT LOUISVILLE, KY., MAY 2, 1904. Pph., pp. 29.

Dr. Dosker's *Inaugural Address* discusses the practical problem of "The Place of Ecclesiastical History in the Seminary Curriculum." After a brief historical survey of the old-fashioned theological course that centred in "Theologia, Ecclesia, Biblia, Rhetorica," the question is raised whether this scheme of studies stands in need of anything like the radical transformation which in these days is so often clamored for by rationalistic critics. The case is thus put: "Shall we abolish the historic scheme of theological studies, devitalizing theology, emasculate

lating exegesis, flattening our homiletics into a sociological whirligig, abolishing our historic studies and substituting for them a roundelay of contemporaneous Church-gossip, in which each Church shall complacently regard itself and softly stroke down the other, trying to forget *what* she is and *why* and *what for*? God forbid! Especially as regards Church life, there is in America an appalling lack of the historic spirit, a lack which is noted by all foreign observers, as is witnessed by the foreign reports of our great ecclesiastical meetings."

Prof. Dosker speaks with the wisdom of experience when he treats of the method of teaching Church History in our seminaries. He rightly contends that the work of the regular student must be "genetic and general, rather than specific and exhaustive." The special studies must be undertaken in post-graduate courses. In speaking of the usefulness of this discipline the writer magnifies its apologetic value—perhaps too much so to accord either with the truly scientific spirit that ought to animate the work, or with the value that inheres in the discipline as an end in itself—while other advantages are not stated with sufficient fullness and emphasis. But we forbear making any detailed criticism of the *Address*, for its extreme brevity—it occupies only fifteen pages—has allowed Prof. Dosker to present only the more salient features of his practical theme, and that only by way of suggestive and not detailed treatment.

The pamphlet contains also the "Inaugural Prayer" by Dr. P. H. Hoge, of Louisville, Ky., and the "Charge to the Professor" by Dr. J. G. Hunter, of Harrodsburg, Ky.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

A HISTORY OF AMERICAN REVIVALS. By FRANK GRENVILLE BEARDSLEY, S.T.D. American Tract Society, 1904. 8vo, pp. 324.

In sixteen chapters of very unequal length and interest Dr. Beardsley has furnished "within modest limits a simple and straightforward account of the great revivals and revival movements characteristic of our national religious history." Without aiming at an exhaustive or critical treatment of this large subject, but with a deeply religious interest as his motive power, and an ample historical knowledge from which to draw, our author has produced a highly instructive and readable volume. Every Princetonian will be especially gratified by the generous recognition which the writer has accorded to the religious influences that have emanated from Nassau Hall and the Theological Seminary from the very birth of these institutions, the former of which may be regarded as a direct offspring of the "Great Awakening" of 1740 and the latter as at least a foster-daughter of the Revival of 1800.

The style, unfortunately, is often marred by an unpardonable looseness, as, for example, in such a sentence as the following (p. 49): "Abhorrent as such doctrines are to this age, when presented by a mind of such logical force and acumen as that of Mr. Edwards, they were calculated to be tremendously effective." Not seldom, too, the flow of the narrative dwindles into the shallow feebleness of mere annals. The first chapter on "The Genesis of Revivals" bears a misleading caption, and is so remotely connected with the main theme that we are inclined to say it would have pleased us more had the author at once plunged *in medias res*, and not tried, in these introductory seven pages, to "consider briefly and somewhat cursorily the great revivals which have characterized the growth and development of religion" from the days of Enosh, through Jewish, Apostolic, Mediæval and Reformation history up to Puritanism.

But the chapters on the most important topics, such as the "Great Awakening" of 1734 to 1740, and the Revivals of 1800 and 1857, and the more modern "Lay Movement in Revivals," are full of varied interest. The great personalities—Jonathan Edwards, George Whitefield, Charles G. Finney and Dwight L. Moody—

stand out in strong relief against a noble army of less celebrated Christian warriors. The specific peculiarities of the most important revivals, such as the antecedent events leading up to the awakening, the diversity of means employed, and the final results attained are set forth with admirable discrimination. Thus in connection with the "Great Awakening of 1800" the fact is emphasized that at least in New England there were "no evangelists or protracted meetings, nor were extraordinary methods of any character resorted to. . . . There were no anxious seats, nor was there any attempt to influence the unconverted to commit themselves in public as seekers after religion." The extravagances connected with many of these seasons of religious excitement are frankly admitted, but in no case is suspicion cast upon the genuineness or real worth of the historic revivals. The denominational issue, as might be expected in a fair-minded work on such a subject, is a matter of altogether subordinate importance, but, of course, truth to history must accord the most generous treatment to the Congregationalists, the Presbyterians and the Methodists. An Index, combining topical with personal items, facilitates reference to the many officers in this long series of religious campaigns, as well as to the numerous strategic points of assault and the varied tactics employed in the different regions. We heartily concur in the conclusion to which the author's inductive study of the facts has led him: "These three elements, Prayer, the Outpouring of the Holy Spirit, and the Presentation of Gospel Truth, constitute the invariable characteristics of all true revivals from Pentecost to the present time. It is safe to presume, therefore, that there never will be revivals of any great value to the Church of Christ without relying upon these conditions which seem indispensable." We gladly recommend the book, in spite of its literary deficiencies, as an admirable reference volume on the subject of "American Revivals."

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

DR. MARTIN LUTHERS BRIEFE NEBST DEN WICHTIGSTEN BRIEFEN, DIE AN IHN GERICHTET SIND, UND EINIGEN ANDEREN EINSCHLAGENDEN INTERESSANTEN SCHRIFTSTÜCKEN. Briefe vom Jahre 1533 bis 1546. Nachlese. Nachtrag zu den Briefen vom April, 1531, bis zum Juli, 1536. Auf Neue herausgegeben im Auftrag des Ministeriums der deutschen ev.-luth. Synode vom Missouri, Ohio und anderen Staaten. St. Louis, Mo.: Concordia Publishing House, 1904. 4to, pp. xxiii, columns 1794 to 3519. (Volume XXIb of Luther's Sämmtliche Schriften.)

The first half of this volume was briefly noticed in this REVIEW in the January issue of 1904. It is needless to state that the same high scholarship that has characterized all the preceding tomes is here also everywhere in evidence: in the careful chronological and topical indexes, in the painstaking translations of the letters into modern German, in the elaborate critical apparatus, as well as in the many improvements that have been made in the text itself.

By far the larger portion of the volume is devoted to Luther's letters from the year 1538 to his death in 1546, together with about two hundred letters addressed to him, including one from Calvin, twenty from Philip of Hesse, twenty-five from Melancthon, and eighty-one from Elector John Frederick of Saxony. The "gleanings" that follow these letters are taken from the original Halle edition of Johann Georg Walch. Thirty-seven documents are here reprinted, many of prime historical importance, such as Spalatin's account of Luther's interview with Cardinal Cajetan and of the transactions at the Diet of Augsburg in 1530, Justus Jonas' letter to the Elector announcing Luther's death, Bugenhagen's funeral sermon, and Cruciger's translation of Melancthon's eulogy at the burial of Luther. The "Supplement" contains epistolary additions and emendations based upon the ninth and tenth volumes of the *Erlanger Briefwechsel*, the late appearance of

which prevented the incorporation of these important data at the proper place in the work before us.

We heartily congratulate the editors on having at length, after twenty-four years of arduous labor, completed their monumental edition of Luther's entire literary output. Some of the volumes, to be sure, contain rather heterogeneous elements, but such infelicities in the matter of arrangement in no wise detract from the high excellence of the work as a whole. We fully concur in the pious wish of the editor, that God may grant "that these glorious writings be read, too, with diligence, in order that by the aid of the divinely enlightened Luther we may more and more attain the right understanding of the divinely inspired Scriptures, and, like him, grasp and retain them with a fervent faith."

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

LIFE AND LETTERS OF MANDELL CREIGHTON. By HIS WIFE Longmans, Green & Co. In two volumes, 8vo; pp. xii, 416; vii, 536.

This is the story of an active and versatile career. The lives of English Bishops have a more than ecclesiastical interest. Their education brings them into close contact with the university and literary life of their country; their place on the bench of Bishops, with political and Parliamentary affairs; so that they often gain, in matters of State, a distinction hardly inferior to that afforded by their position in the Church. The life of Dr. Creighton is a good example of this. The Oxford which he knew was not that of Keble and Newman; it was the Oxford which had been deeply affected by the liberal influences of the latter half of the century—the Oxford of Jowett and Pattison. This nascent skepticism was counterbalanced, however, by the conservatism of the Chapter of Christ Church, and by the leading minds of Creighton's own college, among whom were Wallace and Caird, the pioneers of the Hegelian movement in England.

After years spent as Fellow and Tutor of Merton, Creighton became Vicar of a small country parish on the Northumbrian coast. The living was in the gift of the college, and it was accepted with the hope that it might prove favorable to the quiet pursuit of learning, far removed from the distractions and demands of Oxford life. From this retreat he was called to be a Canon of Worcester, and soon afterward his reputation as a scholar and historian made him a rival candidate to Freeman for the Regius Professorship of History at Oxford, which had been left vacant by the promotion of Stubbs to the See of Chester. Freeman was appointed to the place, but Creighton received the high compliment of being chosen, although he was an Oxford man, to take the Dixie Chair of Church History at Cambridge, where he became also Fellow of Emmanuel College. Seven years later he succeeded the eloquent Dr. Magee as Bishop of Peterborough; and at length, in 1896, Lord Salisbury transferred him to London, where he remained until his death in 1900.

Although not a great preacher, Creighton was a man of extraordinary industry and shrewdness, with catholic taste and many-sided sympathies. He passed from the most trivial to the most serious pursuits: now we find him playing "bridge," now investigating the remote causes of the Reformation; at one moment enthusiastic over George Sand's latest novel, at another discussing the mystery of the sacraments. He was an intense amateur of the fine arts, almost an æsthete, a student of Dante an energetic worker in all kinds of social reform. He was a familiar and welcome visitor in the rude cottages of the northern fishermen, and the guest and friend of the Queen and royal family. He took time in the midst of his busy life to go often to Italy, for whose history and literature he had a singular enthusiasm.

In 1886 he came to America as the representative of Emmanuel College at the John Harvard celebration; and many will recall his graceful response to Mr.

Lowell's words of welcome. In 1896 he had the difficult task of representing the English Church at the coronation of the Czar. He wrote a graphic account of this ceremony, at the Queen's request, the substance of which appeared in the *Cornhill Magazine*.

In his earlier years Creighton was an advanced High Churchman. But while his sympathies were always with a ritual of ceremony and beauty, he was a liberal and tolerant prelate, and was on friendly terms with men of different creeds and sects. As Bishop of London he was necessarily concerned with the perennial disputes about ritual which have made the palace at Fulham a storm-centre in the Anglican communion. It is difficult not to be impatient that a man of such natural gifts and wide scholarship should have had to pay so much attention to the "anise and cummin" of ritualistic practices. Many pages of the biography are given up to a consideration of such momentous issues as the ceremonial use of incense and the use of wafer bread in the sacrament.

As an historian Creighton was painstaking and accurate rather than brilliant. His style was clear and often epigrammatic. But he belonged to the school of Stubbs. His aim was to give, not a picturesque, but a truthful narrative of the periods which engaged his attention. His chief work was a *History of the Papacy* during the period of the Reformation. It is distinguished by precise scholarship and impartiality. It was quite characteristic of him to write to a friend: "Alexander VI was an unscrupulous politician, but not a villain; and Cesare Borgia was neither better nor worse than most other folk. All this is very dull to have to record. I would gladly denounce the abominations if I found them there. At present all that can be said of me is, that I left a dull period of history as dull as I found it." It is not strange, then, that in spite of a strong prejudice against the Roman Catholic system, Creighton rarely gave offense to the Roman Catholic reader. His scientific method removed him far from hero-worship, and led him to seek the causes of events in general movements rather than in the efforts of individual men.

While a Fellow of Merton, Creighton was led by his marriage engagement to petition the authorities for a change in the rules; for at that time celibacy was required of the College Fellows. Pending the settlement of the matter, he was much annoyed that three other Dons should announce their purpose to marry, and should seek the same relief from their associates at Merton. It gave the impression that matrimony was epidemic in the college.

One is impressed by Creighton's freedom from hypocrisy and cant. As the present Master of Balliol once said of him: "Creighton possesses common sense in a degree which amounts to genius." When Mr. Kensit, who is well known on both sides of the Atlantic as a disturber of ritualistic services, interrupted the Bishop because the latter wore a mitre at a Confirmation, he was treated with great good humor. Creighton shook hands with him at the church door, "saying that he was sure they would understand one another when they got to know one another."

His visit to America delighted him. There is at times an undercurrent of satire in the letters relating to his visit; but he gave some offense at home by holding up the American students as models to the men of Cambridge. The amount of public speaking here surprised him. He writes: "The various festivities begin to-day; the amount of talk required in America seems quite appalling. Orations and sermons are to abound. . . . Everybody wants to show me something or explain something, till my brain reels and I can scarce contain my knowledge." "The dinner speeches afterward lasted interminably; truly the Americans are an oratorical race, and no Englishman could venture to compete in tall talk."

Mrs. Creighton has done her work in a very satisfactory manner. In many parts of the narrative the Bishop's letters are made to tell the story. The choice

of letters worthy of publication is not always easy for the biographer, and in this case Creighton's correspondence might have been used less liberally, as it is of unequal merit and interest. Not the least attractive part of the biography is a digression giving an account of Embleton, the scene of Creighton's first work in a parish. Mrs. Creighton's vivid picture of its population of fishermen, its natural beauty, gives one a high opinion of her powers of description.

Dr. Johnson said of biographies that "what is known can seldom be immediately told; and when it might be told, it is no longer known." In these volumes we are told all that needed to be told, and we make the acquaintance of a scholar and man of action, an Englishman of high and wholesome character.

New York.

ARCHIBALD ALEXANDER.

ISLAM AND THE ORIENTAL CHURCHES: THEIR HISTORICAL RELATIONS. Students' Lectures on Missions, Princeton Theological Seminary, 1902-3. By WILLIAM AMBROSE SHEDD, M.A., Missionary of the American Presbyterian Church to Persia. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication and Sabbath-school Work, 1904. 12mo; pp. vii, 253. \$1.25 net.

These lectures give a brief narrative of the long and sanguinary struggles that have marked the course of conflict between the two great faiths of the crescent and the cross; they give a summary view of the present status of affairs; they enumerate some of the causes that account for the defeat which Christianity has suffered at the hands of Islam; and they state telling and striking opinions regarding the stern duty of Christianity to reassert and reestablish its supremacy in the East. The tone of the book throughout is one of candor and bespeaks a scholarly and sympathetic grasp upon the subject. The fact, moreover, that the author has lived and labored many years in the very field of action is by itself a guarantee that he knows whereof he speaks.

As a problem of missions Muhammadanism is perhaps by all odds the most stirring and trying one that confronts the Christian world. One phase of this is the vast numbers of the Islam constituency. "To say that the most elaborate investigation ever made into the statistics of Islam resulted in the conclusion that the Muhammadans number two hundred and sixty millions, or over fifteen per cent. of the population of the globe, is dealing in figures too large to be definitely significant to the mind" (p. 3). Another phase of the problem, in the words of the author, is the melancholy interest which attaches to this faith, that it alone can claim to have met and vanquished Christianity. Thus all history teaches the one lesson: that conflict between these two faiths was, and still is, inevitable. And this conflict borrows its seriousness, especially in our times, in no small measure, from the fact that the Islam has so long resisted and so broadly repelled the approaches of the Christian faith. Victors, as a rule, do not easily bow to the supremacy of those whom once they have conquered. Though in close contact for centuries, and though from its very inception Islam has been influenced by Christianity, these two faiths have remained distinct and antagonistic." And history shows no tendency to agreement, but rather "that the limits set by Muhammad in the Quran to the acceptance of Christian teaching and the limits set in his practice to the principle of religious freedom are permanent and essential elements of Islam. It shows, furthermore, that while Islam is capable of very great modification, the supremacy of Muhammad is challenged only by those outside its pale" (p. 208). And since the supremacy of Jesus Christ is challenged only by those outside the Christian pale, "the point of conflict is one of the first importance to both religions. Because the differences are defined and limited, the conflict is the sharper. Neither faith can compromise. The ultimate question is the personal supremacy of Muhammad or of Christ."

But "the very difficulty of the task" the author brings forward as one of the foremost incentives to a more enthusiastic missionary effort. Another incentive

is "the courageous persistence with which Oriental Christians have held the faith" (p. 210); as well as "the failures of Christianity in times past to hold and to gain its supremacy. Nothing can be gained by attempting to conceal the failures of Christianity in Western Asia. And much is to be gained by learning the causes of its failure." But Islam, too, has failed. "Nothing reveals character more surely than success, and no failure is so fundamental as failure in success. Islam has so failed" (p. 211). "The Turk remains a menace to the world. The failure of Islam calls for the Gospel" (p. 212), and in its very best forms. "The Christianity to meet Islam must be the best and strongest possible" (p. 219). But "the real conqueror of the world is Christ, and the real force of conquest is His Spirit. The truth that Islam lacks is found in Him. Muhammad stands on no level with Christ. We cannot but agree with Joseph Parker in saying: 'There are comparative religions, but Christianity is not one of them'" (p. 226).

To reap, however, the benefit of the study of this subject the book must be read. We consider it a timely as well as a valuable contribution to mission literature.

Princeton, N. J.

J. HENDRIK DE VRIES.

THE STORY OF THE SCOTTISH COVENANTS IN OUTLINE. By D. HAY FLEMING, LL.D. Edinburgh and London: Oliphant, Anderson & Ferrier, 1904. 4to; pp. xii. 84,

When the publishers were preparing the recent edition of the late Rev. J. H. Thomson's *Martyr Graves of Scotland*, they went to the best informed man in Scotland to get an introduction for it. Naturally this introduction proved to have a value of its own: and it can surprise no one that it has been found well to issue it also independently—revised and considerably enlarged, as befits a separate publication. It is presented to us in this beautifully printed and manufactured volume.

Of course, Dr. Hay Fleming has given us a lucid and sympathetic account of the Covenant life of Scotland. Few realize the part played, not only in the history of Scotland, but in the lives of Scottish men and women—yes, and even of children—by what we may call the Covenant habit. It is all illustrated here: and it is not easy to rise from the perusal of these quiet but intense pages without a deepened sense of the seriousness of the life with God which those old-time people lived, or without a deepened sense of what by this life with God they have purchased for us all, in tears and fire and blood. Times change: and with the changing times methods also change. Perhaps, the exact methods of the Scottish Covenanters may not be revived. Is it too much to hope that the world may again see the revival of somewhat of their spirit? The day seems fast making down on us when, if there is no revival of their spirit, we shall apparently have to suffer the loss of most that they gained for us by their toil and suffering.

Princeton.

BENJ. B. WARFIELD.

HANDBOOKS FOR SENIOR CLASSES: THE SCOTTISH REFORMATION. By D. HAY FLEMING, LL.D. Edinburgh: Scottish Reformation Society, 1903. 32mo, pp. viii, 103.

It is not often that "handbooks for senior classes" are prepared by the chief authorities in the topics treated. Nor is it often that such authorities prove themselves able to deal with their special subjects in a fashion that adapts them to the instruction of "senior classes." In Dr. Hay Fleming's little handbook on *The Scottish Reformation*, however, the thing is accomplished to admiration. No living man has a more detailed or profounder acquaintance with the Scottish Reformation. Even this little handbook has been written directly out of the sources. And it is written so as to attract, entertain and meet the needs of the

special class for which it is prepared. It is an instance in which first-hand knowledge brightens the page, instead of clogging the narrative.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

MALTBIE DAVENPORT BABCOCK. *A Reminiscent Sketch and Memorial.* By CHARLES E. ROBINSON, D.D. New York, Chicago, Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Company; London and Edinburgh. 8vo, pp. 161.

This is a lifelike picture of a truly admirable man and minister. We see at once that many-sidedness and superabounding vitality were the distinguishing natural characteristics of Dr. Babcock, but that what made him the "prince and the strong man" that all felt him to be was that he was literally "full of the Holy Ghost and of faith." The only defect in Dr. Robinson's portrait is that there is no shade in it. There is not even a suggestion of any conflict with evil. Dr. Babcock does not appear to have had any besetting sins. The character drawn is from the beginning so perfect as to discourage, perhaps, rather than stimulate. We almost feel as if he were not a being of "like parts and passions" with ourselves. Yet, on the whole, the story is truthfully as well as brilliantly told. We cannot help wishing that we might have a "reminiscent sketch and memorial" of that other mighty man of God who passed to his reward so soon after Dr. Babcock, Dr. George T. Purves.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

THEOLOGISCHER JAHRESBERICHT. Zweiundzwanzigster Band, 1902. Herausgegeben von Dr. G. KRÜGER und Lic. Dr. W. KOEHLER in Giessen. IV. Abteilung: KIRCHENGESCHICHTE, bearbeitet von ERWIN PREUSSEN, GUSTAV KRÜGER, OTTO CLEMEN, WALTHER KOEHLER, JOHANNES WERNER, ERNST ISSEL. Berlin: C. A. Schwetschke und Sohn; New York: G. E. Stechert, 1903. 8vo, pp. xi, 553 (377-929).

Although dated in 1903 this part of the *Jahresbericht* for 1902 did not reach us until 1904 was well on its way: and not even yet (at the moment of writing, viz., in March, 1904) have the subsequent parts (dealing with Systematic and Practical Theology) reached us. This is unexampled delay of issue for this ordinarily very prompt annual survey. The compass of the work, on the other hand, continues to increase. The exegetical sections, to be sure, remain somewhat small; but the historical section has swollen, as will be noted, to 550 pages. The greater portion of it is given to modern history. The period since 1648 absorbs 225 pages; while that between the Reformation and 1648 occupies 125 more. Nearly 150 more are absorbed by the Middle Ages, leaving only some 67 in all for the whole Patristic period. The works passed under review are for the most part admirably abstracted, and altogether the book sustains the high reputation of the series.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

THEOLOGISCHER JAHRESBERICHT. Dreiundzwanzigster Band, 1903. IV. Abteilung: KIRCHENGESCHICHTE, bearbeitet von PREUSCHEN, CLEMEN, KOCH, KÖHLER, ARNOLD, WERNER, ISSEL, KRÜGER. Berlin: C. A. Schwetschke und Sohn, 1904; New York: G. E. Stechert & Co. 8vo, pp. x, 446 (pp. 321-766 of the whole work).

This invaluable annual index to theological literature is too well-known to require description here. It is enough to chronicle the, if somewhat tardy (February, 1905), yet most welcome appearance of this part of the volume dealing with the literature of 1903. The titles have been collected with the greatest diligence, and the estimates have been made with remarkable painstaking.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

V.—SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

THE TEACHING OF THE GOSPEL OF JOHN. By J. RITCHIE SMITH, Minister of Market Square Presbyterian Church, Harrisburg, Pa. New York, Chicago, Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Company [1904*]. 8vo, pp. 406.

It is a delight to receive such gifts from the pastorate as this excellent study of the teaching of John's Gospel. It is one of the evils which grow out of the limitations of finite humanity that the scientific exegesis and the practical exposition of Scripture fall commonly into different hands. We shall not turn aside now to remark upon the gain that would accrue, we do not say to the ordinary run of sermons, but to the best the pulpit gives us, if a little more scientific exegesis lay at their foundation. It is more to the point to emphasize here the failure of not a little scientific exegesis through the absence of the practical interest. How much critical work, otherwise good, jangles with the harsh thinness of a gong because there is no depth of religious atmosphere beneath it to give musical richness to the vibrations. We have often felt, when poring over the pages of Scripture for scientific purposes, that we should need to preach over the whole extent of the passages in contemplation before we could attain confidence in the results of our exegesis. The attitude of mind which belongs to the practical expounder of religion is essential to the assimilation of the message of the Word, we do not say merely in its fullness, but even in its general color and chief relations. There is nothing strange in this. The Bible is a book of practical religion: it is addressed to this end and adapted to this purpose: and we must work our way into its meaning, if at all, along the lines of its own structure. It is the felicity of Dr. Smith that he has been able to prosecute scientific research in John's Gospel under a constant demand upon him for an application of its teaching to the practical needs of God's people. Out of the interaction of these two lines of work this good book has come.

Of course we are not going to say it is a perfect book. Dr. Smith would repudiate this imputation himself. The carping critic is apt to declare that it suffers from its double motive, and is neither quite scientific enough for the critical student nor quite practical enough for purely religious impression. We ourselves disagree with it in some specific points—not many and not seriously—and of course think it could be improved in these. But he would be an exigent reader who did not find both pleasure and profit in its reading and who could close it with any other exclamation than, This is a notably good book. Dr. Smith has given long and loving study to John's Gospel and spreads the rich fruitage he has gathered here before his readers: not at random, as one opens his notebook recklessly and pours its undigested contents upon a long-suffering public, but with careful regard to the impression to be made and through the vehicle of an attractive style, worked out through long years of experience in teaching the people. For ourselves, we can only say that the book has been a pleasure to read from beginning to end, and has carried with it on every page its profitable message.

For its proper valuation we must, naturally, attend to the author's express purpose in writing it. "It is the purpose of this volume," we read in the Introduction (p. 7), "to set forth the teaching of the Gospel that bears the name of John." Further: "Our purpose is . . . purely exegetical and expository, concerned only with the analysis and exhibition of the material that the Gospel presents" (p. 7). Were these statements to be taken strictly, we should expect

* No date on the title-page. The copyright certificate on the back of title says March, 1903. This may be a misprint. The book actually appeared in mid-April, 1904.

to find in the volume an essay in technical "Biblical Theology"—a purely objective study of the points of view and details of teaching of the Gospel of John. Dr. Smith does not permit us to go through the Introduction, however, with this impression. The other writings of John, he tells us at once (p. 7), have also been drawn upon, though no attempt has been made to present their teaching exhaustively. And not the other writings of John merely. "I have not hesitated to transgress the limits which a strictly scientific method might impose," we read (p. 20), "and draw upon the general teaching of the New Testament when it seemed necessary to complete the thought of John"; "and even to venture upon the debatable ground of ecclesiastical history" (p. 20). In effect, Dr. Smith has not written an essay in "Biblical Theology," but an essay in "Systematic Theology." He has not given us a historico-critical study of the mind of John, but a thoughtful exposition of Divine truth, chiefly on the basis of the deposit of it made in John.

If the reader will not find in the volume, however, a technical piece of "Biblical Theology," he will find in it the admirably stated results of much careful and thoughtful exegetical study of John. Even the processes of exegesis are not always entirely excluded, and Dr. Smith knows how to introduce them with excellent effect. Some chapters might fairly be said to be attempts to ascertain and state the doctrine of John historically. Generally, however, a sense of the perennial value of the truth drawn from John predominates, and the author is even more intent on presenting it to favorable consideration as truth than on enunciating it as John's. And he constantly seeks to illustrate, complete and support it from the remaining Scriptures. What he presents to us in the end is, therefore, a systematically arranged statement of doctrine, derived principally from John's Gospel, but rendered more symmetrical, complete and convincing by an appeal to other sources for material to fill in lacunæ and to illuminate and enforce the whole. It would be too much to say that the book thus becomes Dr. Smith's Confession of Faith. It would even be too much to say that it contains the entire body of doctrine he would have formulated had he formally made the entire New Testament, or the entire Scriptural deposit, the basis of the exposition. The choice of John's Gospel specifically as its basis has no doubt affected the extent of the doctrinal construction as well as the forms of its development. It is very much as if Dr. Smith had set himself to discover what kind of a system of doctrine and what extent of a system of doctrine could be framed on the basis of John's Gospel alone; and had determined to draw on other sources only so far as seemed needful to give completeness and force to the result.

The result is certainly very interesting when viewed from this point of sight. Dr. Smith, in his deep and sympathetic study of John's Gospel, has found, to speak briefly, that that Gospel teaches the Reformed system of doctrine. It cannot be said that he has made it teach this system of doctrine. Dr. Smith's exegesis is notably independent. So far from lacking caution in drawing out the teaching of the text, it suffers, perhaps, a little from over-caution; or perhaps we may express it better by saying that his admirable caution in avoiding making his text teach too much is not always matched by an equal caution in avoiding making it teach too little. He is a little affected, in other words, by the modern spirit which puts the established views, so to speak, on trial, and acts as if the presumption were against them and they could be accepted only when the evidence in their favor is compelling. This spirit is certainly not corrected by his chosen guides in the exegesis of John—the best general guides that exist—Meyer, Godet and Westcott, no one of whom is a Reformed divine, not even Godet, whose mediating theology makes him in his fundamental thought distinctively Arminian. Nor yet is it corrected by the masters in Biblical Theology to whom he has naturally turned for guidance—Weiss, Bayschlag, Wendt, Stevens and the writers in Hast-

ings' *Bible Dictionary*. It is an interesting task to trace the dogmatic prejudices of these professedly objective writers, deflecting their exegesis, even if need be *vi et armis*, into anti-Reformed channels at every salient point. Dr. Smith's independence and native sturdiness of straightforward thinking has preserved him from following in the road they have hewn out; and despite their influence with him, he accordingly finds the Reformed theology in John and expounds it from John. And we may be sure he would not have found it there had it not been there to find. Possibly his wide reading has helped him to retain his balance here. Above everything else he has discovered Augustine, and has sunk himself into his rich pages with the enthusiasm of a kindred spirit. Then he has read his Calvin and his Edwards, and he knows his Hodge: and he has read and even cites repeatedly in these pages Thomas Aquinas, an unlikely source in which to seek guidance for the understanding of John, one would think, even though his admiring pupils called him the Angelic and Cherubic Doctor. We sometimes wonder whether Dr. Smith sufficiently allows for Thomas' synergism in his appeals to him (*e.g.*, p. 231); but assuredly the discussions in the *Summa* are good whetstones to sharpen one's wits upon.

We hinted above that there were some things in Dr. Smith's book with which we could not agree. We must not permit that cursory remark to stand without explanation, lest its meaning be exaggerated. With the main contents of the book we find ourselves in hearty accord. There is, of course, however, here and there a minute point of exegesis, or of exposition or of doctrinal statement, or perhaps of mere form of expression, which we would wish otherwise. For example, we do not understand how Dr. Smith could have written the sentence, "Neither the Gospel nor the New Testament pronounces judgment upon those to whom Christ has not been made known" (p. 353). To us both the Gospel of John and the New Testament at large seem to base their whole appeal to men on the fact that the world without Christ is a lost world, and to assert all that is involved in that great fundamental fact, in all the reaches of its inferential developments, not only repeatedly but pervasively. But we shall not go into these points of secondary disagreement. Let us advert to but a single one which concerns rather modes of expression than forms of belief. Dr. Smith fully believes and carefully teaches that "the initiative in salvation belongs to God, and the ultimate ground of it lies in His good pleasure" (p. 231), and that accordingly faith, the alone instrument of salvation, is a gift of God's grace. "Faith is not the cause but the effect of grace," he says explicitly (p. 226): "we are not chosen because we believe, we believe because we are chosen." Yet he has fallen into the bad habit not only of speaking of faith as "the condition of salvation," without careful explanation that this cannot mean that man is to determine his own salvation by an un-given act of faith; but even of repeatedly setting "faith" and "grace" verbally over against each other, as if they were independent factors in salvation, from the sides respectively of man and God. "Salvation is of grace upon the side of God, of faith upon the side of man" (p. 378). "Grace is the hand that God reaches down from heaven, faith is the hand that man reaches up from earth. Faith lays hold of God; but what is far more important, it gives God something to lay hold of" (p. 247). We even read: "They who are capable of penitence and faith must repent and believe, and are saved by grace through faith; they who are not capable are saved by grace alone" (p. 251)—as if all alike were not saved "by grace alone," but in the case of some it was grace *plus* faith that saved them. Surely such false antitheses are gravely misleading, and it will not be strange if some of Dr. Smith's readers, seizing hold of them and forgetting his more exact teaching, may fancy he is instructing them to believe that salvation is not of God alone, but of God and man alike, each contributing his own essential factor, by the conjunction of which alone (except in the exceptional cases of those that

die in infancy and like inability) can salvation be had. Surely we must cleanse our language as well as our hearts from the evil leaven of synergism.

It is too ungracious a task to point out faults of mere modes of statement like this in a book in which there are so few of them, and whose whole warp and woof are so good. It is better to point out the value and attractiveness of this fresh and independent study in the theology of the New Testament, and to commend it as a work which can scarcely fail to please and instruct the reader. It is on this note, therefore, that we desire to close, as it was on this note that we began, this notice.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

DE ZEKERHEID DES GELOOFS. Tweede vermeerddedruk. Door Dr. H. BAVINCK. Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1903. 12mo, pp. 105.

CHRISTELIJKE WETENSCHAP. Door Dr. H. BAVINCK. Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1904. 8vo, pp. 121.

CHRISTELIJKE WERELDBESCHOUWING. Rede bij de overdracht van het Rectoraat aan de Vrije Universiteit te Amsterdam op 20 October, 1904, gehouden door Dr. H. BAVINCK. Kampen: J. H. Bos, 1904. 8vo, pp. 101.

PAEDAGOGISCHE BEGINSELEN. Door Dr. H. BAVINCK. Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1904. 8vo, pp. 178.

The four volumes thus brought together illustrate not merely the productivity, but the vigor and the wide range of the thought of Dr. Bavinck, Professor of Dogmatic Theology in the Free University of Amsterdam. In its first edition the little treatise on the Assurance of Faith was somewhat fully noticed in the pages of this REVIEW (January, 1903, pp. 138-148), and Dr. Bavinck makes graceful mention of the notice in the Preface to this enlarged and improved edition. The treatise on Christian Science was called out by debates in the circles of the Free Reformed Churches in Holland concerning the building up of science on a Christian foundation, aroused by certain criticisms centering about the Free University at Amsterdam. The beautiful lecture on the Christian View of the World was Dr. Bavinck's rectoral address in the same university. The extended treatise on Pedagogical Principles has grown out of an address, frequently given, to which the educational problems of Holland and of the Reformed Churches in Holland gave the occasion. It will go without saying to all who know Dr. Bavinck's writings, that all these treatises are wrought out with the extremest care, are formally complete, are thoroughly thought through, and are attractively written. We content ourselves with this merely formal notice of them meanwhile, hoping to return to them, or some of them, for further study hereafter.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

THE NATURE OF THE STATE. By Dr. PAUL CARUS. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company; London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd. 1904. 8vo; pp. viii, 56. Price 15 cents (9d.).

This essay was suggested and written on the occasion of the indictment of the Homestead rioters for treason, in 1892. It appeared first in several instalments as editorial articles in *The Open Court*. Its aim is to set forth the true nature of the State as a real "superindividual" embodying and expressing more or less fully "the common will," and also the nature of treason as the attempt to subvert the existence of the State. The positions taken are admirable and are admirably maintained, especially as against the individualistic conception of Hobbes and Rousseau. The fatal defect in Dr. Carus' view of the State, which is essentially

the Christian one, is that it lacks utterly a foundation. It is based on the *jus naturale*. The State is demanded by this, it exists for this, and so it rests on this. On what, however, is the *jus naturale* based? Why is it that, according to the constitution of things, certain courses of action are felt to be necessarily right, and others necessarily wrong? This presupposes righteousness; for there could be no obligation to righteousness, if there were not righteousness. But righteousness can be predicated only of persons. Hence, for one to speak of natural law who does not believe in a personal God is absurd. Natural law is the demand of God's nature. Human rights are founded on His ordinance. The State is His institute to guarantee and develop these. This Christian view, and this only, affords the foundation which Dr. Carus' State must have if it is to stand.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

VI.—PRACTICAL THEOLOGY.

THE AINU GROUP AT THE ST. LOUIS EXPOSITION. By FREDERICK STARR.
Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1904. Pp. 118.

This richly illustrated little work is a gem for what it only shows, as well as for what it says. Prof. Starr, of Chicago, went to Yezo, the home of the Ainu in northern Japan, in quest of a group which he brought back, and which was on exhibition in St. Louis; and incidentally he made observations and notes of an anthropological kind, of which he presents a summary. The hairy Ainus were visited more than a generation ago by Miss Isabella Bird (afterward known as Mrs. Bishop) whose decease has just been announced, and of whom the London *Presbyterian* states that she was always a good friend of missions, and her interest in them grew stronger during her later years. Her work on the Ainus (called by her and others Ainos, which is not their own word, and is offensive as suggesting in Japanese that they are *dogs*), was published after she had resided among them, and it covered them with romance; she almost seemed to say that in their native state of simplicity they were good enough without Christian missionaries.

No honest reader of this little book would say so now. And the testimony of Prof. Starr is all the stronger because he went as a missionary of science and not of any kind of theology. The religious missionary is indeed very present throughout the book, but mainly as a matter of convenience to the explorer, and as a scientific illustration of the missionary's wonderful wisdom and success, and of the childlike confidence which the community place in him, because they know that he can be trusted. All these praises are only incidental to the real worth of the London youth, John Batchelor, who left his home in his twenty-fourth year, in 1879, and has lived in Yezo ever since. His proper charge was to bring the knowledge of salvation to an interesting people who were in ignorance. We here learn that he labors among both Japanese and Ainu, yet considers himself particularly called to be the apostle to the latter. He visits the villages in all parts of the island, and speaks the language better than natives; he has reduced it to grammar, and supplied a dictionary, translations of most of the Scriptures, and hymns, and written books about the people. His great trophy, however, is his church of 900 members, with the addendum that he refuses to confirm applicants whenever he is not satisfied with their manner of life. But his acquaintance and influence extend to thousands; he keeps going a temperance society, and also a hospital (a "house of rest") among them. And although the island has got a worthy Japanese governor, the word of the poor missionary seems to go with authority amongst all classes.

The Ainu are not yellow, like the Japanese, nor with the eyes turned up at

the corners, but seem to resemble Europeans; and may possibly, as the author suggests, be degenerate whites rather than ascending primevals. One of the St. Louis group gave expression to their wonder at seeing black people, some negro soldiers at a railway station at Fort Sheridan, Wyoming. He examined them closely, "and finally asked us whether the color was temporary or permanent, and then wanted to know whether it was generally distributed over the body or confined to the face and hands."

As illustrations of the habits of the people, we are told of the *inao* shavings which are deemed sacred, and which ornament places of religion, graves, and weapons of war; of the "moustache-lifter," or "libation stick," which is ceremonially used at feasts, and is like a large pencil, sculptured and lacquered in the highest style of art. Most strange is the bear-feast. A bear cub when caught very young is brought to the home and nursed from the matron's breast like a baby; when too much grown for home life, it is carefully housed and fed in a bear-cage outside. In due time all friends are summoned to the great feast, when the bear is lassoed and tortured to death, amidst laudations and prayers to it as if it were divine. It is finally skinned and boiled, and with suitable additions forms the basis of the feast. Mr. Batchelor was at one time doubtful as to whether it was really nursed at the breast; but his scruples were set at rest by observing, in one of his prayer meetings, a young bear-cub among the audience, which was handed from woman to woman for nourishment in a most commonplace and public manner. The professor's own doubts, if he still retained any, should have been dissipated when he observed in the old illustrated Japanese books of the library at Sapporo a home scene, with a babe pictured, and pointing reproachfully to its mother suckling a young bear instead of her own child.

The Japanese immigrants are now multiplying in this northern island, so as greatly to outnumber the Ainu; and by intermarriages mongrels are multiplying. "To-day the Ainu is a ward to be guarded by a paternal government, to be elevated by civilization. He is forbidden to make arrow poison, he is subject to game laws, he may no longer have his girls tattooed, he must send his children to school, he must learn the ways of industry and till the soil. It is the old story."

Prof. Starr gives a picture (in words) of Rev. John Batchelor, which ought certainly to place that missionary beside Livingston and the others, many of whom still remain; in our roll of honor. And very properly he dedicates his little jewel of a book to W. J. McGee, "who made his Ainu trip possible," and to John Batchelor, "who made it a success." When leaving Tokio, once more he brings missionaries in evidence; on this occasion they were Methodists, while in Yezo they were Episcopalians; but on the mission field, as in heaven, there is only the one sect. At Tokio a complimentary entertainment was gotten up by the mission school; speeches delivered, and sweetmeats supplied for the Ainu. The speech of one of the orators, when translated, ran thus: the speaker "recognizes that in the past the treatment of the Ainu by our own people has not always been what it should, but that the sympathy and love of the boys of the school go with the Ainu in their long journey; that we hope the professor will treat them well and see that others do the same; and we hope for their safe return; be good to the Ainu."

Princeton University.

GEORGE MACLOSIE.

CHINA'S BOOK OF MARTYRS: A Record of Heroic Martyrdoms and Marvelous Deliverances of Chinese Christians during the Summer of 1900. By LUELLA MINER, Author of *Two Heroes of Cathay*. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1903. 8vo, pp. 512.

Is there any reality in religion? Does Christianity retain its primitive power? Is the work of missions achieving any real success? Are the heathen worth sav-

ing? Is the kingdom of Christ coming? Whoever wishes for heartening answers to these and like questions which our faint-heartedness is always prompting us to ask should read this book. For here out of the very last days of the nineteenth century are set down narratives of Christian faith, steadfastness, fortitude, that may well challenge comparison with any similar records of the past. Neither under the Roman emperors of the first three centuries nor under the Inquisition was the constancy of the disciples of Jesus put to severer test than in North China during the Boxer outbreak. It is true that the persecution of the Chinese Christians by the Boxers was comparatively short, lasting only a few months, and that it was confined to a few provinces of Northern China; but within these limits of time and space it raged with a fierceness not exceeded in the history of the Church. And it was met with a steadfastness as heroic as that displayed by any of the martyrs and confessors of earlier ages. In Miss Miner's graphic narratives—narratives secured at first hand from persons who witnessed the scenes described or themselves passed through them, and which show on every leaf the watermark of truth—one may read how the Chinese Christians stood firm in their profession under insult and the spoiling of their goods, in face of peril and hardships, threats, torture, death. And this constancy was displayed not by one class only. It was shown by old men and old women, by schoolboys and schoolgirls, by educated preachers and by coolies, by the well-to-do and by the poorest. It was not confined to a few individuals, but was evinced by hundreds. It was seen not in a few localities only, but in scores of places scattered through half a dozen provinces. It was exhibited by the adherents, not of one Church, but of all the Churches. These things are worth noting, for they seem to justify us in several important remarks. The first is this, that for all fair-minded persons, and so far as North China is concerned, the sneer about "rice Christians" is scotched forever. Men and women who are offered their lives at the price of a single word or gesture that can be construed as a recantation of their faith, and yet refuse to speak that word or make that gesture, may be ignorant and imperfect; but certainly they are not insincere and mercenary.

For another thing, we may get from these narratives a new and reassuring conception of the thoroughness with which the missionaries in China have been doing their work. The test of fire has been applied to that which they have been building on the one Foundation, and the event has proved that the materials they have used were not wood, hay, stubble, but gold, silver, precious stones. Their work has not been a mere scratching of the surface, a building upon the sand. They have not been padding out their rolls with cheaply won adherents. They have not contented themselves with bringing men and women into the Church and then leaving them to a feeble and struggling spiritual life. They have been honestly grappling with difficulties. They have been dealing in real spiritual values. Their work has been thorough work. The Spirit of God has been with them in it, and the seal of divine approval has been set upon it.

Once more, may we not ask whether this steadfastness of the Christians of North China under their fiery trial has not an apologetic value? Not that martyrdom is a test of truth. There have been martyrs to error. But there are martyrs and martyrs. The man who falls sword in hand in a holy war is in a sense a martyr, but his death has a different moral value from such a death as that of Stephen. It is with martyrdoms as with miracles. To know the real meaning of either we must have regard, not to the bare fact, but to all the accompaniments of the fact. To show the martyr's steadfastness unmixed with fanaticism or hate against the persecutor, tempered by a sane anxiety to escape so long as hope of escape remains, but rising to a calm fortitude to bear the worst when hope is fled—is not this to furnish a valid argument for the truth of that which is so professed? Let the academic answer to this query be what it may, the answer of history is beyond question. The blood of such martyrs has ever been the

seed of the Church. If not to the mind, still to the heart the argument has been convincing. Such were the martyrs of China in 1900. Seed of the Church their blood has already begun to prove; and from that precious seed is yet to spring, if we may trust the judgment of those honest and clear-eyed men who made these martyrs ready for their crowns, a far richer harvest of triumph for the truth for which these died.

Pittsburgh.

CHALMERS MARTIN.

TYPICAL ELDERS AND DEACONS. By JAMES M. CAMPBELL, D.D. New York and London: Funk & Wagnalls Company, 1903. 12mo, pp. 137.

In the foreword to this book the author utters his protest against the modern novelist because he so often makes the typical deacon "a man of small calibre—something of a sneak, very much of a hypocrite, proud of his title, much given to cant, with a habit of calling upon his apprentice to sand the sugar, water the molasses, and then come into prayers." Such a representation is, the author declares, "a wicked and senseless caricature of an honorable class of men which cannot be too hotly repudiated," and he goes on to give graceful expression to "his personal thankfulness for the priceless friendships and invaluable services of the elders and deacons with whom it has been his privilege to be associated in the work of the Lord." In the "composite sketches" which follow, however, he falls into the very sin which he has rebuked. Of the twenty elders and deacons who appear in his pages, at least eight are remarkable, not for goodness or wisdom, but for vanity or censoriousness or selfishness or loquacity or intolerance or some other equally unlovely and unedifying quality. Deacon Dennison, for example, "had a way of affirming that things were all right when everyone else knew that they were all wrong. . . . He was not positively, intentionally bad, but he was weak and vacillating. . . . He usually sat upon the fence, and slid down from that place of neutrality after a question had been settled, taking care to land on the popular side. . . . He was a stuffed figure, a man of wax, a thing rather than a man. . . . His moral perceptions were decidedly blunt. He could prevaricate with as much ease as a cat laps milk." Deacon Jones, again, "tells all he knows—and more. The scarcity of his ideas is not more marked than the plethora of his words. . . . His words are from the teeth outwards." After this it is not of much comfort to be told that, "on the whole, he is a well-meaning sort of man." Deacon Simpson is described as wearing a doleful aspect and being as doleful as he looks. "He is always complaining. He carries with him a chilly and repressive atmosphere. He is happy only when nursing a grievance. Fault-finding has become with him a second nature. . . . He is exceedingly liable to take offense. He belongs to the thin-skinned variety, and is easily wounded. He is always being slighted." But let it not be thought that the deacons have any monopoly of gracelessness. Hear what is written of Elder Black. "Elder Black is said to lie awake o' nights thinking over the sins of his brethren. If anything goes wrong he is the first to see it; not that he hastens to put it right. Oh, no; that is none of his business. His Christian duty ends in exposing and denouncing whatever in his opinion is wrong. He acts as if he held a commission of prosecuting attorney for the High Court of Heaven. . . . The Elder is tall and slender, with deep-set eyes, beetling brow, bushy eyebrows, and a hooked nose of the Jewish type. Like Cassius, he hath a hungry look. . . . He has the air of being a very knowing man—a man in whom is embodied the sum total of the world's wisdom. But it is impossible to escape the conviction that no mortal can ever be half as wise as the Elder looks." But to return to the deacons, "Deacon Anderson was a swollen, pompous, bejeweled, overdressed man, with well-developed *embonpoint*. He walked with a strut, with head thrown back and nose tilted heavenward. . . . His manner awakened

the suspicion that under the lion's skin, which he wrapped so tightly about him, was concealed an unmitigated calf." "He had been able to have his own way in almost everything. He was in the habit of showing favors to church members whom he wished to get under his power. To hold his place of preëminence, he did not hesitate to resort to the methods of the ward boss. By working the wires it came about that the church, of which he was a shining light, became like a pocket borough in England, a piece of personal property—a mere appendage to his mill." We pass over Elder Skinner and Deacon Jennings, the former of whom is a narrow-minded bigot and the latter an opinionated and obstinate dogmatist, to quote a few lines from the sketch of Deacon Smith. "He is an undersized man, feline in step, and soft in voice; with small, shifty, furtive eyes, retreating chin and forehead, a long aquiline nose, which stands out in the centre of his face like the end of a triangle, having apparently been made for poking into things. When a new minister is settled over the church, the deacon waits upon him and tells him what he ought to do. If he cannot steer the minister, he becomes his enemy. He begins to plot against him. Seeds of disaffection are silently dropped in the minds of others; the weapons of innuendo and suspicion are freely used, but not a word of open, manly opposition is heard. . . . If the minister resigns, the deacon will follow him up like a sleuthhound, conducting a still hunt, holding on to the scent, never once getting off the trail, and never slackening his pace until he has struck his poisoned fangs into his victim. Should his quondam pastor appear as a candidate before a vacant church, an anonymous letter will come to the church committee warning them that he is not a safe man, and his name will be mysteriously dropped." But enough! though much more to the same general effect might be quoted. One cannot but feel that in spite of any laudation that the preface may contain—for prefaces proverbially go unread—our elders and deacons are in this book "wounded in the house of their friends."

Wooster, Ohio.

CHALMERS MARTIN.

QUIET TALKS ON PRAYER. By S. D. GORDON.

Most of us will agree with the author that we never find time for prayer save as we make time for it. Generally we do not make time because we lack faith in prayer. It is like a breath of tonic atmosphere to find one who has so firm a faith in the power of intercessory prayer. The reader may not always accept the writer's philosophy, as, for example, when he says, in discussing the question of prayer influencing God, "It does not influence His purpose. It does influence His action"; but these times are not often. Of course this is a practical book, and does not pretend to be a theological treatise. No Christian can fail to have his faith in prayer and his zeal in its use stirred by this volume. Especially impressive is the first chapter on "The Meaning and Mission of Prayer," while every student of the Christ will welcome the careful, sympathetic study of "Jesus' Habit of Prayer" in the last chapter. Certainly it is a book to read—and ponder—in these days of evangelistic activity and anxious inquiry for ways to persuade men.

Princeton.

W. B. SHEDDAN.

THE LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN. By G. CAMPBELL MORGAN, D.D.

A certain professor of rhetoric used to tell his students that the chief question an author has to settle is whether he can keep from writing. The same test should apply in devotional literature. Judged by this standard one doubts whether Dr. Morgan would ever have published this book. Of its six chapters on the life of the Christian, only two, the ones on its value and its testing, are

really understandable—and none are inevitable. It goes without saying that the book abounds with dogmatism rather than life. But its chief blemish is its obscurity. If we are to have many more Morgan books, we shall need a Morgan Society to tell the rest of us busy mortals what the books mean. Listen: "Sincerity is the simplicity of righteousness based on the sublimity of love. Sincerity simply means perfect simplicity, not the simplicity of superficiality, but the simplicity of sublimity." Perfectly pellucid in its sublime simplicity, isn't it? With what satisfaction one turns to the beautiful, skillfully wrought, soul-stirring pages of such a book as Dr. Matheson's *Times of Retirement*—type of the devotional literature that ignores neither earth nor heaven.

Princeton.

W. B. SHEDDAN.

OUR PEOPLE OF FOREIGN SPEECH. A Handbook distinguishing and describing those in the United States whose native tongue is other than English. With particular reference to religious work among them. By SAMUEL McLANAHAN. New York, etc.: Fleming H. Revell Company. Pp. 105. 50 cents net.

This small volume is described accurately in its subtitle. It will fulfill the hope expressed in the author's Preface "that it may prove a handy reference book for all engaged in work for people of foreign speech, a text-book for Missionary Study Classes, a source of information for the general reader, and for all a means of stimulating missionary interest and activity on behalf of the class of which it treats." The chapters are brief and compact, showing great industry in collecting facts and equal clearness in presenting them. The first contains a general treatment of "the greatest migration of people in historic times." Among the interesting parallels no mention is made of the Hebrew migration from Egypt to Canaan, although their estimated one or two millions would only bear out the author's description of the twenty-one millions that have come to this country in the last eighty years. The present seriousness of the problem presented to the Church in this connection is shown by the simple statement that from the decade 1861-70 to the decade 1891-1900, the percentage of the more desirable immigrants from the British Islands, Germany, Scandinavia and Canada has decreased from ninety-one to forty-one, while during the same period that of the less desirable coming from Austria-Hungary, Italy, Poland and Russia has increased from one per cent. to fifty per cent. The body of the book takes up the immigration by races: the Teutonic group, the Finns and Magyars, the Slavic group, the Jews, those speaking the Romanic tongues, those speaking the tongues of the Levant, the Chinese and Japanese, and some older residents. The facts concerning these various groups and the work that has been done for their evangelization are noted. One would not be warranted in drawing any inference as to the author's imperialistic or anti-imperialistic attitude from the fact that the various Filipino races are not mentioned among OUR People of Foreign Speech. Interesting charts, showing the distribution of the foreign-born living in the United States and the relative numbers of the different nationalities, close the volume. It should prove a useful handbook.

Princeton.

JOSEPH H. DULLES.

THE NAMES ON THE GATES OF PEARL, AND OTHER STUDIES. By the Rev. C. H. WALLER, M.A. Third Edition Enlarged. London: Marshall Brothers, Keswick House, Paternoster Row, E. C. 8vo, pp. 196.

This is a series of sketches of the founders of the twelve tribes of Israel, together with a number of chapters on various other topics. The title is, therefore, one

of those blind titles, such as Ruskin was so accustomed to place at the head of his books, that do not clearly indicate the nature of the volume. The sketches are each a treating of its title from the strictly Scriptural point of view—a careful and discriminating comparing of Scripture with Scripture; and they contain many suggestive and helpful passages. The book is, however, singularly lacking in imagination and general sprightliness.

Cranford, N. J.

GEORGE FRANCIS GREENE.

OLD TRUTHS NEWLY ILLUSTRATED. By HENRY GRAHAM, D.D. New York: Eaton & Mains; Cincinnati: Jennings & Graham. Pp. 229.

A collection of about three hundred illustrations that have been used in sermons in the course of the author's ministry. These are often homely, but they have the marks of effectiveness. They seem almost entirely to have been culled from experience rather than from books. Apparently the author has kept in contact with men and has been a good observer of the world of sense. Here is a characteristic paragraph, illustrative of the dangers in marriage when both parties are strong-willed: "Two great, strong trees growing too near together chafe and fret each other. In fact, it is on record that two such trees in a high wind chafed their branches together until they set each other on fire. Such results are not utterly unknown in human relations." The little book has a good topical index.

Cranford, N. J.

GEORGE FRANCIS GREENE.

FAMOUS MEN OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. By MORTON BRYAN WHARTON, D.D., Author of *Famous Women of the Old Testament*, *Famous Women of the New Testament*, *European Notes*, *Pictures from a Pastorium*, etc. New York: E. B. Treat & Company, Office of the *Treasury Magazine*, 241-243 West Twenty-third street, 1903. 8vo, pp. 333.

Dr. Wharton has given us seventeen lectures on as many of the famous men of the Old Testament. These lectures are conspicuous for their orthodoxy and for their popular and often colloquial style. They are instructive, and when delivered they must have been interesting and stimulating.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

LITTLE TALKS ON POWER. By S. D. GORDON. 220 pages.

The writer has evidently put his whole heart in this book. His intensely earnest and spiritual personality is impressed upon the reader in an unusual way. Scarcely failing to help any who are truly desirous of usefulness in the affairs of the kingdom, the book is also calculated to arouse those who are indifferent in these affairs to a questioning attitude in regard to them.

Its illustrations, frequently drawn from the realm of science, without being sensational, are well worked up, of peculiar interest, up to date and striking. *Little Talks on Power* will repay a thoughtful reading and is a distinctly valuable addition to homiletical literature.

Newport, R. I.

RICHARD ARNOLD GREENE.

SABBATH-SCHOOL MISSIONS IN WISCONSIN. By Rev. JOSEPH BROWN. With an Introduction by Rev. JAMES A. WORDEN, D.D. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication and Sabbath-school Work, 1904. Cloth, 12mo, pp. 163.

This interesting work is a valuable addition to missionary literature. The book, written out of fullness of experience and fullness of heart, is an inspiring record of fifteen years of mission work by Mr. Brown, as Presbyterian Synodical Sunday-school Missionary for Wisconsin. The Preface concisely describes the

volume as "a collection of pictures of actual Sabbath-school mission work performed along these years and in the order in which it was done." Such a book must do much to deepen the conviction of the importance of Sabbath-school missions; for it stirs us by what has been done and by what needs to be done, and in telling us how the work of evangelization in vast outlying "neighborhoods" can be done.

Newport, R. I.

GEORGE WHITEFIELD MEAD.

VII.—GENERAL LITERATURE.

THE SHAIKHS OF MOROCCO IN THE XVITH CENTURY. By T. H. WEIR, B.D., M.R.A.S., Author of *A Short History of the Hebrew Text of the Old Testament*. With Preface by JAMES ROBERTSON, D.D., Professor of Hebrew and Semitic Languages in the University of Glasgow. With a Map. Edinburgh: George A. Morton; London: Simpkin, Marshall & Co., Ltd., 1904. 12mo; pp. xlvii, 316.

This book is based on the Arabic of Ibn Askar, a "Moorish Boswell," who devoted himself to collecting and recording anecdotes of the shaikhs or religious leaders of Morocco in the sixteenth century. Here are set down the virtues and attainments of several score of these learned and pious men. We are told what books they wrote, what verses they composed, what *bon mots* they uttered, what hospitalities they dispensed, what alms they bestowed, what pilgrimages they made, what honors they enjoyed, what persecutions they endured, what public services they rendered, what predictions they uttered, what blessings and curses they pronounced, what miracles they wrought. Himself a shaikh, Ibn Askar treats his theme with enthusiasm and lays on his colors with a bold hand. A modern reader of his pages is likely to wonder how so small a country as Morocco could, within a single century, have produced so numerous a company of men extraordinary for their learning and piety, not to say for their superhuman powers. And obviously there is much exaggeration in the account, though perhaps it was not intentional. Ibn Askar was not strong in sifting evidence. If a man told him that a certain shaikh was accustomed to provide daily for his visitors "seven hundred sheep, two hundred oxen and twenty camels," or that each of the larger pots in the kitchen of another shaikh "would serve to cook an ox or two oxen at one time," down went the statement in the chronicler's notebook without more ado. It will not be wondered at that a mind so hospitable to the incredible found miracles in plenty with which to enliven his pages. These shaikhs work miracles with one hand, so to say. A beggar had but to appeal to them, a highwayman to attack them, a rival shaikh to worst them in an argument, a sultan to do them some despite, a disciple to ask a boon, and straightway a miracle is forthcoming to meet the need or discomfit the opponent or avenge the insult or deliver from the peril.

But the fact that our critical sense refuses to accept the miracles with which Ibn Askar's pages bristle does not detract from the real value of this book. What we may get from it, and what it is chiefly worth while to get, is not detailed statement of fact about dead and gone Mohammedan mystics, but an atmosphere, an intellectual and religious atmosphere, one in which the allegation and acceptance of miracles wrought for trivial reasons, or even from motives not altogether praiseworthy, seems natural enough. As Dr. Robertson has said in his Preface, these sketches take us behind the scenes and show us the working of at least some of the forces that have wrought out, and are still working out, that wonderful sum total of results which we call Islam. Morocco in the sixteenth century

seems to have been a *mare clausum* where the Koran had untrammelled opportunity to develop its legitimate results in the sphere of the intellectual and spiritual life.

But the book under review has another value in that it presents a striking illustration of the subtle and baffling difference between the manner of thought of the East and that prevalent in the West, between the intellectual processes characteristic of the Semitic world and those of our Græco-Roman-Teutonic world. Who of us has not felt this difference as we have read the rabbinical literature, for example? How often the most applauded utterances of these Oriental thinkers have seemed to us irrelevant or pointless or absolutely unmeaning! How often has their reasoning appeared to us impossible to be followed! Is it we that are so dull, we have been tempted to ask, or is it they? And even with respect to certain portions of the Old Testament, the Wisdom books in particular, we are conscious of this vague but real difference between the sacred writer's mental processes and our own. Could we but grasp the secret of this difference we should be set forward on our way to the understanding of these "dark sayings," and anything that helps us to grasp it is of worth. We may even say (and perhaps this is all that we can say of *The Shaikhs of Morocco*) that anything is of worth that reminds us that such a difference exists; for at least every such reminder may serve to make us thankful that, under the influence of the Spirit of inspiration, the writers of the Scriptures as a whole were able to rise above the limitations of race and time and speak in a language intelligible to the universal mind and heart of man.

Wooster, O.

CHALMERS MARTIN. .

BY NILE AND EUPHRATES. By H. VALENTINE GEERS. With Maps and Illustrations. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons. Pp. viii, 355. Price, \$3.50.

The author was a member of the staff of the Babylonian Expedition of the University of Pennsylvania, and records the incidents of his connection with the party which went to Nippur in 1895, which resulted in scarcely anything but a pleasant trip and a safe return.

After this he joined Prof. Petrie in Egypt, and obtained experience under that veteran excavator which stood him in good stead when he next visited the basin of the Euphrates.

It is scarcely worth while to more than refer to the contents of the first few chapters; for while they are pleasantly written, and in an interesting style, they do not add anything distinctly new from a scientific point of view. Every one traveling in these regions meets with interesting experiences, because the contrast between the civilization of these regions and our own differs so widely. But these can hardly be classed as discovery and adventure, particularly in this age when it is rather hard to make discoveries, and adventures have become somewhat commonplace.

The most valuable portion of the book is perhaps chapter ten, in which an idea of the ruins and the present state of exploration are given. The rest of the book is mainly devoted to the narrative of the experiences of the writer and the party.

It is to be regretted that the open wounds of this subject of the exploration of Nippur should be again disturbed. This subject has been before the public for some sixteen years, and the bitter personalities which have been indulged in might almost be said to have had their origin in the fanatical soil which the early investigators of this region were cultivating, and it is a pity that men who have all done good work cannot find some *modus vivendi* while prosecuting scientific work. Of course, it is absolutely impossible to avoid some mistakes in the early stages of such a piece of work, and it would be difficult to prove that mistakes

have not been made in every stage of its progress. The greatest mistake of all was the sending out of an expedition inadequately equipped either in funds or personnel for the prosecution of what was known to be an undertaking of considerable proportions. But this is not the first, and probably will not be the last, expedition sent out under just such circumstances. All such parties have difficulties to encounter, far beyond the conception of most of the stay-at-home students of the results obtained.

In the first place, they go to a region to which it is difficult to obtain a passport on account of the ugly suspicions and hatred which attach to every foreigner. An illustration is given of the seriousness with which such fanatical ideas have taken hold of the people. The writer speaks of an Arab pilgrim who threw herself overboard when she found that the valve of the pump which drew water on board of the vessel was made of pigskin. This was too much for her religious feelings, and nothing short of death apparently could wipe out the remembrance of her offense.

In the next place, after a permit has been obtained, it is difficult to know just how far the permit allows you to go; for the rulers of this region claim everything to be found beyond a certain distance below the surface of the earth, and also everything in the air above a certain height.

Then there is also the difficulty encountered in the line of breaking in workmen for such delicate work. From all this it is quite apparent that the personal differences of the earlier expeditions should be once and for all decently buried.

The writer refers to them in a very guarded sort of way, but the sooner the parties in interest realize that the public is getting tired of books which record almost on every page the most systematic and studied abuse of fellow-workers, the better it will be for all concerned.

Princeton.

WILLIAM LIBBEY.

ANTS AND SOME OTHER INSECTS. By Dr. AUGUST FOREL. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1904.

This little book takes three-fourths of its forty-nine pages in summarizing the results of the investigations of its author and others, as proving that ants and bees can remember places, people and events, and have a will of their own, and predilections of their own, so that they should be regarded as in a sense reasoning creatures. It is preceded by a synopsis of the author's views on psychology, which appears to us to prove that it should have been a better work if that part had been omitted.

On the part devoted to Insects it is in line with recent researches; and it is strange that the best of these researches appear to be entirely unknown to the author; nor has his American translator deemed it necessary to supplement his work. Rev. Doctor Henry C. McCook's work on the *Ants of Texas*, specimens of which he kept in cages at his home, beside going to Texas to watch them in their own homes, has shown that in some respects they surpass most of the other animals for intelligence. In the ant communities McCook finds that they work hard, and wisely and honestly; and that they are very cleanly and generally obliging in assisting each other in their laborious toilet. It is a pity that all this seems to have been missed by Forel, as it coincides entirely with his ideas. It is a pity that he also overlooked another, an older authority, which is probably not unknown even to Swiss biologists, in which the ant is cited as an example of wisdom, because "without chief or overseer or ruler she provideth her meat in summer and gathereth her food in harvest." Not very long ago the biologists fancied that Solomon had erred in this matter; but they have found that he was all right. It is to be regretted that the Open Court people make up what they call a Religion of Science Library, with such omissions.

In the earlier part of the book the author insists very forcibly on the intelligence of mammalian animals, such as the dog. Here, too, we think that the facts bear him out, Cartesians, antique and contemporary, notwithstanding. As a general principle we may be certain that social animals, like ants and dogs, shall all more or less develop the social faculties and the social virtues. The memory of my lamented dog would rise up to condemn me, if I did not confess that he had a sort of reason. When I asked him to shut the door, he understood me and obeyed; though on one occasion he went to the wrong door and tried to shut one that could not shut. When he was lying on bed beside his mistress, and overheard her lament that another being, a human, had forgot to shut the door, he promptly jumped down, ran to the door and shut it, and then returned to the bed with a look that said, "What a good and intelligent dog I am?" When he wished admittance into the house, he went to my window in the *rear*, and gave a low bark, which I understood as his word for "Open the door," and then he ran round to the *front* door, for he knew that it was the one that I should open. I have often said to my class that if dogs had hands like monkeys, and could talk like parrots, people would all fancy that they were of our own sort and immortal.

All this is plain sailing; but Dr. Forel's ideas about life and mind are, in my opinion, contraindicated by the facts so far as known. He makes thought merely a vibration of brain-matter, and gives us a nice Greek term for the thought-wave, which he supposes to be only a brain-wave. Men like Fiske tried to demonstrate that this view conflicts with our doctrine of the conservation of energy; but Forel, without explanation, states that it is demonstrated by that very doctrine. Recent discoveries in radium will, we opine, teach us all to be cautious in drawing deductions from our old ideas of energy. And all the experiments on neuropsychology have failed hitherto to establish what is here assumed without proof.

The book is equally unfortunate in making *life* merely physico-chemical energy. That was a favorite view some time ago; but it is becoming *passé*, the physiologists condemning it. Dr. S. J. Meltzer, of New York, in his recent Presidential address before the physiologists at St. Louis, takes that as one of the chief points. He explains how the chemico-physical theory of life was at first helpful to physiology, though fundamentally unsound; but he considers it at the present time as the greatest obstacle in the way of progress in that study. Here, again, it is to be regretted that the Open Court people crowd their Religion-Science Library with psychological discussions by writers who are not up to date in the questions which they discuss.

G. MACLOSKIE.

CARDINAL NEWMAN. By WILLIAM BARRY, D.D. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1904. 8vo; pp. viii, 225. Illustrated, \$1.00 net.

In gauging this work on the celebrated English cardinal, it is, perhaps, more important than will be the case with most of the members of this series of *Literary Lives* to remember just what the volumes in question propose to do. These studies are not meant to be general biographies, but "the special aim of supplying full critical and expository estimates has been kept steadily in view." And if the whole series is to be judged in the light of this fact, the volume before us is no doubt entitled to special indulgence because of the inherent difficulty of its task. For, after all, Newman's life is so enigmatical, so full of controversial interests, so replete with apparently irreconcilable contradictions in the man himself, so far beyond the reach of the methods which ordinarily suffice to secure a psychologically satisfactory analysis and interpretation of character, that it is quite vain to expect, within the compass of two hundred pages, anything like an adequate treatment of even the leading problems in this long and singular career. Dr. Barry writes from the fullness of an original and thoroughly sym

pathetic study of his engaging theme, but his point of view is too predominantly that of a purely literary interest to permit him to do full justice to the questions that centre in Newman's religious nature, his theological conceptions, and his ecclesiastical relations.

But with Newman the English man of letters we become quite intimately acquainted. The origin and occasion of each masterpiece is made clear, and its contents sympathetically and broadly, but not always fairly and adequately, interpreted. The cardinal's unique and justly celebrated style is a frequent theme for felicitous and appreciative characterization. Our author possesses, moreover, that large literary cultivation that enables him constantly to enrich his pages with comparisons and contrasts between Newman and other great writers in ancient and modern literatures. Many a paragraph is written with a brilliant suggestiveness and poetic beauty. Of Newman's sermons Barry says: "His discourses were poems, but transcripts, too, from the soul, reasonings in a heavenly dialectic, and views of life, seen under innumerable lights, as from some Pisgah-mount of vision." We agree with his judgment of the *Tracts* as an essentially ephemeral product, and with his verdict that Newman's "undying fame rests on the sermons which he published as an Anglican or a Catholic; on certain of his poems; on the originality of thought and grace of manner which distinguish the *Essay on Development*; on the University Lectures; and on the copious autobiography which, running through his correspondence, gives a singular charm to *Loss and Gain*, is not absent from *Callista*, and culminates in that heart-subduing work of genius, the *Apologia pro Vita Sua*." And concerning all of these, we repeat, the reader may gain from Dr. Barry a clear conception and an essentially fair interpretation.

We feel bound to say, therefore, that this critical treatment of Newman's literary product is instructive, penetrating, judicious, and withal highly entertaining. But we also believe that Dr. Abbott, whom our author somewhat unjustly regards as the *advocatus diaboli* against Newman, must still be consulted as a necessary supplement by all who would know the full truth about the famous cardinal, by all who cannot allow their admiration for Newman as a man of letters to blind them to a certain weakness in his intellectual nature and to a quality in his moral constitution which we find it hard, in spite of Dr. Barry, to distinguish from insincerity. Nor can we refrain from expressing our regret that our writer's style, though always fresh and often strikingly vigorous and brilliant in its beauty, is not infrequently marred by the presence of ambiguous pronouns, loosely connected prepositional phrases, and combinations of elements so disparate that the unity of many a sentence is destroyed. These defects are quite as conspicuous as the literary excellencies to which reference has been made.

Princeton.

F. W. LOETSCHER.

CORRESPONDENCE REGARDING THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND RUSSIA (1903-1904). Presented to the Imperial Diet, March, 1904. Translation. Paper, pp. 59.

This informing brochure contains the explanatory speech of Baron Komura, Japanese Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, before the House of Representatives, March 23, 1904, in which is presented a brief *résumé* of the efforts at negotiation between the cabinets of St. Petersburg and Tokio. The full text of this speech is followed by a document in which appear all the details of the negotiations as set forth in a full and exact reproduction of the official correspondence between Baron Komura at Tokio and Mr. Kurino, the Japanese Minister at St. Petersburg. While it is not to be overlooked that the view here obtained is strictly *ex parte*, yet it is impossible for the unbiased reader to peruse this correspondence—extending from July 28, 1903, to February 9, 1904. the date on

which Mr. Kurino finally cabled Baron Komura that, in obedience to his peremptory instructions from Tokio, he should "withdraw with his staff and students on the 10th instant"—without feeling that Japan made every honorable endeavor toward a peaceful and perfect adjustment of the whole question, while, on the other hand, a policy of indirection and procrastination and tergiversation was being studiously pursued at St. Petersburg. The acuteness of the situation came on with painful swiftness at the last. We believe that the printing of this pamphlet at Washington and the distribution of it in this country will tend to confirm our approval of Japan's course in beginning the war just when she did, and to strengthen the sympathetic hope that Japan will win out in the end.

Trenton.

HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

THE WHITE SHIELD. By CAROLINE ATWATER MASON, Author of a *Lily of France*, etc. Philadelphia: The Griffith & Rowland Press, 1904. 8vo; xvi, 160.

This is a story based on the *Acta Pauli et Theklae*. "This document, itself not later than about A.D. 140, was an amplified and embellished version of a much earlier tale. The original form of the story is proved by internal evidence to have been produced little later than the middle of the first century A.D." "The *Acta* possesses very great value as being the only extant literary work which throws light on the character of popular Christianity and on its first impact on the social fabric in Asia Minor in the age of the Apostle Paul." "As here given, the story of Thekla conforms in every essential particular to the earliest known and authentic version of the *Acta*." It is well told, and its interest is enhanced by five admirable full-page illustrations.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

MANUAL OF PHYSICAL EXERCISES FOR SCHOOL AND HOME. Arranged by F. RECHLIN. St. Louis, Mo.: Concordia Pub. Co., 1904. 8vo, pp. 145.

A collection of carefully graded exercises, drills, marches and calisthenics with accompanying songs for the Primary, Intermediate and Grammar grades.

Princeton.

PAUL MARTIN.

POEMS. By WILFRID EARL CHASE. Madison, Wis.: W. E. Chase., 1903. 8vo, pp. 18.

Of the six poems four are religious, two upon nature. They are of varying poetic excellence. They preach to those in bewilderment and distress the comfort and strengthening faith in the all-wise Father and the final good. The verses entitled "Good Cheer," and addressed to the diverse types of the insane, are marked by insight, sympathy and appropriate messages.

Princeton.

PAUL MARTIN.

TALES FROM WONDERLAND. By RUDOLF BAUNBACH. Translated by HELEN B. DOLE, and Adapted for American Children by WILLIAM S. M. SILBER. New York: A. Lovell & Company, 1903. 12mo; pp. vi, 122. Cloth

A series of eight prettily told stories, in a manner suggestive of *Alice in Wonderland*, in quaint and pleasing settings of native descriptions and word-pictures. The stories are highly imaginative and adapted to childhood's readiness to respond to what is fanciful and mystical. Some phases of life are touched upon which may well seem to lie beyond the scope of child-life, and where they do not they ought. But the tone of this little volume is pleasing and in the main wholesome, and well calculated to bring good to the world of little folks, for whom it was prepared.

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J. HENDRIK DE VRIES.

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